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ABSTRACT
THE "NEGRO MARKET" AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN
NEW YORK CITY, 1930-1965
MAY 2006
JULIA L. SANDY-BAILEY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kathy Peiss
This dissertation examines the "Negro market" and consumer activism within the
context of the black freedom movement in New York City from 1930 to 1965. The
"Negro market," a term used by the advertising industry to indicate a racially defined
consumer market that was separate from the mainstream one, first emerged during the
Great Depression. It expanded during World War II when the government gave more
attention to racial matters and actively supported corporate attention to black consumers.
In its first three decades, "Negro market" advertisers sought to reach African Americans
without alienating whites, and strategies were shaped by advertising agencies,
corporations, black media, and black marketing experts. During these years "Negro
market" campaigns were conducted solely in black media. Although this reinforced the
segregation of the consumer market, it did result in positive advertising images of blacks
in the black press. Black protests in the early 1 960s resulted in the integration of a small
number of ads in mainstream media, changing the exclusively segregated approach of
advertisers.
viii
Black New Yorkers used their consumer power as a tool in the black freedom
movement, a movement that included campaigns for employment, integration, and
positive black cultural portrayals. They also worked for consumer rights such as
integrated commercial spaces, fair prices, and quality merchandise, and understood these
rights as an important part of their struggle for racial equality. Groups from a variety of
political perspectives - including housewives leagues, the NAACP, CORE, the African
Nationalist Pioneer Movement, and the National Negro Congress - took part in these
activities. Consumer weapons such as picketing and boycotts were only one aspect of
black rights campaigns, and were often very effective. But there were limits to the
usefulness of consumer action.
By looking at business trade journals, the black press, advertisements, and the
records of civil rights organizations, advertising agencies, corporations, and
governmental agencies, this study traces the early history of the "Negro market,"
demonstrates the importance of consumer rights to black New Yorkers, and also shows
the limitations of consumption as a method for achieving racial equality.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
In 1946 James Farmer, founder and director of the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), published an article in The Crisis titled "Unsheathing the Consumer Sword,"
about the ways in which Southern blacks could use consumer power in their struggle for
racial equality. Farmer argued that African Americans had been led to believe "the
fiction that their ability to consume rests of necessity upon the white man," and that more
than loss of life, blacks feared "that the bare necessities of life will be snatched from
them if they do not respect the southern code of behavior." Afraid of losing jobs,
monetary support for schools and churches, a market for their crops, and access to
consumer goods, Southern blacks were reluctant to challenge racial inequality. Farmer
insisted, however, that African Americans had a potential weapon. "The dragon of
segregation in the South has a soft under-belly," he wrote, and "upon the Negro as
consumer the South has a great and real dependence. That is the fact which Dixie must
hide from the Negro himself in order to maintain its vertical caste system." 1
Because segregation had hidden the power of black consumers it was "vulnerable
at that very point. Once the . . . myth is exploded, not so much in theory as through
demonstration, the mortality of the segregation dragon is at least in sight." Calling
untapped black consumer power the "sword to destroy the lumbering beast," Farmer
suggested establishing consumer and producer cooperatives in order to challenge white
control of Southern economies. He was advocating, in essence, the establishment of a
separate black economy but one whose ultimate goal was integration and equality. By
eliminating what he termed "consumer slavery," black cooperatives would "force more
1 James Farmer, "Unsheathing the Consumer Sword," The Crisis 53 (December 1946): 362-364.
1
civilized treatment of the Negro by the South." Moreover, black economic independence
would be "an important opening wedge toward the elimination of segregation" and
would eventually lead to a "raceless system of production, distribution, and
consumption." African Americans would be liberated as workers, producers, and
consumers.
2
Although consumption is often left out of the history of the civil rights movement,
Farmer was not the only black leader to call attention to consumer issues and power. 3 By
1946, the year Farmer's article was published, African Americans had been wielding
their "consumer sword" for over two decades. In northern and southern communities
black activists incorporated consumer boycotts and picket lines into many aspects of their
racial equality campaigns, and with these weapons challenged employment
discrimination, legal and de facto segregation, racial violence, and even unfair consumer
treatment. And although Farmer's strategy of producer and consumer cooperatives was
not widely utilized, in some communities African Americans were able to establish and
maintain these ventures and a few black leaders even advocated the creation of a separate
black economy.
Consumption, both as an issue of importance to African Americans and as a
useful tool for black rights, deserves a place in the history of the black freedom
2
Ibid.
3 While most civil rights studies fail to mention consumption a few recent works draw attention to
its role in the civil rights movement. See, Robert E. Weems, Jr., Desegregating the Dollar: African
American Consumerism in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1998);
Kathleen Michelle Newman, "Critical Mass: Advertising, Audiences, and Consumer Activism in the Age
of Radio" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1997); Ted Ownby, American Dreams in Mississippi: Consumers,
Poverty, and Culture 1830-1 998 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Grace Hale,
Making Whiteness: The Culture ofSegregation in the South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Paul R.
Mullins, Race and Affluence: an Archeology ofAfrican America and Consumer Culture (New York:
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of
Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003).
2
movement. This study examines the role of consumption in the lives and activism of
African Americans by focusing on the black community in New York City from 1930 to
1 965. Like their counterparts around the country, black New Yorkers considered
consumer rights vitally important to the well-being of their community. While some
historians argue that consumer issues served as a substitute for "real" political and
economic issues, African Americans understood consumption as an important element in
the struggle for freedom and equality. 4 How they were treated as consumers had real and
symbolic importance in their lives, and high prices, merchandise quality, and access to
public commercial sites affected their individual and collective economic strength.
Studies and surveys often confirmed that prices were higher in New York's black
neighborhoods, and many groups worked to change this through direct action protests,
negotiation, legal channels, and governmental lobbying. The meaning and importance of
consumption was not a fixed concept among black New Yorkers, and groups across the
political and ideological spectrum understood it, and used it, in very different ways.
4
Studies that argued consumption limited political resistance and promoted values of self-
fulfillment over group interests include Steve Fraser, 'The 'Labor Question'," and Nelson Lichtenstein,
"From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the
Postwar Era," in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall ofthe New Deal Order (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989); T.J. Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising
and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture," in Richard Wrightman Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears
eds., The Culture ofConsumption (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983); William Leach, Land ofDesire:
Merchants, Power and the Rise ofa New American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1 993); Susan
Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making ofthe American Mass Market (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989). This argument is extended to the black community in Weems, Desegregating the Dollar.
Recent studies, however, challenge this interpretation and argue instead that consumption was an arena for
political protest, see Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: the Laboring ofAmerican Culture in the
Twentieth-Century (New York: Verso, 1996); Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in
Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cohen, A Consumers' Republic;
Susan Glenn, Daughters ofthe Shtetl: Life and Labor in the Immigrant Generation (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990); Hale, Making Whiteness: Ownby, American Dreams in Mississippi; Kathleen
Newman, Radio Active: Advertising and Consumer Activism, 1935 - 1947 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004).
3
Consumer weapons were also used in campaigns that extended well beyond
consumer rights. While only one tool in a wide-ranging struggle for racial equality, black
New Yorkers frequently turned to consumer power in their campaigns for greater
employment, in support of black-owned businesses, to fight segregation, to assist black
rights campaigns in other cities and regions, and to promote more positive portrayals of
African Americans in popular culture. This dissertation analyzes those battles by asking
how consumer tools were used and to what extent they were effective. Which groups
were more willing than others to use boycotts and picket lines, in what campaigns were
they successful, and what limited or enhanced the chances for success?
As with consumer rights campaigns, political ideologies and goals shaped the
ways in which activists incorporated these tools into their larger freedom struggles.
Consumerist tactics were part of the work of churches, liberal civil rights groups, black
nationalists, leftists, and trade unionists, as well as local businesspeople, black media, and
black marketing executives. Although these groups often disagreed and sometimes
openly fought one another, at times they formed coalitions to present a unified challenge
to the status quo. Considering the differences within the black community helps shed
light on competing understandings of the function of consumer power.
My study starts in the midst of the Great Depression, when black communities
organized around consumer issues and capitalized on spending power to a degree not
seen before in American society. The 1930s also witnessed the emergence of the "Negro
market," a term used by the advertising industry to connote a racially defined consumer
market that differed from the mainstream one. Advertisers turned their attention to black
consumers in search of an untapped domestic market to help them weather the severe
4
economic crisis of the decade, giving birth to what would be a complicated relationship
between the advertising industry and black communities. Many individuals and groups
helped direct the formulation of "Negro market" campaigns, including advertising
agencies, corporate manufacturers, industry observers, and government agencies.
African Americans were also involved in "Negro market" activities and were considered
by advertisers to be automatic experts on black consumers. Black media, salespeople,
and advertising professionals promoted the importance of black consumption to both the
advertising industry and African Americans, and their influence depended in part on an
understanding of the "Negro market" as distinct from the mainstream consumer market.
Furthermore, this study explores how the "Negro market" was created through the
interaction of the producers and consumers of this market. Early historical studies of the
marketplace emphasized the hegemonic impact of mass consumption by national
corporations, chain retailers, department stores, and the advertising industry. Historians
making these claims tended to focus on the producers of mass culture and assume passive
receptivity by individual consumers. 5 More recent work has challenged this assumption
by examining audience reception, and finds that consumers have mediated the values of
the mass market according to their own needs.
6
In this study black consumers in New
5
See Stuart Ewen, Captains ofConsciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots ofthe Consumer
Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976); Richard Fox and T.J. Jackson Lears, The Culture of
Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880 - 1980 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983);
Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making ofthe American Mass Market (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989); Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story ofMass Marketing in America (New York:
Basic Books, 1990); William Leach, Land ofDesire: Merchants and the Rise ofa New American Culture
(New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
6
See Janice Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Cohen, Making a New Deal; Kathy Peiss, Hope in a Jar:
The Making ofAmerica's Beauty Culture (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998); Susan Douglas,
Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination (New York: Times Books, 1 999); Newman, Radio
Active.
5
York not only adapted mass consumption to their lives but also shaped the direction of
the "Negro market." How black rights campaigns influenced understandings of the
"Negro market," and the activities of advertisers targeting it, are concerns addressed in
my dissertation. As the advertising industry sought to attract black consumers, to whom
did they turn for advice, what racialized assumptions did they draw on, and did those
assumptions change over time? By exploring these questions this study contributes to,
and complicates, discussions about the formation of mass culture.
The marketing campaigns that emerged out of the interaction between black
consumers and the advertising industry differed significantly from general marketing
campaigns - especially in their depictions of African Americans. In the early twentieth
century, the use of blacks as stereotypes, caricatures, or servants was firmly established in
ads that targeted a general audience. In mass media this practice largely continued until
the 1960s. Historians evaluating these images argue that they constructed a vision of "the
consumer" as white and thus reinforced a system of white supremacy and black
subservience.
7
Including an examination of black media, however, reveals another story
- one in which African Americans were, in fact, constructed as consumers. Throughout
the 1940s and 1950s businesses sought to reach black customers without alienating
whites, and struck this balance by creating campaigns that were placed only in black
7
See Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Wayfor Modernity, 1920-1940
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); T.J. Jackson Lears, Fables ofAbundance: A Cultural
History ofAdvertising in America (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Jan Nederveen Pieterse, White on
Black: Images ofAfrica and Blacks in Western Popular Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1990); Jannette L. Dates and William Barlow, Split Image: African Americans in the Mass Media
(Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1990); Marilyn Kern Foxworth Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben,
andRastus: Blacks in Advertising, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1994); Jason Chambers, "Getting a Job and Changing an Image: African-Americans in the Advertising
Industry, 1920-1975," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2001); Faith Davis Ruffins, "Reflecting on
Ethnic Imagery in the Landscape of Commerce, 1945-1975," in Getting and Spending: European and
American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century; Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, And Matthias
Judt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6
media. "Negro market" ads depicted African Americans as professionals, college
students, medical experts, sports heroes, celebrities, and as members of nuclear families -
in other words, as typical American consumers. These ads included African Americans
in the increasingly consumer-oriented vision of American society but confined that vision
to the black community. More than just a segmented market, the "Negro market" was
largely hidden from white America. 8 Although this practice would eventually be
questioned, the segregated nature of the "Negro market" was its defining characteristic
until the early 1960s. This study ends in 1965, and as such explores the initial stage in
which the separate "Negro market" was challenged by black activists but before those
challenges would involve direct action campaigns against advertising agencies
themselves.
Despite this segregation, the "Negro market" gave black activists a corporate
audience, and as interest in black consumption expanded in the postwar era African
Americans used the "Negro market" directly in their black freedom movement. As in
previous eras, activists achieved a number of victories in the postwar years but there were
also limitations to their success. Disagreements among black New Yorkers and their
organizations about the best direction for the community sometimes worked against their
overall efforts. Additionally, governmental and legal institutions were sometimes allies
in their work but could also impede their efforts. Furthermore, local stores, national
corporations, and advertising agencies resisted wholesale changes to their business
8
Most histories of the advertising industry argue that market segmentation did not occur until the
late 1950s, and that before that manufacturers and advertising agencies targeted a mass market that did not
differentiate among consumers. See Cohen, A Consumers ' Republic, chapter 7; Richard S. Tedlow, New
and Improved: The Story ofMass Marketing in America (New York: Basic Books, 1 990); Roland
Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Wayfor Modernity, 1920 - 1940 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985); T.J. Jackson Lears, Fables ofAbundance: A Cultural History of
Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
7
practices and strategies, and therefore progress was incremental, incomplete, and faced
frequent setbacks. Looking at these challenges and the ways in which black New
Yorkers utilized the "Negro market" as a justification for racial equality helps illuminate
the relationship between black expectations for American race relations and the use of
consumption in helping them fight for racial equality.
Finally, focusing this study on New York City is significant for several reasons.
Looking at the relationship between a local community and a national market complicates
understandings of how mass consumption has operated in American society. Instead of
assuming that communities were marketed to and responded in identical ways, this study
explores how the "Negro market" was locally executed and how advertisers adapted
national strategies to target black New Yorkers. At the height of the mass advertising
approach advertisers understood the importance of locally-focused campaigns. Choosing
New York City as the setting for a local study offers a particular advantage in that it was
home to Harlem, considered the capital of black America, and to Madison Avenue, the
center of the advertising industry. As such it offers a unique window into the intersection
of black rights campaigns and the work of advertisers.
The last advantage in studying New York City is that by doing so this study
contributes to the growing literature on the black freedom movement in the North. The
southern civil rights movement was for many years the almost exclusive focus of
historians, and northern communities were examined only with the rise of the black
power movement and the riots of the late 1960s. More recently, scholars have turned
their attention to northern communities and have found a rich, complex, and long history
of black struggles there; several historians focus on New York City, especially after
8
World War II. My dissertation contributes to this history by including consumer issues
and the "Negro market" as important elements in the black rights struggle. 9
Farmer's plea that southern blacks take up their "consumer swords" to create a
better life for themselves and their communities was relevant to northern blacks as well.
Throughout the thirty five years covered in this study, activists, business owners,
government officials, advertising executives - and consumers - faced each other within a
complex, dynamic, and contested urban society.
9
This work includes, Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds., Freedom North: Black
Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940 - 1980 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Jeanne F.
Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds., Groundwork: Local Blackfreedom Movements in America (New
York: New York University Press, 2005). Many new studies on northern race relations focus on New York
City, including Roger Sanjek, The Future of Us All: Race and Neighborhood Politics in New York City
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Steven Gregory, Black Corona: Race and the Politics ofPlace in
an Urban Community (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant
with Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn (New York Columbia University Press, 2000); Wendell
Pritchett, Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face ofthe Ghetto (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2002); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: the Strugglefor Civil Rights in
Postwar New York City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Julie Gallagher, "Women of Action,
In Action: The New Politics of Black Women in New York City, 1944-1972," (Ph.D. diss., University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, 2003).
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CHAPTER 1:
THE ORIGINS OF THE "NEGRO MARKET"
In 1936 Paul K. Edwards published an article in the journal Food Industries
,
urging national food manufacturers to market their products to black consumers. He
argued that "manufacturers generally think of the domestic market as being more or less
uniform in its characteristics. And they develop promotional and selling programs on the
basis of broad income divisions. This is the same as saying that racial, occupational and
psychological differences are not important." Opposing the "American mass approach"
system, Edwards insisted that in order to survive the Great Depression corporations
should expand their customer base to include consumers not easily reached through
traditional methods. And one of the most sizable of these overlooked groups, he argued,
was the "Negro market." 1
Edwards' claims occurred simultaneously with African Americans' own growing
awareness of the importance of black consumption. During the 1930s black communities
across the nation seized upon their spending power as a way to improve their
communities' economic condition. Consumption became contested political terrain as
blacks battled for employment and better treatment by merchants, supported black-owned
businesses, and challenged prevailing assumptions which judged them insignificant
consumers. Like African Americans in other urban centers, black New Yorkers fought on
the frontlines of these campaigns, and their activities helped shape the "Negro market" in
the 1930s. Several issues, in fact, influenced the growth and course of this black
consumer market: the economic condition of Harlem and the effects of the Great
1
Paul K. Edwards, "Negro Market Merits More Attention," Food Industries, November 1936,
565.
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I depression, the advice and assumptions or "Negro market" proponents within the
advertising industry, the eonsumer aetivism of I larlemites, and the strategies ofthe first
national manufacturers who marketed to blaek New Yorkers.
The u Ne«ro ( apltal"
"I larlem, a bite off Manhattan Island, is ealled the Negro capital," wrote Roi
Ottley in his 1943 study of blaek New York, "New World A -Coming ": Inside Muck
America, "hut it is more," he continued,
it is the nerve center of advancing Black Ameriea. It is the fountainhead of mass
movements. From it Hows the progressive vitality of Negro Life. I larlem is, as
well, a eross seetion of life in Blaek Ameriea a little from here, there, and
everywhere. It is at once the eapital ol" clowns, cults, and cabarets, and the
cultural and intellectual hub of the Negro world, liy turns Harlem is provincial,
worldly, cosmopolitan, and naive sometimes cynical. From here, though, the
Negro looks upon the world with audacious eyes. 2
Drawn by the promise ol jobs and fewer racial restrictions, New York City's black
population rose dramatically at the turn ol the twentieth century. Part of the (ireat
Migration of African Americans from the rural south to northern cities, from 1X90 to
1920 New York City's blaek population increased from 36,000 to 152,000, by which
time Harlem had become the predominant black neighborhood in Manhattan.
1 Crowded
by racial segregation into the area bounded on the east and west by the I larlem River and
Amsterdam Avenue, and on the north and south by I 55 and I 10 streets, I larlem
2
Roi Ottley, "New WorldA-i 'ominy, ": Inside Black America (New York: Houghton, Mi I'll in
Company, 1943; reprint, Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1945), I . (page citations are to the reprint
edition)
'Charles E. Hall, Negroes in the United States, 1920-1932 (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 55;
Gilbert Osofcky, Harlem The Making ofaGhettoQ&VN York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1966; reprint,
< hi< ago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1996), 18-19, 123. (page citations are to the reprint edition).
I I
housed a socially, politically, and economically diverse black community. Blacks born in
the North, South, and abroad populated Harlem's streets, and these groups often viewed
each other with suspicion and derision. Foreign-born blacks migrated mostly from
various islands in the Caribbean, especially Jamaica, Bermuda, Antigua, and the Virgin
Islands, and considered themselves as culturally distinct from each other as they did from
native-born African Americans. "To the outsider" the New York Times noted, "they
present a homogeneous body, standing as a unit. To the insider, they separate into
distinct individual groups, with individual differences, antagonisms, loyalties and
prejudices."4 Residential segregation patterns meant Harlem also housed blacks of all
economic classes, another factor influencing the heterogeneity of its population. 5
Black migration to the city remained high during the 1920s, and the Manhattan
borough's black population alone reached over 224,000 by the end of the decade, with
1 85,000 in Harlem.
6
Celebrating their culture and heritage in poetry, novels, essays,
sculpture, painting, and music, the Harlem Renaissance brought black culture into
mainstream American society in a new way. Black political consciousness flourished in
Harlem, too, and it was home to Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement
Association (UNIA), the National Urban League (NUL), and the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Believing that cultural and artistic
recognition would cause a "revolutionary revaluation of the Negro," many black leaders
4 Rose C. Feld, "Harlem Riot Attributed to Many Economic Ills," New York Times, 24 March
1935, sec IV, p. 1 1
.
5 See Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, "Or Does It Explode": Black Harlem in the Great Depression
(Oxford- Oxford University Press, 1991); Charles Green and Basil Wilson, The Strugglefor
Black
Empowerment in New York City: Beyond the Politics ofPigmentation (New York: Praeger Publishers.
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iii I larlem looked confidently to the future of American race relations and to life for
African Americans. 7
This optimism, however, hid grim realities for black New Yorkers. Even in the
economic prosperity of the Roaring Twenties, black families in New York C ity lived a
precarious economic existence. In Harlem: The Making ofa Ghetto, Gilbert Osofsky
argues that it was during the 1920s that I larlem became a slum: "Largely within the
space of a single decade I larlem was transformed from a potentially ideal community to a
neighborhood with manifold social and economic problems called 'deplorable/
'unspeakable,' ' incredible.
,,,s
Osofsky lists several reasons for this decline, most
importantly I larlem' S high cost of living. Because other New York City neighborhoods
discouraged or barred black tenants, I larlem's landlords charged extraordinarily high
rents. While renters in the rest of the city paid twenty percent of their yearly salary in
rent, I laiiemites usually paid between thirty and forty percent.
9
The high cost of
consumer goods added to their economic burdens, and government and private surveys
showed that 1 laiiemites paid substantially more lor retail merchandise than did other New
Yorkers.
10
In addition to the high cost of living, racial discrimination kept African
Americans in low paying jobs. Mayor LaGuardia\s Commission on Conditions in
I larlem put it bluntly: "The stores and other types of business enterprises outside of
7
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Harlem may be divided into two classes in regard to . . . the employment of Negroes
those that employ Negroes in menial positions and those that employ no Negroes at
all."
1
1
Although greater employment opportunities for African Americans existed in New
York City than they did in many other parts of the country, blacks usually held the lowest
skilled and worst paying jobs. They earned less than whites in comparable positions, a
condition exacerbated by their inability to join most unions. Black men found
employment most often in personal service and unskilled industrial jobs. Black women
worked as domestic servants, service workers, or as unskilled laborers, many continuing
employment after marriage. Even educated and skilled black men and women found
themselves confined to the lower-end of the job market. Historian Cheryl Greenberg
notes that while the federal government estimated that the average New York family
needed an income of $1,760 in the 1920s, the average Harlem family earned only $1,300.
This, combined with the higher rents and cost of living in Harlem meant most families'
expenditures exceeded their income. 12
Lack of employment opportunities led some in Harlem to open their own
businesses. Most were in restaurant or personal service work, such as barbers,
beauticians, and tailors. These businesses usually required little capital investment and
were therefore more feasible since banks were reluctant to make business loans to
African Americans. During the 1920s white-owned businesses far outnumbered black-
owned ones in Harlem, even in the service sector. White owners were better financed.
1
1
The Complete Report of Mayor LaGuardia '.v ( Commission on the Harlem Riot ofMarch IV,
1935 (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 39.
12 Edwards lists female employment in New York City in 1930s as 54.7% for African Americans,
3 1 .8% for whites, and 23.2% for foreign-born, see "Distinctive Characteristics," 60. See also Greenberg,
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and could therefore offer lower prices for the same goods and services and weather short
economic downturns. In 1929 African Americans owned less than twenty percent of the
1
3
stores in Harlem. Lacking employment and business opportunities, crowded into
segregated and high-rent housing, Harlem, as Greenberg so vividly notes, "crumbled into
a slum while optimists noticed only advancement. It lived in depression before the
Depression." 14
When the Great Depression hit, Harlemites suffered tremendously. In a 1935
article for The Nation Claude McKay wrote, "the facade of the Harlem masses' happy-
go-lucky and hand-to-mouth existence has been badly broken by the Depression. A
considerable part of the population can no longer cling even to the hand-to-mouth
margin." 15 African Americans' most common occupations - unskilled labor and service
employment - experienced massive layoffs during the 1930s. The depression shaped the
employment of African Americans in other ways, too, observed the New York Times:
"With continued unemployment staring him in the face, the white worker is glad to get a
job which in better days he spurned and the colored worker must make room for him." 16
This type of competition added to the staggering employment problems of black New
Yorkers, who as early as 1931 suffered from over twenty five percent unemployment. By
1937 that rate was forty percent, and even in 1940 thirty percent of the labor force in
13 Greenberg, 27-28.
14
Ibid, 14.
15 Claude McKay, "Harlem Runs Wild," The Nation, 3 April 1935, 382-83.
16
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Central Harlem was on work relief or unemployed. 17 Black businesses actually rose in
number during the 1930s, but their total profits declined as unemployment among
African Americans limited their ability to sustain these stores. African Americans made
do by holding rent parties, taking in boarders or "bunching up" with other family
members, sharing household items and necessities among themselves, and sometimes
engaging in illegal activities like bootlegging, numbers running and prostitution."* These
strategies were not enough, however, and many 1 larlemites required support from other
sources.
lilack New Yorkers seeking financial and employment assistance in the 1930s
had several places to turn. Some Manhattan charities, like the Association for Improving
the Condition of the Poor, and the Charity Organization Society, served whites and
blacks, but many private agencies refused to aid African Americans. Existing black
organizations, such as churches, the Urban League, and the NAACP expanded their
services to include work placement, medical and dental care, youth recreational
programs, and soup kitchens. They also provided emergency loans, clothing, and food
for those in desperate need, and helped families negotiate the government relief
application process.
With the implementation of New Deal programs a new avenue of support opened
up for African Americans, and through governmental aid they received home and work
relief. Public agencies established guidelines against racial discrimination, and in New
17
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York City many officials worked to put these policies into action. Greenberg gives much
of the credit to Mayor LaGuardia: "He made his commitment to equal access and
opportunity clear with agency regulations, the appointment of decent men, careful
oversight of departments, ... and his general willingness to speak out clearly in support
of black interests." Nonetheless, race played a factor in relief. Sometimes the
discrimination was unintentional, such as the home relief policy that required proof of
residency in New York State for two years and in New York City for one. Not only were
African Americans more often recent arrivals in the city, but since high rents caused
frequent moves and "bunching up," many Harlemites had no proof of long-term
residency. Additionally, many African American day laborers could not offer proof of
previous employment, another requirement for home relief. 21 In work relief programs,
agencies like the Works Progress Administration (WPA) often subcontracted their work
to businesses whose racial practices were not as evenhanded as public agencies, and the
government failed to intervene in the hiring policies of private employers. Still, despite
the overt and unspoken racism that existed, New Deal programs helped many black New
Yorkers weather the Great Depression. Like African Americans in other northern areas,
black New York rewarded the Democratic Party for their New Deal. In 1932 about half
of the African Americans in the city voted for Roosevelt in the presidential election.
Four years later that number had risen to eighty one percent.
22
African Americans
supported Republican mayor La Guardia, too, whose liberal administration actively
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courted the black vote.23 The government's unprecedented involvement in the economy
and people's everyday lives led to greater demands and expectations on the part of many
Harlemites. 24
At first glance, the Great Depression is a surprising era in which to mark the
growing attention to black consumption. Low wages, high unemployment, and
widespread government relief among Harlemites were hardly indications of an important
consumer market, and reinforced prevailing perceptions about African Americans'
relative poverty. It was precisely the Great Depression, however, which sowed the seeds
of the "Negro market."
The "Negro Market"
In the early decades of the twentieth century corporate America rarely took notice
of black consumers and considered them too rural and poor to merit attention or
advertising dollars. In his study of the early advertising industry, Advertising the
American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, Roland Marchand finds that
advertisements failed to include African Americans in what he terms "consumer
citizenship." The consumer ethic emanating from the advertising industry confined
personal fulfillment and the American dream to the realm of consumption, and by the
1 920s this ethic pervaded middle-class American society. To the advertisers, democracy
meant a "democracy of goods" with equal access to consumer products, and ads
23
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demonstrated this equality by showing both ordinary and wealthy consumers enjoying the
same products. Those excluded from "consumer citizenship" were implicitly excluded
from this new definition of democracy and the American dream, and although products
could bridge the class divides within white America, no such bridge extended to the black
25
community. Despite the Great Migration, and the rising incomes and concentrations of
blacks in urban communities, few businesses sought to understand black consumption
habits or market to black consumers. Even in New York City - which in the 1920s
became not only the capital of black America but also witnessed the ascent of "Madison
Avenue" as the capital of the advertising industry - few advertisers or manufacturers
showed any interest in Harlem's consumer market.
With the onset of the Great Depression, however, a few voices in the advertising
industry began reassessing black consumption, attempting to challenge prevailing beliefs
about the potential of the "Negro market." Advertising and business trade journals
carried periodic articles about African Americans' economic status and their potential as
consumers of national brand products. Although rare, these voices promoted the
importance of black consumption and, as the first attempts to define the "Negro market,"
helped reformulate industry beliefs about African Americans and establish methods for
reaching them.
One of the first marketing experts to address the "Negro market" was H.A.
Haring. Haring's articles in Advertising & Selling in 1928 and 1930 were filled with
insulting observations and remarks, and he supported many stereotypical racial
assumptions of the era. Of southern black consumers he wrote, "Although their condition
25 Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Wayfor Modernity, 1 920-1940
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 64, 193-3,202-3.
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is improving, they are not a great market for goods. First, because they are, for the most
part, so far from literate and their intellectual habits are so low that no form of advertising
can whet the desire of possession."26 On the other hand, Haring believed that northern
black consumption merited attention, and he advised businesses to take greater notice of
urban African Americans.
Haring also specifically studied the consumption habits of black New Yorkers in
his article, "Selling to Harlem," though strangely his examination of Harlem businesses
excluded consideration of its main retail district on 125 th street. Basing his findings on
stores outside this district he argued that Harlemites consumed large quantities of beauty
products, medication, and inexpensive clothing: "indigestion and vanity, laxatives,
cosmetics and silk stockings are the outstanding traits of Harlem."27 In his advice
regarding marketing strategies Haring wrote, "Negroes have poor memories for names.
Faces, however, and pictures are indelible. Therefore they are repeat customers and will
28
re-purchase a familiar package." However, Haring did offer some observations which
other "Negro market" specialists confirmed in later studies, in particular that using
African Americans in sales positions and treating black customers with respect would
help businesses gain a loyal clientele in this potentially lucrative market.
While Haring' s work received little attention, the "Negro market" received its
first big boost with the publication in 1932 of Paul Edwards' The Southern Urban Negro
26
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as Consumer. Mentioned in government publications, trade journals, and white and
black newspapers, Edwards 1 work detailed the occupations, purchasing power, spending
habits, and merchandise preferences of African Americans in southern cities, and offered
advice to national advertisers about how to market to this audience. A white economics
professor at black Fisk University and an advisor to national corporations, Edwards
conducted his own Held research in over a dozen black urban communities and followed
up his landmark study with a 1936 dissertation and numerous trade journal articles on
black urban consumption. Although he only occasionally addressed black consumption
in Harlem, his work laid the foundations for general industry understandings of the
"Negro market."29
In all of his writings Edwards worked to dispel the beliefs of advertising agencies
and national manufacturers that black consumers lacked significance and value. "The
white community," he wrote, "unfortunately, has embedded in its mental processes a
most one-sided and incomplete picture of urban Negro life, invariably overdosed with
and dominated by conceptions of extreme poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, and disease."30
To overcome these prejudices he first made a case for the economic importance of black
consumers. Because black wages and income were low, common wisdom held that only
low priced goods would appeal to African Americans, and therefore manufacturers of
high-quality or brand products wasted their time marketing to black consumers. Edwards
29
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asserted, instead, that the blaek consumer market's 1935 estimated value of $2 billion
was larger than many foreign markets, "the cultivation of which much painstaking study
and effort has been devoted." 11
To support his claims Kdwards provided a great deal of statistical information on
blaek urban consumption, with most of his figures derived from analyses of black
spending in Nashville, Atlanta, Richmond, and Detroit. 32 Based on those cities, he
estimated that black families spent approximately 14 percent of their income on rent and
utilities, 27.2 percent on food, and 14.9 percent on clothing. The rest of their incomes
went to personal care products, recreation, transportation, and household furnishings,
though especially in the Great Depression most black families avoided spending much on
those items.
33
Edwards did not offer any consumer information on New York City and
I larlem's consumption patterns differed from his findings in several important ways.
I [arlemites spent between 30 and 35 percent of their incomes on rent, almost twice the
amount Edwards estimated as the national average. This was significant in that Edwards
argued repeatedly that the low rent of African American families helped boost their
spending power in other areas. For food and clothing I larlemites' consumption patterns
mirrored the national averages more closely with 31 percent spent on food and 10.3
percent spent on clothing. Since food and clothing were the two biggest consumer
31
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categories for black families, whether in Harlem or other cities, most of Edwards' work
focused on convincing manufacturers of these products to enter the "Negro market:'
Persuading corporate America of the economic importance of black consumption
was only the first step, however, and Edwards also argued that black consumers merited
attention because they bought high quality and brand-name items in disproportionate
numbers to their income levels. The effects of the Great Depression and African
Americans' already low incomes meant price was necessarily a factor in black
consumption, but it was only one of many reasons for black purchases. Black consumers
afforded more expensive food items, for example, by limiting variety in their meals, and
by sacrificing in other consumer areas. Blacks often took advantage of lay-away plans in
order to purchase more expensive clothes, and in talking with black housewives Edwards
found many believed better goods were ultimately more economical. 34 Also, as domestic
servants, their low incomes were supplemented by taking food home from their jobs and
having their employers pay for transportation to and from work - two things unavailable
to whites working in factory or retail employment. And because black women worked in
far greater numbers than white women their earnings helped raise their total family
income.
Even during the Depression Edwards found that black consumers continued to
buy high quality and branded merchandise, especially food. African Americans surveyed
bought real butter, top quality potatoes and meats, and higher-priced brands of coffee,
Hour, and baking powder.
35 Edwards reasoned that, like white working class jobs, the
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physical demands of black employment meant that they needed "heavy, energy-
producing, mUflCle-building foods."36 I Ic believed black families also bought higher
priced goods because so many worked in domestic service where their middle-class and
wealthy employers exposed them to higher quality goods. 17 Branded products also
offered consumer protection to African Americans. 1 Awards observed that the "apparent
importance of brand names to the Negro housewife may lie in her suspicion, often
justified, Ofthose with whom she has had to do business. In purchasing foods in bulk she
often not only suspects short weight, but has no way to assure herself as to quality. North
and South, the Negro all too often has been victimized by unscrupulous merchants."38
Furthermore, blacks' employment in low-paying service positions, usually
considered a reason to ignore black consumers, actually gave added significance to the
"Negro market." As cooks, housekeepers, and butlers, African Americans influenced the
consumption habits of white middle-class and wealthy homes, as well as white
restaurants and hotels, lor example, although African Americans did not purchase great
numbers of automobiles, their employment as chauffeurs and truck drivers placed them in
a position to make brand recommendations to wealthy whites and white-owned
businesses. These jobs also made them consumers of gas, oil, and other auto supplies
greater than their actual auto ownership would indicate.
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Simply recognizing the value of the black consumer market was only the start,
and Edwards urged businesses to alter their marketing strategies to the "Negro market."
He advised businesses to place advertising campaigns in black newspapers and to employ
African Americans in marketing and sales positions. In a letter to Claude Barnett, head
of the Associated Negro Press and avid proponent of the black consumer market,
Edwards discussed his meeting with the Rumford Baking Powder Company. "I insisted,"
he wrote, "that to get effectively into the market necessitated the use of Negro
representatives, -- that they could not proceed with simply their regular white
organization. Moreover, I insisted that the Negroes employed must be made an integral
part of their sales organization on a level with their white salesmen."40 This would
demonstrate to black consumers that a company was invested in a local black community
and took them seriously as customers. Black employees would also be more familiar
with local merchants and businesses than whites, and could therefore market products
more effectively. They could also be used locally to give educational talks about brand
products, teach cooking schools, and work as food demonstrators in grocery stores.
Edwards' final point about reaching the black consumer applied directly to the
racial content of advertisements. Depictions of blacks in ads exposed African Americans
to a pervasive visual culture that insulted and caricatured them. As Roland Marchand
explains, "Blacks never appeared as consumers or as fellow workers with whites, or as
skilled workers. Primarily they functioned as symbols of the capacity of the leading lady
and leading man to command a variety of personal services."
41
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Weems argues in Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the
Twentieth Century, that "because of black's apparent powerlessness in the realms of
politics and economics, white Americans, and especially white businesses, believed they
could, with impunity, denigrate African Americans."42
Several African American images became popular advertising icons in the early
twentieth century, and they receive extensive treatment in Marilyn Kern-Foxworth's Aunt
Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus: Blacks in Advertising, Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow. Kern-Foxworth believes these icons had a lasting impact on perceptions
about the black community: "the symbols that have stood for and defined blacks in
advertising over the years have varied. Some have been real people, some have been
fictitious. Nevertheless, whether real or artificial they have forged permanent images of
A 1
blacks into the American psyche For example, Cream of Wheat used the image of a
real African American cook for its icon, making Uncle Rastus a literal and figurative
servant. Described by historian T.J. Jackson Lears as a "desexualized member of [a]
subordinate caste" who was used to embody "a static, folkish vision of preindustrial
abundance,"44 Rastus was both a reminder of the happy plantation slave and a symbol of
continued white supremacy, and like other black servant icons, his image helped maintain
a racial hierarchy that kept African Americans in subordinate roles.
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In conversations with black consumers Edwards discovered their dissatisfaction
with these derogatory depictions: "the Negro is chagrined by the advertising literature
which so customarily pictures him as a cook, hooded with red bandana and using broken
English, or as a servant or laborer, or that which caricatures him as a thick-lipped
comedian: 145 The way in which a company used African Americans in their ads directly
influenced how blacks felt about and consumed their products; demeaning
representations increased animosity toward a product and company. Edwards studied this
reaction by asking black consumers to compare and judge eight ads, two each from Rinso
Soap Powder, P & G Laundry Soap, Squib and Sons pharmaceutical products, and Aunt
Jemima's Pancake Flour. Each pair included one ad with an African American figure,
and one without, and responses were measured by gender and profession. 1 [e found that
while the inclusion of a black character in an ad caused African Americans to notice it
more quickly, the ultimate product judgment depended upon the character's portrayal.
For example, the P & (i Laundry Soap ad showed an African American laundress,
identified as "Mrs. King's Eliza," hanging laundry while white children played around
her. In the ad Eliza praises the laundry soap by tell her employer, "right much life in that
soap." Edwards quoted the following responses to this ad: "Don't like advertisement.
Gives me impression that Eliza is 'black mammy."; "Don't like her English - 'right
much,' etc."; and "The words 'Mrs. King's Eliza' prejudice me against P & G."46
Aunt Jemima Pancake Flour advertisements elicited the harshest responses in
Edwards' study. Arguably the most pervasive black icon in American advertising
45
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history, Aunt Jemima was based on the image of the slave mammy. Kern-Foxworth
points out that "the physical attributes of the original versions of Aunt Jemima were
totally the opposite of how white Americans traditionally defined beauty. She was very
dark-skinned, had extremely broad features, and was extremely overweight - a far cry
from the thin, blond, blue-eyed Barbie type heralded as the standard of beauty for
decades."47 Furthermore, Aunt Jemima's red bandana and broken English marked her
with the badges of slavery, and facilitated the dissemination of stereotypical beliefs about
African Americans. Historian Grace Hale describes Aunt Jemima as the epitome of the
"spokesservant," drawing her representation from both the African American as servant
and the African American as a happy slave. Like Uncle Rastus and other black servant
icons, Aunt Jemima embodied the idea of black subservience and white superiority.
They helped construct "the consumer" as white and "helped organize the one
commonality that all white consumers shared regardless of their class, regional, religious,
48 * c c
or gender positions: their racial privilege." Responses to Aunt Jemima from African
Americans in Edwards' study included: "I have never bought Aunt Jemima flour because
it pertains to slavery type of Negro."; "Illustration of Aunt Jemima utterly disgusts me.";
"Attracts attention, but arouses antagonism."; "Don't like Aunt Jemima with rag on
head"; "Wouldn't read it. Hate it."
49
It is clear from these responses that African
Americans reacted strongly to typical depression-era depictions of blacks. From this
Edwards concluded: "racial elements can be used to advantage in advertising copy to
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gain the attention of the Negro. It is evident, too, that elements relating to this race can
serve, on the one hand, to build up the Negro's good will towards, and interest in, a
particular brand of merchandise, or, on the other hand, to build up his ill will and
resistance to it.
Edwards spent less time on the types of advertisements which appealed to black
consumers, but included in Southern Urban Negro as a Consumer two ads to which
African Americans responded positively. Both for beauty products, the ads sold Madam
C.J. Walker's Face Powder and Dr. Palmer's Skin Whitener, and featured photos of
African American women. Edwards argued that these ads appealed to black consumers
because their images "pictured the Negro as he really is, not caricatured, degraded, or
made fun of; that here the Negro was dignified and made to look as he is striving to look,
and not as he looked in ante-bellum days; that here was the new Negro." 51 These choices
were especially interesting because of the controversy within the black community
surrounding beauty products, especially hair straighteners and skin whiteners. Some
African Americans argued that using these products fostered self-hatred and white
emulation, and they denounced those who sold and used such products. As Kathy Peiss
finds in Hope in a Jar, others in the black community argued that these products showed
attention to one's appearance. And in an era which defined beauty as white,
demonstrating black women's beauty benefited the entire black community. Proponents
of these products also argued that their use supported the black businesses which
manufactured them. Entrepreneurs like Madam C.J. Walker, whose ad was praised by
50
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Edwards and who ran one of the most profitable and visible black beauty companies in
the early twentieth century, emphasized the racial pride associated with a pleasing
appearance, and understood black women's participation in the beauty industry as a
means of collective advancement as well as a way to earn a living. Such arguments,
however, failed to persuade all African Americans, and these beauty products remained
contested items in the black community. 52
In his work Edwards repeatedly stressed the segmented nature of the American
consumer market. Attacking the mass approach, he wrote, "the assumption is implicitly
made by such procedure that the consumption characteristics of our large urban Jewish.
Negro, Polish, or Italian groups, for instance, or the farm market of the Middle West, are
for all practical purposes alike."" To those who maintained that the mass approach was
the cheapest way to market products, Edwards argued that better understanding
differences among consumer groups would allow companies to create more effective, and
ultimately less expensive, ad campaigns. Black consumers could not be reached in
mainstream magazines, the usual place for national marketing programs, but instead
needed to be reached through black newspapers. In an article in Food Industries in 1936,
Edwards argued that these special marketing programs would create good will for
companies among individual consumer groups, which would "produce greater and more
lasting patronage than appeals addressed to the market as a whole."
54 Edwards even took
care in many of his writings to point out the differences among African American
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consumers, including occupation, gender, and rural/urban distinctions. He did not go so
far as to suggest that companies tailor their strategies for different groups within the black
community, but this further demonstrates his attention to the segmented approach.
Edwards was the loudest and most consistent white voice advocating the
importance of the "Negro market." The few others who joined him usually echoed his
findings, often citing his research directly. W.B. Ziff Company, a business which helped
black newspapers gain national advertising revenue, also published information about the
"Negro market," and drew much of its data from Edwards's work. In 1 932 it produced a
39 page brochure titled The Negro Market: Published in the Interest ofthe Negro Press,
which offered information on various aspects of the black community, statistics on black
spending, and ways to reach black consumers. Ziff s overwhelming message was that
discrimination and segregation meant African Americans were cut off from the rest of
society and forced to operate in separate communities. This segregation shaped all areas
in the black community - education, social organizations, churches, and home life. "As
he is born," the brochure read, "so the Negro is placed at rest - removed and isolated as a
separate group."
55
Social isolation made black newspapers vital to the black community
because just like white Americans, "Negroes must read about their own life - social and
commercial. Where will they find this NEWS? Certainly not in the white-man's
newspapers any more than they find their babies born in white hospitals nor their dead
buried in white cemeteries." By placing ads in black newspapers, advertisers showed
black consumers they respected them and wanted their patronage: "the Negro newspaper
. . . speaks directly to the Negro on many subjects. When he reads it he knows that
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whatever is presented there is specifically for him. Consequently, this medium affords
the advertiser an opportunity to speak to the Negro alone." 56
It is clear in these writings that "Negro market" observers considered this market
similar to, yet distinct from, the mass market, and that its characteristics were in large
part racially determined. Specifically, discrimination and segregation shaped black
consumption patterns and attitudes. Unlike lower-class whites, racial discrimination
meant African Americans most often worked as domestics, where they influenced, and
were influenced by, the purchase of brand goods by whites of higher economic status.
Companies had to market to African Americans differently, and using African American
salespeople and the black press were necessary steps to gaining black consumer loyalty.
Demeaning images of blacks in advertisements also had an impact on black consumption,
and businesses selling to African Americans were advised to eliminate these derogatory
stereotypes. Significantly, no "Negro market" specialists advised companies to change
their ads in white consumer spaces, or to employ African Americans as salespeople
anywhere but black neighborhoods. Edwards stressed to companies, "it is exceedingly
important to bear in mind that Negroes and Negro newspapers employed in these ways
are used almost exclusively in Negro neighborhoods."" White salespeople and white
newspapers would continue to target white audiences only; "Negro market" campaigns
were to supplement, but not change, mainstream marketing programs.
No "Negro market" specialists in the 1930s suggested advertising on radio, and
this is hardly surprising given the scarcity of black-appeal stations and programs before
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World War II. In Voice Over: The Making ofBlack Radio, William Harlow argues that
the concept of black radio programming emerged at the end of the 1920s but that the
economic diHlculties faced in the (ireat Depression prevented its development until the
1 940s. Opposition from commercial sponsors to African American performers
sometimes made it difficult for stations to feature African Americans in any of their
shows. Corporate resistance rested on the belief that sponsoring shows with black
performers would scare away white customers. "If it gets out that we were pushing
Negro talent on a Pillsbury program," explained one advertiser, "the next thing you
know, it would be branded a 'nigger flour 1 and it would never move." 58 Since black
newspapers were seldom bought by whites they were a much safer avenue for national
advertisers, and not until the proliferation of black-appeal stations would these advertisers
utilize radio.
The federal government helped the cause of "Negro market" promoters with
studies of black demographic patterns, employment, and spending habits. The
Department of Commerce released several articles directly selling the importance of the
black consumers market, most often written by Eugene Kinckle Jones, head of the
department's Division of Negro Affairs. Jones cited Edward's Southern Urhun Negro as
( 'onsumer, and noted the $2 billion estimate of the national black consumer market. 1 le
echoed Edwards' other arguments by urging advertisers to use black-owned retail stores
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and newspapers to gain black customers, and stressed that as "employees who are
occupying positions requiring them to make purchase for their employers" the
importance of the "Negro market" exceeded blacks' spending power. 60 The Department
of Labor released frequent studies of black businesses, black income and spending
patterns, often comparing whites and blacks of the same occupational level. In its
publication Monthly Labor Review, the department also reported on black consumer
activism, especially the "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaigns in major urban
centers.
In the twenties and thirties, African American journals and magazines held their
own discussions about the "Negro market," most notably in Crisis and Opportunity.
These articles reaffirmed many of the arguments of white specialists, such as the potential
profits of an overlooked market, the importance of utilizing black newspapers, and the
value of treating black customers with respect. Additionally, these articles contained an
argument that was ignored in other publications - that the power of black consumption
could be used for black economic advancement. In 1932, in the wake of Edwards'
publication of Southern Urban Negro as a Consumer, National Urban League executive
T. Arnold Hill argued in Opportunity that the "Negro market" could be used to support
black businesses and gain black employment in white-owned stores. Edwards' study, he
contended, was important because it gave "authenticated figures" to support these
goals.
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In a 1935 Crisis article, "Big Business Wants Negro Dollars," James A. Jackson
also made connections between the "Negro market" and economic gains. Jackson, who
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as an employee of the Standard Oil Company was one of the first black marketing experts
hired by a major corporation, argued that blacks should patronize Standard Oil because it
employed African Americans in a variety ofjobs throughout the company and because it
worked with thousands of African American gasoline and kerosene dealers. 62 Although
Edwards and other white observers of the "Negro market" advised businesses to hire
African American employees, their justification for this was to secure the good will of
customers, not to help the economic viability of the black community.
The Black Press
One universal recommendation made by white and black "Negro market"
promoters was to advertise in black newspapers. New York City's two weekly black
newspapers were the New York Age and the New York Amsterdam News. 63 Writing
mostly about Harlem, these papers included sections about black life in New York City's
other boroughs. Most black newspapers generally assumed that their readers also
purchased white daily newspapers, and the Age and Amsterdam News were no exception.
Their coverage, therefore, focused on African Americans or on national and international
news that related in some way to African Americans.
T. Thomas Fortune founded the New York Age in 1887 and he quickly gained a
reputation as a militant defender of black rights and a political independent who publicly
criticized the Republican party. Historian Charles Simmons argues that in the
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widespread racial discrimination and violence which followed Reconstruction, "the
African American press abandoned an editorial philosophy of militancy and became
virtually mute on race issues"; the Age, however, was a notable exception to this
practice.
64
Fortune believed that the black press should be the voice of the black
community, and the Age continually advocated racial equality for African Americans in
politics, economics, and society. 65 In 1906 Fortune sold the Age to Fred R. Moore and it
remained in the Moore family until the late 1940s. 66
The Age's chief rival was the Amsterdam News, which by the 1930s outpaced the
Age in length, circulation, and advertising. Founded in 1909 by James Anderson, the
Amsterdam News grew into a prominent paper under the direction of Anderson and his
business partner Edward Warren. The Warren family continued their partnership in the
paper after Warren died in 1921 , and in 1926 Anderson sold his interest in the paper to
them. In 1 930 it became the second black newspaper to join the prestigious Audit Bureau
of Circulations, the foremost verifying agency for newspaper circulation figures. In 1935
workers at the paper organized a union, and went on strike when management refused to
recognize it. The strikers won but the financial stress of the strike caused the Amsterdam
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News to go into receivership, and it was bought in 1936 by C.B. Powell and Philip M.H.
Savory.
67
Prominent physicians in Harlem, Powell and Savory had a long-standing business
partnership. Powell, a native of Virginia, was the first black roentgeneologist in New
York City and started the first x-ray laboratory in any black community. 68 Savory, an
immigrant from British Guiana, worked at newspapers in his native country and Brazil
until moving to the United States in 1 91 1 . After receiving his medical degree in Canada,
Savory moved to New York City to practice medicine. 69 Among other businesses,
Powell and Savory owned the Victory Mutual Life Insurance Company and the
Community Personal Loan Company. In 1939 Fortune magazine estimated that they
paid almost $300,000 in wages each year to African Americans in Harlem. 70
The Powell-Savory Corporation bought the Amsterdam News more as a business
investment than out of an interest in journalism, and it immediately set out to attract
advertisers to the paper. However, like the Age, the Amsterdam News had difficulty
securing advertising revenue. In their study of black newspapers, historians Armistead S
Pride and Clint C. Wilson argue that advertising was a perpetual problem for the black
press which had a negative impact on their entire enterprise:
• th
for a large body of black newspapers during the first half of the 20 century,
things moved in an eternally vicious circle: sordid advertising, uneven news
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selection, careless editing, and low economic status among many readers kept
brand-name advertisers away; lack of a sturdy advertising income kept salaries
and staffs at the minimum level; and the unprepossessing staffs produced
unprepossessing papers, which, in turn, were unattractive to quality advertisers. 71
Most advertisements in black papers of the era were for patent medicines, local
businesses, and beauty products such as skin bleaches or hair straighteners. More so than
in the Age, the Amsterdam News also carried advertisements from local white and black
owned businesses. Advertising in the Amsterdam News increased substantially after its
purchase by Powell and Savory, and opening the paper in the late 1930s one could find
ads for trade schools, business colleges, funeral homes, and local black stores, as well as
the white-owned Blumstein's, Sally's, and the A&P grocery chain.
Both the Age and Amsterdam News hired white-owned national advertising
representatives to increase their exposure to corporate America. The Age hired the New
York City firm, H.B. Crohn, while the Amsterdam News engaged the services of the W.B.
Ziff Company of Chicago. Since its inception in 1920, Ziff focused on forging
relationships between blacks newspapers and corporate advertisers. Its founder and
president, William Ziff, helped found the Interracial Council, an organization of foreign
language and black newspapers that worked to "better the economic and social conditions
of alien-born and Negro peoples in America." Ziff s client list included the Pittsburgh
Courier and Chicago Defender, two of the largest black newspapers in the country.
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Ziff also promoted the importance of black consumption to corporate America. In
addition to its aforementioned 1932 "Negro market" brochure, it offered statistics on
black populations in each state, advertising rates for all of the papers it represented, and
marketing assistance. Upon request, a company could receive lists of "retail outlets in
all the major cities catering to the Negro trade," and also have advertising materials
delivered to these stores. Ziff also offered, free of charge, "copy assistance and counsel
to advertising agencies not familiar with the Negro Market. Arrangements may be made
for photographs and endorsements of all types of legitimate products."74
By 1940, however, many newspapers began leaving Ziff, perhaps spurred by its
high commissions of thirty five to fifty percent, and perhaps because Ziff turned its
attention to other publishing enterprises. There are also indications that not all black
newspapers considered Ziff s role in the black press a positive one. Fred Moore, the
Age's owner and editor, was quoted as saying, "For a decade W.B. Ziff has sought to
monopolize the Negro newspaper advertising field. ... He is guilty of a vicious and high-
handed practice if he gives out misinformation concerning newspapers with which he has
no connection." Ziff s place in the industry was taken over by the Interstate United
Newspaper, Inc. (IUN), founded by Robert Vann and Ira Lewis of the Pittsburgh Courier.
In 1939 Vann and Lewis purchased H.B. Crohn, quickly expanding Crohn's client list.
The Age, who had been one of Crohn's clients, stayed with IUN, while the Amsterdam
76
News remained with Ziff throughout the early 1940s.
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During the 1 930s both the Age and the Amsterdam News worked to convince
advertisers and black consumers of the importance of the "Negro market." Within their
pages they ran articles about organizations and experts who studied black consumption,
such as the consumer study conducted by Negro Business Institute in 1940. 77 They also
announced the hiring of African American sales and marketing representatives by
national manufacturers, often praising these companies for their attention to the "Negro
market." The Age, for example, reported Pepsi's hiring of Herman Smith in 1940 to
direct their marketing campaigns to black consumers. The article argued that this
position, "one of the most important held by a Negro in private industry today," was also
a benefit for the entire black community: "Mr. Smith said that the Pepsi-Cola Company
has shown a great deal of respect and confidence in the Negro by his appointment."78 The
Amsterdam News used the hiring of black employees by national corporations as the
opportunity to pitch that company's product to its readers, hoping, perhaps, that its
gesture would gain future advertising revenue. These announcements also promoted the
importance of the "Negro market" by highlighting the growing corporate interest in black
consumption.
As the self-proclaimed voice of the black community, black newspapers'
promotion of the "Negro market" placed them in a difficult position. On the one hand
they needed advertising revenue and therefore worked to make the black consumer
market more appealing to the advertising industry, and themselves as the natural way to
77
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reach it. On the other hand, their audience expected them to be critical of businesses
considered unfriendly to African Americans. Dependent on subscription revenue but
seeking advertising income, these papers walked a narrow road during the 1930s. If they
were too strident in their attacks on businesses, they risked alienating potential
advertisers, but if they moderated their attacks, they risked alienating their audience and
losing essential customers. So while they ran features about sales representatives hired
by corporate America, they also reported, and sometimes led, consumer protests in black
communities.
"Don't Buy Where You Can't Work"
During the economic turbulence of the 1930s consumers became more critical of
the advertising industry and its corporate clients. As evidence of this trend, Roland
Marchand notes the remarkable success of the humor magazine, Ballyhoo, which
lampooned the advertising industry. Creating parodies of national advertising
campaigns, such as "Blisterine: Buy yourself some false teeth with the money you save
on toothpaste," Ballyhoo's circulation reached over 1.5 million in December 1931, its
fifth month of publication. 74 A more serious problem for agencies and manufacturers
was the growing consumer movement, dedicated to consumer education and increased
government regulation of advertising and manufacturing. This consumer movement
pushed the federal government into greater involvement in consumer issues and led to the
establishment of the Consumer Advisory Board and the Consumers' Council. The
National Recovery Administration placed consumer representatives on its code
79
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authorities where they brought consumers' concerns to the formulation of economic and
labor policies. Through the federal government, consumer activists worked to counteract
price fixing, ensure honest product labeling, and support consumer education initiatives.
In Consumers
'
Republic: The Politics ofMass Consumption in Postwar America,
Lizabeth Cohen terms these activists "citizen consumers" who thought of themselves "as
responsible for safeguarding the general good of the nation, in particular for prodding
government to protect the rights, safety, and fair treatment of individual consumers in the
private marketplace."80
Cohen also argues that consumer activism became a new avenue into the public
arena for groups formerly denied access to political and economic power, especially for
women and African Americans. Black groups shared some similarities with female
organizations in that both drew on an emerging ideology which viewed consumers as
legitimate political actors, and neither women nor African Americans sought to overturn
America's capitalist structure. But while women concentrated on protecting consumers'
rights and generating public interest in consumer issues, African American consumers
worked to improve the economic status of black communities. "African Americans in the
urban north also mobilized politically as consumers during the 1930s, in ways unique to
their racial situation," Cohen writes. "By boycotting some merchants while favoring
others, organizing cooperatives, and undertaking other kinds of consumer activism,
African Americans asserted themselves in the retail marketplace on an unprecedented
scale."
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Although black consumer activism grew tremendously during the Great
Depression, even before the 1930s African Americans had, with varying success, used
their spending power to self-consciously strengthen their communities. Starting in the
late nineteenth century, segregation laws in the South frequently met with consumer
boycotts, while in northern urban communities some African Americans worked to
establish separate black economies. 82 Harlem was the center of Marcus Garvey's
Universal Negro Improvement Association, with its goals of economic and political
independence for black America, and its advocacy of consumer support for black-owned
businesses. Also, throughout the 1920s local branches of the NAACP and the Urban
League worked with Harlem's merchants to negotiate increased black employment in
Harlem stores. 83
New York's African American community brought this activist tradition with
them into the Great Depression era, and during the 1930s significantly expanded their
consumer work. Local groups representing very different political and ideological
perspectives participated in these activities; sometimes creating coalitions of disparate
organizations and other times challenging one another's goals and tactics. In Along the
Color Line: Explorations in the Black Experience, August Meier and Elliott Rudwoick
argue that the expansion of direct action protests by black activists in 1930s was due to
several factors, including the desperate economic conditions brought on by the Great
Depression, Communist Party work in black communities, and what they term the
"general leftward drift of American society." Additionally, the 1932 Norris-La Guardia
2
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Act guaranteed the right to picket and boycott stores for employment, and in New York
( ity the LaGuardia administration discouraged police from arresting or harassing
picketers.
M
The most visible campaign in Harlem, "Don't Buy Where You Can t Work"
grew out of protests started in Chicago in the late 1920s, and its goal was increasing
employment in white-owned stores. KS In early 1932 the black nationalist leader Sufi
Abdul Hamid led his followers in a picket ofthe Woolworth\s store on 125th street. His
campaign failed to win support from other local organizations and was barely mentioned
in the black press; it ended after lour months without winning any jobs for African
Americans. In the spring of 1934 Hamid again led a campaign against Woolwortlf s and
this lime he was joined by several local black leaders, particularly Adam Clayton Powell,
Jr. and Rev. John II. Johnson, head of the prominent St. Mark\s Episcopal Church.
Johnson and Powell created a coalition of local groups, including Hamid and other black
nationalists, neighborhood churches, housewives leagues, liberal black organizations, and
Communist Parly members.
This coalition, the Citizen's League for fair Play (CLFP), waged its first
campaign against Harlem's largest department store, L.M. Blumsteirf s. Blumstein's,
located in I larleirfs main retail district on 125 th street, employed only sixteen African
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Americans on its staff of one hundred and forty, and all these black workers held menial
positions. After an unsuccessful meeting with store officials to negotiate the hiring of
black female sales clerks, the CLFP distributed leaflets and picketed the store with as
many as 1 500 protestors. At times the picket line turned violent, with shoppers reporting
that picketers attacked them and damaged their purchases. Blumstein's quickly relented,
hiring fifteen black female clerks and promising an additional twenty hires in the near
future. Other local stores followed Blumstein's lead and by the fall over one hundred
African Americans had gained new jobs as a result of these campaigns.
Despite its initial success the CLFP quickly fell apart. Black nationalists
complained that the hired sales clerks were all light-skinned African Americans, and
broke from the organization to resume their pickets on 1 25 lh street. These protests were
condemned by other members of the CLFP. Hamid also drew criticism from leftist and
liberal groups for his anti-Semitic attacks on white merchants. Many of Harlem's white
merchants were Jews, and at times protests against white-owned businesses became anti-
Semitic as well. Additionally, the CLFP tactics received an attack from the outside when
in October 1934 the New York Supreme Court ruled that "Don't Buy" picketing was
illegal. Although the CLFP could have continued its protests despite the court ruling -
using boycotts, mass parades, and merchant negotiations - internal divisions prevented
the implementation of these strategies. Blumstein's reneged on its promise to hire the
additional twenty black employees, and other white-owned stores failed to hire any black
workers at all. 86
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The next major "Don't Buy" campaign in Harlem was not waged until 1938, and
came on the heels of another legal decision. In that year the United States Supreme Court
reversed the lower-court decision and restored the legal right to picket stores in protest of
racially discriminatory hiring practices. 87 The Greater New York Coordinating
Committee for Employment (GNCC) seized the initiative to use this important consumer
weapon. Chaired by Powell, the GNCC was a coalition of over two hundred community
groups, including black churches, leftists, and liberals. It immediately launched multiple
initiatives to increase black employment and in addition to pickets and boycotts the
GNCC used strategies specific to the businesses they targeted. For instance, when
focusing on the electric company Consolidated Edison, activists instituted "blackout
nights" and used candles instead of electric lights. When targeting the New York
Telephone Company, GNCC threatened to place all their calls with operator assistance,
thus greatly increasing the company's workload. Black nationalists refused to join the
GNCC and instead conducted their own campaign under the auspices of the Harlem
Labor Union. 88
The GNCC organization had many successes, the most significant of which was
an April 1938 agreement with the Uptown Chamber of Commerce, in which all member
stores pledged to employ at least thirty percent African American white-collar workers
and assure their timely and fair promotion. The agreement stipulated that stores would
not fire whites in order to hire African Americans, but would instead gradually increase
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the proportion of black employees by giving any newly created jobs to blacks and hiring
more whenever whites resigned their positions. The agreement was a tremendous boost
to African American white-collar employment and by July over 300 blacks worked in
white-collar positions in Harlem stores. Many of these stores advertised more frequently
in the Amsterdam News in the wake of this agreement, especially the New York
Telephone Company and Consolidated Edison. 89
Another successful campaign was waged against the Fifth Avenue Bus Company
in the spring of 1941
.
It was one of the few instances where Powell's GNCC and the
nationalist Harlem Labor Union worked together, launching a four week boycott and
street protest of the company's refusal to hire black drivers. The agreement reached in
May 1941 guaranteed the recruitment of one hundred black bus drivers and seventy
mechanics. 90 These later "Don't Buy" campaigns owed their successes to their
widespread support in the community, the legal right to picket businesses, and also the
March 1935 Harlem riot, which set a precedent for violence against discriminatory
business and economic practices. The riot started with false rumors that a young boy had
been killed while resisting arrest for stealing a 5 cent knife from white-owned Kress Store
th
on 125 street. Although the crowd at the store dispersed during the original afternoon
disturbance, later that night a large group gathered outside of the store to protest the
incident. Carrying signs and distributing leaflets protesting the store and the police, the
crowd quickly grew violent, looting and breaking into stores throughout Harlem's main
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retail district. The riot left three dead, sixty-four injured (including seven policemen),
seventy-five arrested, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage. 91
Many recognized that the source of the riot was the underlying economic
problems in Harlem. A week after the conflict, an article in the New York Times
reasoned, "it appears that Harlem, long before the riots occurred, reached a state of
poverty, distress and depression that seemed desperate even to a people to whom hard
times were no novelty."92 Mayor LaGuardia established a Commission on Conditions in
Harlem, whose members included the prominent African Americans E. Franklin Frazier
and A. Philip Randolph, to investigate the riot. Issuing its report in the spring of 1936,
the commission argued, "this relatively unimportant case ofjuvenile pilfering would
never have acquired the significance which it later took on had not a fortuitous
combination of subsequent events made it the spark that set aflame the smoldering
resentments of the people of Harlem against racial discrimination and poverty in the
midst of plenty."93 That rioters attacked only white-owned stores - leaving alone black-
owned ones and white shops which employed African Americans - offered leverage to
the future efforts of Harlemites' "Don't Buy" campaigns. In its analysis of public
utilities in New York City, the commission report even offered a justification for
increased employment on the basis of black consumption when it argued, "Even on a
conservative estimate, the 50,167 Negro families in Harlem spend annually around two
million dollars with the gas and electric companies and three-fourths of a million dollars
91
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with the telephone company. Yet none of the publie utilities give employment to more
than a few hundred Negroes who are restricted to the lowest and least remunerative forms
of employment."94 Consolidated Edison and the New York Telephone Company became
two of the biggest targets in the 1938 campaign.
Although 1934 and 1938 marked the two major "Don't Buy" movements,
throughout the thirties and early forties African American groups continued to demand
greater employment in local stores. In 1 936 the Amsterdam News and the Harlem
Housewives' League, an organization that had participated in the 1934 "Don't Buy"
movement, launched a Community Progress Campaign in which I larlemites were asked
to only buy from merchants who agreed to comply with the campaign's goals of
increased African American employment and "fair merchandise at fair prices."
Cooperating merchants identified themselves with window cards and also through
collective full-page ads in the Amsterdam News!* In 1940 the Amsterdam News again
teamed with the Consolidated I lousewives' League (successor to the Harlem I lousewives
League) to organize for belter treatment and increased employment in local grocery
stores. Participating grocers ran ads in the Amsterdam News proclaiming, "When You
Buy Here, You Buy Where You Can Work."96 In all of the "Don't Buy" campaigns, the
goal remained increased employment in white-collar jobs, a demand which recognized
the usual practice of only employing African Americans in menial positions.
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in
The "Don't Buy" campaigns sought a greater place for African Americans
Harlem's largely white-dominated economy. The second type of consumer fight waged
by Harlemites, the "Buy Black" movement, aspired instead to improve the economic
condition of African Americans by supporting black-owned businesses. Like the "Don't
Buy" campaigns, the movement to buy from black-owned businesses took place in many
urban communities, based on the conviction that more and more profitable black-owned
businesses meant increased jobs and a better employment future for African Americans,
and better treatment and wages within those jobs. In most communities this movement
was supported by black nationalists, and in New York the nationalist Harlem Labor
Union repeatedly urged 1 larlemites to patronize black merchants. Black churches were
also prominent proponents of "Buy Black" campaigns, and throughout the late thirties
and early forties, local black ministers held conferences on the state of the black-owned
business community. At a conference in 1941 titled, "The Responsibility of the Church
Toward Negro Business," a speaker argued, "A minister who is interested in the general
welfare of his people
. . . must of necessity show interest in their economic life."
Attendees were told to "build our own economic salvation" by supporting black-owned
businesses.
97
Naturally, black-owned businesses in New York City also took part in the "Buy
Black" movement. The Brown Bomber Baking Company (BBBC) waged a very public
and extensive campaign in Harlem - promoting both its company and the general goal of
supporting black businesses. Named for boxer Joe Louis, the company began production
in 1939, and at its height in 1941 employed an all-African American staff of eighty.
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Although the main company plant was located in the Bronx the BBBC had retail stores in
Harlem, and since most of its owners and stockholders were Harlemites it promoted itself
as a Harlem business. C.B. Powell and P.M.H. Savory, owners of the Amsterdam News,
sat on its board of directors, and each held various executive positions throughout the
company's history. Because of their connection, the company enjoyed an enormous
amount of print in the pages of the Amsterdam News. Although no Brown Bomber ads
ran in the Age, the Amsterdam News ran almost weekly ads throughout the late thirties
and early forties. These ads made a point to mention the number of company employees
and that it purchased supplies and other necessary services either from black-owned
businesses or white-owned business which hired African Americans. Furthermore, ads
argued that buying BBBC products enhanced the status of the black community by
proving the importance of the black consumer market: "your purchase of Brown Bomber
Bread creates respect as well as other consideration from other baking companies and all
other companies merchandising in Negro areas."98 The BBBC also publicized its
company through local black churches. Officials of the company used Sunday religious
services to advertise their product and promote the benefits of patronizing black-owned
businesses. Addressing these congregations, Brown Bomber executives mixed an appeal
for their business with arguments about the benefits for the larger community, and even
the duty of black Christians to patronize African American stores. Notice of these
gatherings ran frequently in the Amsterdam News, which took the opportunity to press its
case for the BBBC.
New York Amsterdam News, 20 January 1940, 12.
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To boost black consumers' attraction to "Buy Black" arguments, some businesses
established cooperatives and associations to help them compete with chain stores and
while-owned businesses. The Colored Merchants' Association (CM A), first started in
Alabama in the late 1 920s, spread to I larlem in 1929. The CMA was a voluntary
association of black-owned grocery stores, and in exchange for weekly dues member
stores had access to marketing and sales training, and cooperative advertising. Most
importantly, CMA stores offered lower prices because they made collective purchases in
large quantities. By 1932 Harlem's CMA had over 20 member groceries and four model
stores which served as demonstration and training schools for CMA members.^
In the long-run the "Buy Black" campaign had limited effectiveness. Although
the number of black-owned businesses increased during the thirties, their total profits
declined, and business failures were common. Harlem's CMA folded by 1934,
succumbing to the low prices and wide selection of white-owned stores. The BBBC
enjoyed an initial surge of business through 1941 but its viability declined in the early
1 940s, and in 1943 it ceased operation. Although details of the company's closing are
unclear, scholars argue that the Great Depression's impact on black purchasing power
made it difficult for black businesses to stay afloat. 100
In addition to the Colored Merchants' Association, black consumers also formed
cooperatives in the 1 930s. The largest of these was the Young Negroes' Cooperative
League, started by George Schuyler in 1930. This was a national association of local
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cooperatives with member organizations in various urban centers and headquartered in
New York City. Ella Baker was its first national director and she traveled throughout the
nation giving lectures and helping local groups with fundraising and recruiting. Although
not formally affiliated with the Communist Parly or socialist organizations, the League's
activists promoted their efforts as a challenge to American capitalism. Historian and
biographer Barbara kansby argues, "Baker and her idealistic young comrades saw the
building of cooperative economic institutions as the first step toward peaceful
transformation of society from capitalism to a more egalitarian, socialist alternative." 101
By 1932 the membership had grown from thirty to four hundred members and had local
affiliates in over twenty cities. Plagued throughout its existence by financial problems,
the YNCL was unable to sustain itself for more than a few years and was closed by the
mid- 1930s. 102
I larlemitcs sought other ways to increase their consumer power, and throughout
the 1930s waged frequent and public fights against fraudulent selling practices, including
"overcharging, shorlweighting, adulteration, misrepresentation, selling spoiled foods."
and hiring "pullers-in" to entice window shoppers inside a store. I( " I lousewives
organizations made consumer issues a central concern of their organizing, building on
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female-led protests that cast women as natural experts on consumer issues. 104 The
Harlem Housewives League, the Consolidated Housewives League, and Consumers' Unit
No.
1 all investigated members' complaints against local stores, educated women on how
to identify unfair and dishonest practices, and negotiated with the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce for better treatment by store clerks. In many of these campaigns there was an
understanding that racial discrimination was at the root of dishonest business practices in
I larlem. Leaflets and advertisements for consumer campaigns argued that prices for all
types of goods were cheaper in other areas of Manhattan, and that many of Harlem's
merchants used illegal methods to cheat black consumers. Ironically, as Cohen points
out, racial discrimination and segregation, which led to lower employment and a higher
cost of living for Harlemites, also helped fuel their consumer activism:
favoring black businesses wherever possible, turning familiar strategies of
economic self-help and self-sufficiency into a new kind of black mass politics
during the thirties. It was a mass politics, furthermore, aimed at taking advantage
of de facto racial segregation of urban communities. Although carried out as
protests against white exploitation, "Don't Shop Where You Can't Work" and
black capitalism and cooperativism nonetheless depended on residential
segregation. The concentration of black consumers in specific neighborhoods
was required to make their market pressure felt. 105
As African American consumer movements continued, companies were
confronted with an active constituency they could no longer ignore, and learned they
needed to be more careful about how they interacted with the black community. In 1940
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the Uptown Chamber of Commerce went on the offensive, waging a goodwill campaign
that created the 125 th Street Shoppers Adjustment Committee. 106 This committee set up a
Shoppers Bureau on 125 th street where consumers could lodge complaints about local
businesses, with the promise of an investigation and, if necessary, arbitration by a
committee board. Merchants promised "fair dealing, courteous service, quality
merchandise, low prices, and a satisfactory settlement of disputes over transactions." 107
Merchant members also pledged to continue increasing black employment in stores,
indicating that the "Don't Buy" impulse continued into the 1940s with enough strength to
warrant attention by Harlem businesses. Although consumer activism of the 1930s
focused on local and chain stores in Harlem, it was not just local businesses who took
Harlem consumers more seriously during the Great Depression, and slowly corporate
America began to awaken to the "Negro market."
Early marketing campaigns
Although attention was limited, a few national manufacturers began marketing to
African Americans in the 1 930s, testing the waters of the black consumer market. Paul
Edwards wrote about some of these companies, such as Rumford Baking Powder,
Kellogg's, and Pillsbury's. They reached black consumers by employing black sales
representatives and food demonstrators, advertising in black newspapers, and conducting
cooking schools in large urban centers. Edwards worked directly with Rumford Baking
Powder Company, and convinced it to enter the "Negro market" in several southern
106 The 125 ,h Street Shoppers Adjustment Committee was sometimes referred to as the 1 25 th Street
Shoppers' Grievance Committee.
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cities. He coordinated this campaign with the National Association of Colored Women
and the Associated Negro Press to publicize the importance of this effort for the future of
the black consumer market. 108
None of the companies mentioned by Edwards conducted campaigns in Harlem,
although others marketed to the black community there. Reflecting the advice of "Negro
market" promoters, national advertisers demonstrated their interest by hiring local black
representatives to sell and market their products. Among the first to do so were Gordon
Baking Company, Canada Dry, Standard Oil, and Pepsi, and by 1941 over ten companies
employed black salespeople in Harlem. As noted earlier, these hires met with great
approval and fanfare in the black press, praised by both the Amsterdam News and the Age
as a sign of their admiration for the black community. To support their efforts in Harlem,
many of these sales representatives formed the Metropolitan Association of Salesmen, a
group of "local specialists in merchandising and public relations in the Negro market,"
including black newspaper advertising managers, black merchants, and "local
representatives of the largest business concerns."
109
The organization's activities
included monthly meetings where members and white business leaders spoke about
marketing techniques, and periodic community social events designed to raise funds for
local charities.
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In addition to hiring black sales associates, manufacturers also advertised in black
newspapers. As early as 1936 several national companies ran ads in the Amsterdam
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News, including BC Powder, General Electric, and Vaseline. Most of these ads were
small and infrequent, and companies rarely changed their ad designs to appeal
specifically to African American consumers. By 1941 over thirty national manufacturers
joined these first few, although less than a dozen regularly advertised in the Amsterdam
News. The most aggressive advertisers - Beech-Nut Gum, Coca Cola, Pepsi, Philip
Morris, Vaseline, and from the liquor industry, Schaefer Beer, Carstairs Whiskey, and
Ruppert Beer - ran frequent ads in the Amsterdam News. Less successful at attracting
corporate attention, the Age's only consistent national advertiser was Sheffield Farms
Milk. Most companies used the same ads in black newspapers as they did in white print
media, often selecting the smallest and simplest varieties to target black consumers.
Pepsi ads, for example, featured the Pepsi bottle as the most dominant image, and
emphasized the product's price and popularity. Like ads in white print media during the
Great Depression, many ads in black newspapers emphasized low price, a strategy which,
according to Marchand, differed dramatically from the 1920s. He notes, "Depression
advertising was distinctively 'loud,' cluttered, undignified, and direct," with ads that
grabbed the reader's attention." 1 Advertising headlines in black newspapers sometimes
screamed, 'The girl who punished herself!" or "I WANT A MAN!," mostly because
these exact ads ran in white newspapers as well. Significantly, corporate advertisers
carefully omitted ads with derogatory caricatures or racist language, and unlike the
popular mainstream practice of showing blacks as butlers, porters, and maids, "Negro
market" ads excluded depictions of African Americans as servants.
111 Marchand, 300.
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The overwhelming majority of "Negro market" advertisers used their standard ads
in black media, but a notable few created special campaigns to target black consumers
specifically. In March 1938 Vaseline became the first national manufacturer to use
African Americans in its ads, and the first featured a smiling, well-coiffed and made-up
African American woman. Other than using a black model, this ad was similar to
Vaseline ads in white print media. Vaseline ran these ads regularly in the Amsterdam
News throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, other designs featured a black male chef
and young boy in a baseball uniform. Their ads stressed the medicinal uses of Vaseline
and the importance of buying Vaseline instead of an imitation brand. The chef ad was
especially significant because it depicted an African American man as expert whose
advice the consumer should follow. The headline read, "For minor burns and scalds
insist on Vaseline.
,,
Vaseline was a popular product in the African American community
mostly because it was used in hair-straightening procedures, although no mention of this
was made in the product's "Negro marker ads. Vaseline also produced a hair tonic,
although it advertised only in white print media.
The 1941 marketing campaign by Beech-Nut Gum added a local component to its
"Negro market" ads by using black New Yorkers in its Amsterdam News advertisements.
African Americans in this campaign included I larlemites active in a variety of fields,
especially local entertainment and sports celebrities, and two women billed as "prominent
in NY social and civic life." One of these women, Bessye Bearden, made an especially
interesting choice as she was a well-known activist in the local housewives leagues and
the "Don't Buy" campaigns, and perhaps it was her reputation as a consumer activist
which made her an attractive figure for Beech-Nut. All of the Beech-Nut ads utilized a
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simple design, with the drawing of a Beech-Nut Gum pack underneath a head shot and
quote of the featured person. Each Harlemite was identified by name and a short
description. Edward Matthew's ad, for example, said he was a "talented performer on the
Major Bowes Sunday radio program." The headline in this ad read, "A grand flavor," and
Matthews was quoted as saying, "Yes Sir! Beech-Nut is one of my favorites. It not only
tastes great, but its delicious flavor is long-lasting. Try a package and you'll find out
what I mean." Ruppert Beer was the only other national advertiser to use an African
American in its ad, and it followed a similar tactic of using a named, local African
American instead of an anonymous black model. Ruppert' s ads featured its local
salesman Cecil Cooke, and in this way these ads were triply effective: they used a
positive African American image, ran in the black press, and identified the company as
an employer of black sales representatives.
Though Philip Morris did not create special "Negro market" ads, in the fall of
1941 it launched an extensive campaign to attract Harlem consumers. It hired African
American John Sandifer as its local sales representative, and placed large and frequent
ads in the Amsterdam News. This campaign was national in scope in that Philip Morris
advertised in black newspapers throughout the country, selecting the Amsterdam News as
its representative in Harlem. In addition to its advertisements Philip Morris also
sponsored a dance called the "Philip Morris Frolic" to benefit the James Weldon Johnson
Literary Guild. Participants collected Philip Morris cigarette wrappers which they turned
in at the dance for prizes, and event proceeds bought books for local underprivileged
children.
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The Amsterdam News heavily promoted Philip Morris's campaign, arguing its
success meant more jobs for African Americans, better revenue lor black newspapers,
and enhanced status for the black community in Harlem. The paper displayed Philip
Morris advertising exhibits in its office windows and published frequent articles and I
editorials highlighting the racial appeal of the company's activities. Referring to Sandifer
as the "only Negro connected in such a capacity with a big cigarette concern,"" 2 an
Amsterdam News editorial praised Philip Morris as having "far-sighted executives" who
were among the first national manufacturers "impressed with the potentialities of the vast
Negro Market." 113
.
•
A lew weeks into the campaign the Amsterdam News published an article titled,
"Philip Morris Cigarettes Catch Public's Fancy." In copy that sounds more like a
marketing brochure than a newspaper article, the article reported that "the swing to Philip
Morris has been even more sensational than originally anticipated." 1 14 In addition to
hiring an African American "as a salesman and good will builder," Philip Morris also
showed its appreciation of black consumers through its direct marketing campaign in the
black press. Generating advertising revenue for the Amsterdam News, the article
reasoned, benefited the entire Harlem community:
We present news that dailies will not print about you socially, civicly, politically,
etc.: we fight your economic battles for you and stand out for the cause of the
Negro at every turn. We are publishing your newspaper! We sometimes wonder,
however, if you realize that you could reciprocate this service by simply
mentioning to our advertisers that you saw their advertisements in the
[Amsterdam] News.
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By purchasing Philip Morris cigarettes Harlemites exercised consumer choice, showed
their support for the Amsterdam News, and encouraged Philip Morris and other
advertisers to target black consumers. The article also encouraged retailers to "cut
yourself an even larger slice of the Philip Morris volume melon - by giving added
window and counter space to Philip Morris cigarettes and displays." Philip Morris's
activities paid off, and in the first year of its "Negro market "campaign it increased its
sales over thirty percent, jumping from seventh to fourth in cigarettes sold in Harlem. 115
Other companies who invested in Harlem's consumer market reaped benefits, too.
Gordon Baking Company became the top seller of bread in Harlem after employing two
African American salespeople there. In 1940 Pabst beer sold only 15,000 cases of beer in
Harlem, but after hiring a black sales representative it sold over 12,000 cases in May
1942 alone, jumping from fourth to first place among beer distributors. 1 16 Despite these
successes, most national advertisers failed to address black consumers in Harlem during
the Great Depression. Ads from local businesses and black beauty companies continued
to dominate advertising space in the Amsterdam News and the Age, and at the start of
World War II less than twenty major corporations employed black marketing
representatives to work the "Negro market" in Harlem.
Conclusion
During the Great Depression, Harlemites used consumption to increase black
employment, gain respect from merchants, and improve their economic status. Excluded
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from many areas of American society, black New Yorkers joined African Americans
from around the country in fighting for their inclusion in "consumer citizenship," using
the power of the purse even when other forms of power remained limited or completely
out of reach. The activities of consumer activists, black leaders, and black newspapers
may have been economically driven, but they also recognized that respect in the
consumer realm meant greater respect in other public arenas. Though they did not yet
direct their protests toward corporate America, the arguments and tactics of the 1930s
campaigns drew attention to the "Negro market," and established strategies which would
be taken up in the postwar era.
Convincing stores in Harlem of their value as consumers, black New Yorkers had
much less success convincing national manufacturers. Despite Paul Edwards' optimistic
appraisal in 1936 that "today the [Negro home] is being consciously and energetically
appealed to by means of planned advertising and other and various promotional and sales
efforts on the part of a rather broad field of producers,"
1 17
very few corporations sought
out black customers in the 1930s. Still, the modest attention from the advertising
industry and national manufacturers set the stage for developments during World War II
when corporate America would expand its "Negro market" campaigns.
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CHAPTER 2:
CITIZENS, CONSUMERS, AND WORKERS
When one black woman remarked, "Hitler was the one that got us out of the white
folks' kitchen," she expressed the sentiments of many in the black community that World
War II helped bring about new and better opportunities for African Americans. 1
I listorians often refer to the war as a watershed event in race relations, which catalyzed
activism in the black community and caused many Americans to reevaluate their own
racial beliefs and practices. The federal government became more involved in race
relations, needing both to demonstrate American egalitarianism in opposition to its
totalitarian enemies and to fill wartime labor shortages. Consequently, the government
implemented a racial propaganda campaign and grew more willing to respond to
demands and protests from African Americans.
The war was also a watershed moment for the "Negro market," and helped to
expand the tentative steps advertisers had taken during the Great Depression. African
Americans became a more visible part of American society, their incomes rose, and the
interest of advertisers increased, with many companies adding African American
salespeople to their staffs and advertising in Harlem's newspapers. Historian Lizabeth
Cohen finds that black consumers, like their white counterparts, were more willing to
make wartime sacrifices in order to ensure a postwar society that was increasingly
defined by access to consumer goods. Participating equally in the realm of consumption
meant participating more fully in American life, and when African Americans were
1 As quoted in Sherna Berger Gluck, Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the War, and Social
Change (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987).
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denied this they fought back. As they did with black political and economic rights,
Harlemites used the war as a springboard for their consumer rights campaigns.
What was the impact of WWII on the "Negro market," and how did the
government, corporate America, and African Americans shape that market's
development? In answering these questions I examine the ways in which wartime
demands on American society opened up opportunities for black rights, as well as the
connections between government campaigns to solicit black support and the expansion of
the "Negro market." Government actions, in fact, take center stage in this story, both in
encouraging interest in the black community and as a focal point for African American
consumer activism. Wartime experiences helped black New Yorkers increasingly
identify themselves as consumers and helped reinforce the importance of the "Negro
market" in their struggles for civil rights.
"The Negro Looks at the War"
As war broke out in Europe in 1939, memories of World War I greatly influenced
African Americans' attitudes and fears. During the first conflict many in the black
community followed the "Close Ranks" position first proposed by W.E.B. Du Bois in
1917, which encouraged African Americans to postpone their own struggles for equality
while the nation engaged in war. Du Bois and other black leaders believed that in a
conflict which purported to "make the world safe for democracy," black service and
loyalty would be rewarded with improvements in race relations and black rights. These
hopes proved false, however, and throughout the war blacks continued to face racial
prejudice and discrimination. Race riots and violence occurred all too frequently, and in
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the summer of 1919 seventy-seven blacks, including ten WWI soldiers, were lynched.
As historian Gary Donaldson shows, this violence was especially virulent in the South,
where "soldiers had their uniforms torn off, and many were beaten for no other reason
than to make sure they knew their places in southern society.
. . At least in the South,
fighting for America still did not transfer into racial equality, or even racial tolerance." 2
furthermore, blacks returning from Europe found that the government and media
stereotyped them as undisciplined and cowardly soldiers. Before the war's end Du Bois
himself recognized that the "Close Ranks" philosophy failed to improve American race
relations and the lives of most African Americans. 3
Understandably, then, as a new world conflict emerged, black leaders resisted any
suggestion that they compromise their activism for the sake of national unity. When the
first peacetime draft was instituted in the summer of 1940 the military was still racially
segregated, and African Americans were excluded from the Marines and confined to the
lower ranks in the other service branches. The Navy, for example, restricted black sailors
to the rank of messman, while in the Army there were only five black officers. 4 The
expansion of war-related industries pulled much of the nation out of the Great Depression
and put many Americans back to work, but here, too, black opportunities and progress
lagged far behind whites. White unemployment dropped from almost eighteen percent in
April 1940 to thirteen percent in October of that year but black unemployment remained
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steady at twenty-two percent. 5 Many defense industries limited black employment. In
1940, for example, the aircraft industry employed only 240 African Americans and as
late as March 1 942 black employment in defense industries was still less than three
percent.
6
The main organization protesting industrial discrimination was the March on
Washington Movement (MOWM), founded by A. Philip Randolph. Randolph proposed
a massive demonstration in Washington, D.C for the summer of 1941, and African
Americans around the nation rushed to join his organization. The MOWM held protests
in most urban centers, and the largest was in New York City in June 1941 when over
twenty thousand people filled Madison Square Garden. Movement activists demanded
that the president sign an executive order prohibiting discrimination in defense industries
or else face a march of one hundred thousand African Americans in Washington, D.C.
Significantly, Randolph included consumer rights in the campaign. "Nothing gripped
their heart and caught their interest and quickened their imagination more," argued
Randolph, "than the girding of our country for national defense without according them
the recognition and opportunity as citizens, consumers and workers they felt justified in
expecting." 7 The call to march, then, extended the demand for equal opportunities
beyond employment and politics to include consumer issues as well.
MOWM protests created problems for FDR, who knew that the march would be a
visible demonstration of national disunity at the very time the country was preparing for
5 Wynn, 40.
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war. Throughout the early summer of 1941 Roosevelt searched for a way to diffuse the
movement without taking official action. However, when it became clear that the march
might, indeed, draw one hundred thousand blacks to the nation's capital, FDR signed
Executive Order 8802 in late June, mandating an end to racial discrimination in
government and war-related industrial employment, and creating the Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC) to implement the changes. These measures, however, did
not automatically ensure equal employment. The FEPC's power was limited and in the
early 1940s half of the war production jobs remained closed to African Americans; where
blacks were employed they languished in low-paying, unskilled jobs. When blacks took
advantage of new opportunities and moved into traditionally white occupations, violence
and race riots often erupted. Likewise, the military establishment resisted attempts to
change existing racial policies, and stories of discrimination and mistreatment of black
soldiers frequently circulated in the black press.
When America entered the war in December 1941 it was clear that black support
was uncertain, and criticism from black groups and the black press caused alarm within
government agencies. Government correspondence repeatedly referred to "the Negro
problem" or "the Negro Question" and expressed a clear sense of anxiety about black
hostility. Three months into the war black activism crystallized around the Double V
campaign, started by the Pittsburgh Courier, Double V stood for victory abroad against
fascism and victory at home against racism, and drew on the "V for Victory" slogan that
had become a prominent symbol for the Allies. Soon picked up by other black
newspapers, Double V became a rallying cry for the African American community.
Although the movement worried government officials, many historians maintain that it
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was, in fact, a conservative campaign because it allowed for criticism within a framework
of support for the war. African Americans recognized that the best way to gain rights
was to pin them to the war effort and used the struggle against fascism as a way to
highlight America's own discriminatory and repressive policies. 8
Black New Yorkers expressed their attitudes about the war in a government
survey conducted in Harlem in April 1942, entitled "The Negro Looks at the War."
Utilizing many of the advertising industry's survey techniques, the study identified a
small sample of Harlem residents and sent interviewers to ask them about the war's aims,
the Double V campaign, the armed forces, and race relations in general. These
interviewers questioned over one thousand black New Yorkers and five hundred white
New Yorkers for comparison. The findings confirmed that black support for the war was
affected by racism and discrimination. When asked, "Is it important right now to beat
Germany and Japan or to make democracy work at home?" ninety percent of whites
interviewed responded it was more important to beat the Axis powers, while only forty-
seven percent of blacks agreed. 9 Even more shocking were the statistics that thirty-one
percent of African Americans believed they would fare the same under Japanese rule,
with eighteen percent responding they would be treated better by Japan. As the survey
reported, "the receptiveness of the Negroes to the Japanese propaganda line is reflected in
8
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the fact that of those who felt that Negroes would be treated better under Nipponese rule,
a large majority gave as their reason: 'The Japanese are colored and would not
discriminate against dark people.'" 10
Not surprisingly, the most important issues for black New Yorkers centered on
their lack of economic opportunities. When asked, "What do Negroes feel worse about
right now," forty-seven percent placed jobs at the top of the list, with wages the second
most common reason at twenty-two percent; sixty percent believed that blacks did not
have as good a chance as whites to get defense work. The report explained.
Not segregation nor purely social discrimination, but rather the barriers put in the
way of his normal desire to work and earn a decent living, are the foci of Negro
complaints today. Almost half of all Negroes interviewed ranked the
employment situation as their outstanding grievance. Incidental complaints
revealed that the menial jobs open to them and the fact that some employers
won't hire them were both aspects of this complaint. 1
1
Black New Yorkers argued that managers, government policies, and unions all prevented
them from obtaining work in defense industries. Employment statistics in the early 1940s
help explain these feelings, and at the end of 1940 forty percent of black New Yorkers
were on some type of government relief. At that time New York City unemployment as
a whole was worse than the national average but by mid- 1942 the city began receiving
contracts for defense work. Between July and October 1942, twelve percent of the
Navy's contracts went to city firms and this helped cut the city's unemployment rates in
half. Blacks left relief much slower than whites, however, and in 1942 their relief rates in
New York City actually rose from twenty-two to twenty-six percent. In that year blacks
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represented only 2.5 to 3 percent of all war workers nation-wide, and black income
remained 40 percent of white income. 12
Still, the survey indicated that a majority of black New Yorkers supported the war
even though their view of it remained influenced by their treatment as African
Americans. Part of their support was based on the expectation that the crisis could
improve race relations. Like whites, African Americans believed the sacrifices they
made during the war would produce a better society, although their expectations were
focused on increased racial tolerance. When asked, "If we win the war, do you think the
Negroes will be treated better than they are now, or worse, or about the same?" forty-six
percent responded "better" and only five percent felt they would be treated worse. The
most common reason given for a "better" response was that they would gain the respect
of white America, "out of gratitude for what the Negroes would have done to help win
the war."
13
The second most frequent reason given by Harlemites for why they felt African
Americans would be better off after the war was, "Negroes will take initiative to demand
better treatment," and throughout the war that's exactly what they did. As demonstrated
by black New Yorkers' participation in the March on Washington Movement, their
activism began even before Pearl Harbor, and it accelerated soon after. A government
report in April 1 942 remarked on the relationship between the war and rising black
activism:
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I he organizations for racial protest and advancement [have] acquired for the first
time a mass following. The urban Negro rank and file is more actively resentful
over the inequalities which have been accentuated by the defense program
Negroes on every class level are affected by the Jim Crow policies of the Army
and Navy, and the restrictions on economic development. To a greater extent
than ever before, the war has given Negroes, particularly Northern urban Negroes
a common focus of attention and a common resentment. This is reflected in the
fact that membership drives of the protest groups are more successful this year
than they have been for nearly twenty years. 14
For example, during the war the NAACP's national membership rose from 50,000 to
450,000. Harlemites joined this trend, flocking to existing organizations while starting
others, such as the West Harlem Riverside Defense Council and the Negro Labor Victory I
Committee (started by the leftist National Negro Congress). Most of these groups
merged their activism for black rights with war-related work.
s
Often, when black New Yorkers sought to change racial conditions they turned to
i
the federal government for assistance. Civil rights organizations continually lobbied the
federal government to increase opportunities for African Americans, and both the March
on Washington Movement and the "right to fight" campaigns lobbied for executive
orders to change government and industry policies. Black New Yorkers also sought help
|
from newly created government agencies. For example, after the FEPC was established
1 larlemites frequently turned to it for employment assistance. In its first eighteen months
the FEPC offices in New York City received over 1 100 complaints, more than in any
other city and twenty percent of the national total. Throughout the war, black New
Yorkers pressed the government to preserve the FEPC and extend its powers, holding
14
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rallies and conferences whenever the FEPC'fl existence was threatened. 1 s As the war
progressed black employment began exhibiting signs of improvement. Between 1940
and 1944 national black employment increased thirteen percent, with employment in war
production tripling during that period. Black income was also improving, from forty
percent of white income in 1942 to sixty percent in 1944. By the end of 1943 African
Americans in New York City began making gains, too, not just in numbers but in the
types of jobs as well, from 1940 to 1944 black employment in skilled and semi-skilled
fobs doubled. These increases came only after much protesting and lobbying on the part
of black New Yorkers, but showed them that government and industry could be
responsive to their demands. Throughout the entire conflict I larlemitcs continued
protesting military and industrial discrimination, seeking always to keep and extend any
gains made by the black community.
The "NegTO morale" campaign
The government needed black support for the war, and in surveys, protests, and
black newspapers, African Americans signaled that this support would not be automatic;
affirmative steps were needed to boost black morale. Once the war began the Office of
facts and figures (Off), which already ran many of the government's propaganda
efforts, became the lead organization directing the "Negro morale" campaign. Like many
war-related agencies. Of f was staffed by people who had been involved in government
service in the 1930s and were either New Dealers or liberal Republicans. Roosevelt
named the writer and Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLcish, to be director of the
13 Cheryl (ireenberg, "Or Docs ll Explode": Block Harlem in the < rreat Depression (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 199-200; "FEPC Rally," People's Voice, 23 June 1945, 2.
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agency. An outspoken opponent of fascism, MacLeish believed that WWII was a war of
liberation from the evils and prejudices of fascism. Historian Allan Winkler, whose book
The Politics ofPropaganda examines the internal dynamics of wartime propaganda
agencies, argues that MacLeish and his staff believed the home-front battle of the war
would be to win public support for these ideological goals. These men "took the Four
Freedoms
.
.
.
seriously and used the slogans to shape their messages about the war. A
brave new world was possible, and victory would help bring it about." 16
In creating its "Negro morale" campaign OFF sought the involvement of African
Americans and in March 1 942 held a conference for fifty black leaders in order to solicit
their advice on racial issues. OFF also employed African Americans in its organization
and named attorney Theodore Berry its top African American advisor. Berry had been
one of the lawyers on the 1938 New Negro Alliance court case which successfully
reestablished picketing for racial equality in employment, and he was also the former
chairman of the Allied Councils for Participation of Negroes in National Defense. In
March 1 942 he submitted a report titled, "Blue Print of Program for Strengthening Negro
Morale in War Effort." In this report he explained that African Americans held "a strong
and prevailing skepticism that this war is genuinely prosecuted for practical democratic
principles. They remember the last war and its slogan of 'Save the World for
Democracy' and the treatment of Negro troops in France when they returned home." He
further argued that this skepticism was fed by an awareness of the colonial policies of
Great Britain, especially in regards to South Africa and India, and also because there was
16
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"no change of attitude in this country which would convince them that their efforts are
wanted or that Negroes will be given an opportunity to serve according to their talents,
abilities and inclinations without imposition of racial restrictions." Specifically, Berry
argued that the black community objected to limited opportunities in the military and
industry, and resented continuing legalized segregation in the South. 17
To gain black support Berry recommended a three part plan. First, the
government should use propaganda techniques such as pamphlets, radio programs,
posters, and newsreels to educate African Americans on war aims. Berry argued that
propaganda messages should be designed to "convince the Negro public of the need for
their full participation and that it is desired.
|
And] clearly define the stake the Negro has
in the war effort." Secondly, Berry suggested the government also produce propaganda
to educate white audiences about the contributions of blacks to American society and to
the war effort. Berry argued, "any treatment of this problem must recognize the basic
principle that morale depends upon unity of belief, thought, and action; that the Negro
must be treated in every respect as a part of the inclusive whole program and not as an
isolated, segregated phase."
19 He spent a large portion of his report on the necessity of
changing white attitudes and suggested issuing a "Presidential statement declaring those
practicing race prejudice and discrimination to be fifth columnists and aiding the enemy
by inciting civilian unrest." Berry proposed using integrated scenes in propaganda and
suggested OFF create "radio, cinema and graphics of Negro and white workers, soldiers.
17
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civilian defense workers, etc.
. . . working together."20 Thirdly, Berry stressed the
necessity of supplementing propaganda techniques with substantial changes in
government policies. He argued for all federal agencies and military branches to
eliminate race restrictions, for the government to urge labor unions to lift racial barriers,
and for the inclusion of African American representatives in all war organizations and
committees. Berry wrote,
the success of this or any program treating the problem of Negro morale depends
chiefly upon the degree to which other governmental agencies, particularly the
Army and Navy, will cooperate
. . . establish a clear non-discriminatory policy
and practice which can be used as a local or community pattern. The grass-roots
of low Negro morale is what they see and experience in the home community.
We cannot bolster morale by words alone . 21 [emphasis added]
He noted the added expense and waste of maintaining segregated military and industrial
facilities, and the loss of workers in the war effort because of racial discrimination. Berry
further believed that changing racist and discriminatory policies would have the added
effect of boosting America's international reputation and distinguishing it from its fascist
22
enemies.
The three parts of this plan were supported in varying degrees by different OFF
staff members. MacLeish echoed many of Berry's ideas in a letter to General Philip
Fleming of the Federal Works Agency, writing, "words should be supplemented by
action," and that OFF needed to push for changes in the government, military, and
defense industries. Like Berry, MacLeish felt OFF should educate the white public and
suggested that the "informational facilities of the federal government should be used to
20
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inform white employers of labor and the white population of the country in general of the
Negro's part in American industry and American defense and the important role played
by Negroes in the history and development of the United States." 23 William Alexander,
an African American physician and advisor to the government, offered a proposal for
"Negro Morale Building" that included a wide variety of media and he further argued that
the government should encourage mainstream media to refrain from "slander and comical
jokes concerning Negroes, and
. . . make an attempt to have them portrayed in their
natural capacity."24 What Berry, MacLeish, and Alexander recognized was that in order
to improve race relations the government had to address both white and black
communities, and demonstrate to the general public the contributions of African
Americans. Although not everyone at OFF agreed with the need to improve the material
lives of African Americans, they were more likely than later war propagandists to push
for concrete changes in race relations. As a propaganda agency, however, OFF had very
little power over government policies, and while it could identify the problems facing
African Americans it could not change them.
OFF did not live long enough to implement many of its proposals and throughout
the spring of 1942 different agencies competed for control of government race relations.
Even beyond the African American morale campaign the entire government propaganda
program began breaking down under the stress of decentralization. In June 1942
Roosevelt consolidated OFF with three other government agencies to create the Office of
War Information (OWI), responsible for managing the entire propaganda machine.
Archibald MacLeish to General Philip B. Fleming, 7 April 1942, record group 208, box 3,
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While military branches continued to distribute their own information, OWI had more
power over government agencies than OFF and remained in charge of propaganda efforts
for the rest of the war. Roosevelt named Elmer Davis, an author and popular radio
journalist, as the head of OWI, and MacLeish was given the lesser position of Assistant
Director in Charge of Policy Development. Davis held many of the political convictions
of MacLeish but wanted propaganda to be less aggressive and idealistic, and he drew
large numbers of OWI's staff from corporate America. 25 Gardner Cowles, Jr., publisher
of several mid-western newspapers and Look magazine, became head of OWI's Domestic
Branch, and turned increasingly to executives from the radio and advertising industries.
Historians have noted that these men produced slicker, "gut-level" appeals and there was
a "steady absorption by OWI of the sales-promotion ideas and techniques."26 OWI
established an advertising division as a liaison to Madison Avenue, and helped set up the
War Advertising Council (WAC), an organization of advertising agencies, major
manufacturers, and government officials. Advertising was used throughout the war to
promote government messages, such as rationing, conservation, and buying war bonds,
and through OWI and WAC, corporations were assisted in the creation of war-related
advertisements. In effect, the government helped businesses advertise the war and their
own companies at the same time. The new staff members at OWI were not opposed to
improving racial conditions but their approach to propaganda was very different from
25
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those in OFF, and gradually many from OFF left OWI. MacLeish resigned in January
1943 and most of his former staff members soon followed. 27
The development of "Negro morale" propaganda changed focus under OWI.
First, African Americans themselves had less voice in OWI's propaganda policy
decisions. Although the agency continued to employ black staff members it held no
equivalent to OFF's conference of national African American leaders and relied more
Often on white advisors. In September 1942, George Barnes, a top Davis aide,
recommended that Milton Starr be considered OWI's main advisor on the black
community. Barnes argued that Starr, a white owner of theaters in Southern black
neighborhoods, "knows more about Negroes and Negro reactions than anyone in OWI."
Barnes claimed that there was too much infighting between African American leaders for
OWI to trust any one black person or group and suggested that Starr "be quietly regarded
as the staff advisor on problems in this f1eld. ,,2X Although Starr believed in the necessity
for a "Negro morale" program, in his OWI correspondence his descriptions of African
Americans were often less than complimentary. For example, in October 1942 Starr
contacted the head of the Radio Bureau to discuss creating radio programs for the black
community. In his justification for these programs he wrote, "Negroes, constituting one-
tenth of the population, represent a large apathetic and seditious minded group according
to all the intelligence we can get on the subject. They have a large potential for patriotic
response, and this response would surely be forthcoming if the Government would only
27
Alan Brinklcy, End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1995), 189; Winkler, 42.
Memorandum from George A Barnes to M.S. Eisenhower, 28 September 1942, record group
208, box 8, Records of the Office of" War Information.
78
see fit to embark on a modest information program identifying the Negro with the war."29
Throughout his employment at OWI Starr pressured movie companies, including the
black-owned All American News, to minimize depictions of American racial problems in
their newsreels and films. 30 Starr and his work drew fierce criticism from the black
community, and Theodore Berry resigned from OWI over disagreements with Starr's
approach to the "Negro morale" campaign. Walter White, head of the NAACP,
conducted a lengthy correspondence with Elmer Davis over African Americans' distrust
of Starr, characterizing him as the owner of "a chain of theatres in the South chiefly
located in Negro slum and dive areas."31 Under pressure from black organizations and
newspapers, Starr resigned from OWI in May 1943. 32
In addition to limiting black contributions to OWI's propaganda, within the
agency there were few proposals that suggested African Americans could best be reached
by improving their material circumstances, and internal memos suggest that the agency
self-consciously stayed away from this issue. The most direct example of this comes
again from George Barnes, and his characterization of the OWI campaign is worth
quoting at length:
It is of utmost importance, I feel, to recognize the fact that OWI is concerned only
indirectly with the problem of anti-Negro discrimination as such. . . . this Office is
directly concerned with the much more immediate problem of getting the Negro
to support and take part in the war effort. One approach - and certainly the most
fruitful from a long-time standpoint - is to put an end [to] the discriminatory
29
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practices and abusive treatment which tend to alienate Negro sympathies. In the
immediate situation, however, the approach necessarily must be less idealistic.
We must go direct to the Negro with an appeal for participation in the war, using
methods that will bring the quickest, most positive results. That means filling him
with information about his stake in the war, what Negroes are doing in the armed
services and otherwise; it means, in effect, a direct andpowerful Negro
propaganda effort as distinctfrom a crusadefor Negro rights. That's putting it
bluntly, but I believe it is the case. 33 [emphasis added]
OWI's program became more segregated as officials felt little need to educate the white
public about the contributions of blacks or about how racism hurt the war effort and
concentrated instead on developing campaigns that appealed exclusively to African
Americans. Consequently, much of the government's African American campaign
developed propaganda intended solely for black audiences. 34
For the "Negro morale" campaign, OWI created pamphlets and posters for
distribution to black neighborhoods, sent representatives to give speeches at rallies and
meetings held by black organizations, and developed shows for black-appeal radio
programs. Like OFF, OWI also set up a "Negro press" division through which it
funneled news stories and photographs to black newspapers. OWI also used this division
to develop and distribute political cartoons for use in the black press, and these cartoons
are a good example of the type of propaganda directed to black-only audiences. Cartoons
were created mostly by African American artists who contracted with OWI; one of the
most-used artists was Charles Alston, a Harlem artist who worked and taught in WPA
programs during the Great Depression. Alston's cartoons were designed to boost black
morale by highlighting positive actions taken by the government on behalf of African
33 Memorandum from George A Barnes to M.S. Eisenhower, 28 September 1942, record group
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Americans and by demonstrating the community's participation and stake in the war.
Many cartoons portrayed the federal government as an ally in the struggle for racial
equality. For example, one cartoon showed an FBI agent jailing a farmer with the
headline, "US Indicts Sugar Planters for Holding Negro Laborers in Peonage." The
planter is told, "And While You're There, Find Out Something About a Man Named Abe
Lincoln." Other cartoons depicted African Americans involved in the World War II
effort, as soldiers and workers, or in historic scenes at other American wars. One cartoon
even included an African American in the boat at George Washington's crossing of the
Delaware River, placing African Americans in the story of America's founding. OWI
produced dozens of cartoons during the war and several appeared in the Amsterdam News
and the Age. These images were extremely positive representations of African
Americans, connecting them to the war effort and demonstrating government support for
the black community. Many focused on the themes of American democracy and
egalitarianism, but some, like the "sugar planter" cartoon, dealt with issues of racial
discrimination. As such they had the potential to upset a resistant white audience, but as
propaganda intended solely for the black press their messages could be more assertive
than those that might risk being seen by whites.
Although OWI directed much of its "Negro morale" program to African
Americans, sometimes it reached out to more mainstream audiences, and in so doing the
government faced the difficult task of appealing to African Americans without offending
whites. As historian George Roeder explains, the challenge was to:
encourage those excluded from equal participation in American society to become
fully engaged in the war effort without frightening a large portion of the
population who agreed with practices that linked opportunity to race, gender,
class, religion, and ethnicity. . . . [A]s recognized by [one] OWI analyst, one
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person's needs of social change were another's fears. The conditions that some
sought to correct, others wished to protect. 35
Controversial topics, such as social integration or race riots, were avoided, and
propaganda repeatedly reinforced the message that domestic unity was necessary for
victory. Because race was such an explosive issue the government created its I
propaganda for mainstream audiences in such a way as to promote hlack participation m
the war without offering a radical redefinition of race relations. It was a narrow road to
walk.
Two propaganda posters, "Pvt. Joe Louis" and "United We Win," demonstrate
some of the ways in which the government attempted to negotiate and satisfy opposing
racial attitudes. The first, "Pvt. Joe Louis" |Ligure 2.1], was released by OFF in May
1942, and was the only poster to portray an African American in a combat pose. Louis is
depicted in army fatigues, lunging with his bayoneted rifle stretched out before him.
There is no background on the poster and the wording reads, "Pvt. Joe Louis says -
'We're going to do our part
.
. .
and we'll win because we're on God's side.'" Although
Louis's aggressive position seems potentially inflammatory, both the construction of the
poster and the choice of Louis as the soldier help explain this image. Louis's public
persona was that of a peaceful, quiet man - he never drank heavily or smoked, and his
trainers advised him never to have his photo taken with white women or gloat after
beating a white competitor. ' In 1938 Joe Louis fought German Max Schmeling for the
heavyweight championship, in a match that was depicted as symbolically pitting America
35
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Pvt. Joe Louis says.
our part
because
side"
Source: National Archives and Records Administration
Figure 2.1 : Joe Louis World War II Poster
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against Nazi Germany. Two years earlier, in 1936, Louis had lost to Schmeling, but at
that time their fight was seen more as a contest for racial superiority than a battle of
nations. When Schmeling won the earlier match many whites in America celebrated:
"hundreds of Americans sent Schmeling congratulatory telegrams, and a newspaper
reported cheers in the gallery of the House of Representatives, in late session, when the
result was announced."37 The situation was very different in 1938. Everywhere
Schmeling appeared in the U.S. he was met with boos and taunts of "Nazi," and was
pelted with fruit as he approached the ring to fight Louis. Louis's quick and decisive
victory over Schmeling was celebrated by white and black Americans alike, and in the
process he was transformed from black hero to American hero.
This status was enhanced in January 1 942 when he became a private in the Army.
The press was eager to portray Louis as a hardworking soldier who did not receive any
special treatment from the Army, and continually wrote of the financial sacrifices he
made to be a soldier. He was all the more admired by white Americans for remaining
uncritical of race relations even though he was assigned to a segregated unit on Long
Island. While in the Army Louis was placed in Special Services where he sold defense
bonds, held exhibition matches to raise funds for the military, toured army camps, and
helped improve military race relations by appearing in propaganda media. All of this
helps explain the depiction of Louis in his propaganda poster. Louis was an American
who had defeated a German, therefore he both literally and symbolically demonstrated
American superiority over Germany. Louis's power defended, not threatened, America,
and thus it was safe to present him in a combat role. Because his appointment to Special
37
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Services was well publicized everyone understood he was not an actual combat sohder.
Additionally, his uniform and weapon, in comparison to posters of white servicemen,
appear old-fashioned. Combined with the stark black background, the poster has an
anachronistic quality to it, placing Louis outside the actual WWII fighting. The caption
accompanying Louis's picture was a famous quote that he gave after his first fight for the
military in March 1 942. The match raised money for the Navy Relief Society and before
the fight Louis addressed the crowd and media, saying "We're going to do our part . . .
and we'll win because we're on God's side," the exact wording on the poster. After his
speech, the press and public lavished praise on Louis for his patriotism and for
interpreting the war as a holy war. There was a poem written which was titled, "Joe
Louis Named the War" and President Roosevelt personally thanked Louis for his
comments.
Another poster created for white and black Americans was "United We Win,"
[Figure 2.2], issued by the War Manpower Commission in 1943. The poster showed two
factory workers, one white and one black, working together on an aircraft, and
exemplifies Roeder's argument that visual imagery promoted the importance of domestic
unity to victory. This poster was the only one to incorporate African Americans directly
into a setting with whites, and it depicted a peaceful scene of integration that did not hint
at any racial tension. The necessity of showing integrated work situations was stronger in
industry than in the still-segregated military. In the background of the poster is a soft
glow which illuminates both the workers and a large American flag hanging behind them.
38
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Source: National Archives and Records Administration
Figure 2.1 : United We Win World War II Poster
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This type of poster appealed for job harmony on the grounds that it was patriotic, and
spoke to white and black workers and their employers. Like "Pvt. Joe Louis," this poster
was constructed in such a way as to soften its racial message. The black worker could be
interpreted as bowing to the white worker, who is watching him, and at the very least he
is in a deferential position. Additionally, these two men are shown in an integrated
workplace, not an integrated social situation, which might have been less palatable to
whites.
Despite attempts to diminish their racial messages, both "Pvt. Joe Louis" and
"United We Win" posters included blacks in the war effort and in American society in
ways that were new and different. African Americans and black organizations flooded
OWI with requests for these and other "Negro morale" posters. Roeder writes, "during
the war years the federal government probably distributed more respectful visual images
of blacks than it had in its previous century and a half of existence."39 In these images
African Americans were soldiers, workers, and heroes - equal Americans - not Aunt
Jemimas, Pickaninnys
,
or happy-go-lucky servants. Although OWI officials repeatedly
stressed the need to downplay World War II as a race war, in their propaganda they
continually pitted America against her enemies in ways that reinforced the message that
American democracy included racial equality, and that it was superior to the racist
ideologies of Nazi Germany. That positive black propaganda, even in the most carefully
constructed designs, had the potential to upset the racial order was not lost on those who
opposed this idea, and many politicians and ordinary citizens wrote to OWI expressing
their outrage. In short, while the "Negro morale" campaign was at times segmented or
39
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softened for white audiences, it opened up a space in the national cultural dialogue to
include groups who had been previously excluded.
The government's actions during WWII were important for the "Negro market" ir
several ways. Because propaganda challenged popular stereotypes of African Americans
and included them more fully in American society it helped support the idea that they
were productive members of society, worthy, among other things, of attention as
consumers. Also, many OWI staffers were drawn from the advertising industry and
were exposed, for the first time, to a black constituency. Those who worked directly on
the "Negro morale" campaign gained experience appealing to black consumers and
became more familiar with the treatment and demands of African Americans. Most
would return to advertising work after the war and take this experience back with them.
As it had in the 1930s, the government published reports and statistics on black income
and spending habits, demonstrating to potential advertisers the value of the black
consumer market. It also became more directly involved by participating in "Negro
market" seminars. In May 1943 Gardner Cowles, along with other OWI staffers,
participated in a meeting held in New York City and sponsored by the Council for
Democracy (CFD). Organized in 1940, the CFD's goal was to increase support for
military and industrial production, and after Pearl Harbor, to promote domestic unity and
war work. Henry Luce was a financial backer of the organization, whose members
included major corporations and white liberals. A. Philip Randolph was an original CFD
board member and Walter White joined the group in 1943. One of the main goals of the
May 1943 conference was to help black newspapers gain increased national advertising.
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In addition to OWI staffers, representatives from the white press, trade journals and
national corporations attended the meeting. 40
The government also unintentionally encouraged companies to advertise in black
newspapers through changes in federal tax policy. During the war the government
required companies to pay a heavy tax on profits made from increased war production;
this "excess profits tax," as it was called, could be extremely heavy, anywhere from
twenty-five to ninety percent. Rulings by the IRS, however, allowed companies to
deduct advertising from this tax, encouraging businesses to put money into marketing
instead of paying it to the federal government. Journalists Mary Alice Sentman and
Patrick Washburn argue that this policy had the inadvertent result of attracting advertisers
to the black press. "Given this incentive," they argue, "the black press, formerly
considered inconsequential or a duplication by many national advertisers, became an
attractive supplementary advertising vehicle." Studying the ads in the Pittsburgh
Courier, Sentman and Washburn found that there was a sixty percent increase in national
advertisements between 1941 and 1945 (with a high of seventy six percent in 1944). And
not only was there a total increase, the types of ads changed during this time period as
well. Ads directly aimed at blacks, defined by Sentman and Washburn as those that
mentioned African Americans in the copy or used African American people in the ads,
increased thirteen percent.
41
Clearly, the racial, social, and economic circumstances
See Finkle, 79-80; "Conference on Negro Press to feature Wilkie, Buck," People's Voice, 17
April 1943, 31; Council for Democracy, Negro Press Conference, Sponsored by the Councilfor
Democracy, (New York, 1943).
41 Mary Alice Sentman and Patrick S. Washburn. "How Excess Profits Tax Brought Ads to Black
Newspaper in WWII." Journalism Quarterly 64, no. 4 (1987): 770.
89
created by the war, and the government's responses to them, facilitated the wartime
expansion of the "Negro market."
Promoting Harlem's Consumer Market
On both the national and local level African Americans became more involved in
the promotion and activities of the "Negro market." Nationally, Claude Barnett continued
his work surveying black consumption and publicizing the benefits of advertising in
black newspapers. Barnett also spoke at many "Negro market" conferences and wrote to
major manufacturers during the war, urging them to advertise in black papers. Barnett'
s
organization, the Associated Negro Press, published surveys and statistics on the
circulation and advertising rates of its member organizations, and helped black
newspapers promote themselves to corporate America. In 1944 Barnett also helped with
the formation of Associated Publishers, Inc. (API), a national advertising representative.
API joined Interstate United Newspapers as the second black-owned advertising
representative, both headquartered in New York City.
One of the first papers to work with API was the People 's Voice, a Harlem
newspaper started by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. in February 1942. Rev. Powell used the
paper as an outlet for his political aspirations, having just won a seat on the New York
City Council in 1941. Billed as a working-class, crusading publication distinct from the
sensationalized style of the Amsterdam News and Age, the paper quickly established itself
as a force within the black community. The Rev. Powell and C.B. Powell, publisher of
the Amsterdam News and no relation to Rev. Powell, each used their papers to attack the
other's motives and political views. The People 's Voice's circulation reached over
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twenty-nine thousand by the end of 1943, second behind the Amsterdam News wh,eh had
a circulation of over 84,000. Like the Age and Amsterdam News, the People s Voice
criticized racial discrimination in the military and war industries, and gave voice to
I larlemites' frustrations.
Each of Harlem's three weekly black papers aligned itself with a different
advertising representative. The People 's Voice joined API, the Amsterdam News stayed
with white-owned W.B. Ziff& Company, and the Age remained a client of Interstate
I Jnited Newspapers (IUN). IUN was the largest of these organizations and expanded its
client list throughout the war. William Black, a former advertising manager for the
Amsterdam News and Harlem salesman for the General Baking Company, became head
of IUN in 1942. Under his leadership the organization obtained a great deal of national
advertising for its clients, and its most prominent advertisers included Bond Bread,
Calvert, Coca Cola, Pabst, Pepsi, Seagrams, and most of the major cigarette companies.
Interestingly, many of IUN's "Negro market" clients advertised in the People 's Voice and
the Amsterdam News, while only Pepsi advertised in its New York City member paper,
the Age.
In 1944 IUN published a marketing brochure designed to solicit advertising for
the black press in which it characterized the white press as "inadequate" and "indifferent"
to African Americans, and argued that only in black newspapers could companies reach
black consumers: "the NEGRO PRESS does not offer just a repeat of your white press
advertising ... it offers you results your white press ad isn't getting!!" Focusing mostly
on food and beverage manufacturers, the brochure repeated the message of many trade
journals of the 1930s, arguing that blacks were important food buyers because they
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preferred quality goods, did the food purchasing in many "better type" white homes, and
spent a greater proportion of their income on food. IUN claimed that mainstream
magazines had low black readership and therefore black newspapers were a better
medium to reach black consumers. They were better than radio, since fifty percent of
black women worked outside the home they did not listen to afternoon soap operas, a
popular place for radio advertisements. The brochure erroneously claimed that half of
African American homes had no radios, although most surveys placed black ownership
over seventy-five percent. IUN stated, "Daytime radio includes very little Negro talent,"
implying that black consumers were not effectively reached on all-white programming.
This may have also been a reference to the "Don't Buy" campaigns in black
communities, arguing in essence that if radio programs failed to give jobs to African
Americans then their advertisers would not be supported by black consumers. Finally,
the IUN brochure argued that advertisements in black newspapers were cost-effective:
"The NEGRO MARKET, twice the size ofNew York City, can be bought for less than
hajf the cost of an ad in all the New York daily white press."42
Another national black organization which worked for greater "Negro market"
advertising was the Negro Newspapers Publishers Association (NNPA).43 Formed in
1939, the NNPA was an organization of black newspapers from around the nation, and
throughout the war it held annual conferences, met with government officials, and
lobbied for greater access for African American newspaper correspondents. Although
advertising in black papers was just one of its many concerns, at every NNPA conference
4
"
"America's Negroes Live as a 'Country Within a Country' in many places as a 'City Within a
City'" box 132, Claude A. Barnett Papers.
43
Also referred to as the National Negro Publishers Association or the Negro Publishers
Association.
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it held sessions about obtaining greater local and national adverting, with the following
top,cs listed in their programs: "Why are we not getting the big national accounts," "Is
quack medicine, numbers, good luck charms, etc. type of ads hurting us," and "Should
we establish our own cooperative agency."44 In the summer of 1943 NNPA
representatives held a series of meetings with Vice President Henry Wallace, Attorney
General Francis Biddle, War Manpower Commission Chairman Paul McNutt, and
various military officials where it discussed racial discrimination in war industries and
the military, establishing black war correspondents, and increasing government
advertising in black newspapers. Out of these meetings the NNPA formed a committee
to advise the OWI on its dealings with the black press. 45 NNPA also monitored the
advertising content of black newspapers. At its 1944 annual conference NNPA passed a
resolution "toward the elimination of all undesirable and racially offensive advertising
from the columns ofNNPA papers." The Amsterdam News reported, "most delegates
interpreted that to mean that advertisements on luck charms, magic pills, salve 'to make
the skin white,' and other phony copy would in the future be rejected." At the
conference, C.B. Powell stated that these were "meant only for the gullible and
superstitious. We usually reject it as a matter of policy. In doing so, we lost about
$25,000 worth of business a year, but I am convinced that it is for the best interest of our
group to do so.'"46 Apparently, Powell did not consider products like Dr. Palmer's Skin
Whitener and Sweet Georgia Brown Hair Straightener to fall under the category of
44
"Program of the Meeting of the National Newspapers Publishers Association," box 143, Claude
A. Barnett Papers.
45
Finkle, 83-85.
46
"Publishers End 4-Day Meet; Sengstacke Re-elected Head," New York Amsterdam News, 24
June 1944, 1,5.
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"racially offensive," as those advertisements frequented the pages of the Amsterdam
News.
Of course, the Amsterdam News, People 's Voice, and Age all continued to
promote black consumption and worked to increase advertising in their papers. The
Amsterdam News held a conference on advertising in June 1942, billed as the
-first
advertising and marketing forum ever held on the subject of the Negro market."47
Speakers included William Black of IUN, William Ziff of W.B. Ziff Company, and
various African American sales representatives from major advertisers. Also presenting
at the conference were representatives from the Department of Commerce, advertising
agencies, and marketing research firms. These speakers discussed methods for attracting
companies to the "Negro market," the vital role of African American marketers in
educating the advertising industry about black consumption, the place of advertising in
the war effort, and the need for further research into black consumption patterns.
Although the Amsterdam News organized the conference, both the People 's Voice and the
Age sent members of their advertising departments to the event, and the three papers all
hailed it as a successful venture.
The People 's Voice worked to gain corporate advertisers and became a member of
the Audit Bureau of Circulations to, in its words, "furnish advertisers with verified
reports on [its] circulation." It even went so far as to promote its paper as a service to
advertisers: "Whether you are selling ideas or service or merchandise, you can reach this
vast market most effectively and economically through the advertising columns of the
47
"Star-News Stages Advertising Meet," New York Amsterdam News, 20 June 1942, 26,
48
Advertisement in People's Voice, 4 March 1944, 10.
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People 's Voice."
1
The paper clearly wanted advertising revenue but it was sensitive to
any risk this might bring by alienating its readership - and often tried to assure both sides
that it was working for their best interests. On its editorial page it ran the slogan, "we
cannot be bought and will not be sold," and assured black New Yorkers that it would
maintain a militant and independent position whether or not advertisers approved. In one
Of Powell's earliest editorials he addressed this issue, pledging to readers: "Advertisers
will never control this paper, even if Charlie Buchanan and I have to stand on 125 ,h street
with a tin cup and pencils. NOBODY IS GOING TO TELL US WHAT TO DO, WHAT
TO PRINT, OR HOW TO PRINT IT."50 He encouraged Harlemites to be engaged and
active consumers, and to use the People 's Voice as a tool in their spending decisions:
WHENEVER YOU SEE IT ADVERTISED IN THE VOICE, BUY IT.
Whenever you find out that it is not right, let us know immediately. Tell us and
we'll tell the world.
WHENEVER YOU DO NOT SEE IT ADVERTISED IN THE VOICE
DO NOT BUY IT, THIS MEANS THAT THE PRODUCT HAS NOT BEEN
'
INVESTIGATED, THAT THE MERCHANT IS NOT KNOWN TO US AND
WE, THEREFORE, DO NOT GUARANTEE FAIR TREATMENT OR A FAIR
PRICE. IN ALL YOUR SHOPPING USE THIS PAPER AS A GUIDE AND
YOU WILL NEVER GO WRONG.
Aware that this argument might upset advertisers, he assured them that this type of
militant stand would, in fact, make the People 's Voice a more attractive venue through
which to reach Harlemites:
One thing the business man must realize is that inasmuch as this is a
people's paper, his ad carries much more weight with us than with most of the
others. Any time the readers see an ad in this paper, they know that it is the real
McCoy, and they know that they can buy without fear of being gypped or pushed
around. . .
Advertisement in People's Voice, 23 January 1943, 13.
50 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. "Soapbox," People's Voice, 21 March 1941, 5.
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This column is also an open letter lo Mr. Business Man, lolling him that ifhe wan s really to sell his product, then here are people ready ,„ huy it h i
they believe in us.
Aiding Harlem's newspapers were two African American marketing
organizations in New York City that each got their start during the war. I larlem's Pabst
salesman William Graham formed W.B. Graham & Associates, Inc. in 1944. Graham's
chief advice to corporations was to use black celebrities and leaders in their
advertisements, arguing,
-(Jetting famous personalities to put in a good word lor your
product is one of the oldest secrets in advertising. But experience has proven the method
to work far more wonders among Negroes than a White endorsement among Whites.
That's because it's more a Negro's nature to imitate his 'hero.'" 51 Graham & Associates
brochures made strident arguments for the differences between white and black
consumers, maintaining that the "Negro Market" was "not, as some think, part of the
White Market in the usual sense of the word. It's a separate market - it's a lucrative
market - it's a virgin market."52 To help reach black consumers Graham & Associates
offered advertisers advice on public relations programs, plans for special "Negro market"
campaigns, and access to their black celebrity contacts.
fhe other local black-owned marketing company was the Negro Market
Organization (NMO), founded by Harlemite David J. Sullivan. Before launching his own
company, Sullivan had managed a General Electric retail store, and been both district
manager for the Wilson Distilling Company and advertising manager for the Amsterdam
M W.B. Graham & Associates, Inc., "Beat Those Drums!" Schomburg Center Clippings file:
"Consumer Market: Chronology, 1930-1948."
" W.B. (iraham & Associates, Inc., "The Race is On," Schomburg Center Clippings Hie,
"Consumer Market: Chronology, 1930-1948."
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News. Sullivan was a member of the Metropolitan Association of Salesmen, Harlem's
organization of African American marketers and salespeople, and held various offices in
the group. Gaining national attention through his wartime trade journal articles about
black consumption, Sullivan would continue to be a conspicuous figure for the next two
decades. "He knows his market as few whites know theirs," wrote Philip Salisbury,
Executive Editor for the trade journal Sales Management™ NMO offered companies
connections to the black press, research on black consumers in 31 different regions, the
creation of marketing campaigns designed to reach them, and general public relations
expertise on working with the black community. Like Graham, Sullivan warned that,
"studies repeatedly reveal that, you can't reach the Negro market through general media."
He urged companies to hire African American marketing specialists: "owing to the need
for specialized advertising and selling appeals to reach the Negro consumer, due to the
peculiarities of the market's buying habits, you should have expert counsel on hand to
reach them." 55 In its first few years NMO worked with national advertisers such as
Liebmann Breweries and Tip-Top Bread, and also included among its clients the J.
Walter Thompson Company and the Federal Advertising Agency.
African Americans and black marketing organizations were aided in their efforts
by trade journal articles, which continued to describe black consumers as a racially
distinct market. Most industry experts believed that blacks approached the marketplace
primarily as African Americans. Class, gender, age, and educational differences went
53 David J. Sullivan, "Don't Do This - If You Want to Sell Your Products to Negroes," Sales
Management, I March 1943,48.
54
Ibid., 47.
55
David J. Sullivan, Negro Market Organization marketing brochure, 14 October 1943,
Schomburg Center Clippings File: "Consumer Market: Chronology, 1930-1948.".
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Ic was
unexamined. The only distinction that was recognized was between rural and urban
African Americans, and most of the articles offered advice on reaching urban black
consumers. As they had been in the 1930s, blaek consumers were deser.bed in the
language of'outsiders, and were compared to foreign markets; one Sullivan articl
even titled, "The American Negro - an "Export" Market at Home!" Not only was the
"Negro market" promoted as bigger than most foreign markets, the advantages of selling
to African Amerieans were that advertisers did not have to cross language barriers and
could use established disMbution channels. Reinforcing earlier theories, observers
frequently noted that blacks were brand conscious eonsumers, relying on the quality and
protection these products offered: "Not necessarily an inherent trait, this devotion to
quality may have arisen from years of working in moneyed homes; or it may be that,
having been cheated plenty, the negro is convinced he can depend only on quality
products."56 They noted that WWII had made African Americans more able eonsumers,
arguing that "the war and its manpower shortage have brought a windfall of opportunity,
and with it the Negro's greatest prosperity. Negro employment and Negro spending are
definitely up, and the Negro market of today is vastly different from that of former
years."
57 By 1943 this was estimated at over $10 billion, with food the largest
expenditure at $1.8 billion. As in the 1930s, housing costs took up a great deal of the
New York City black family's budget, but they also spent a considerable amount on
personal care items, alcohol, and medicines.
'"'the Negro Market," The Management Rcvic\\\ April 1943, 148.
7
Ibid., 147.
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Trade journals also repeated pre-war adviee about the best strategies for appealing
to black consumers. Advertisers were told that the "Negro market" was a segmented
market that could not be reached through mainstream campa,gns. African Americans
responded to advertisers they considered "friendly" to the black community, and
companies were told to advertise in the black press, avoid racially insensitive
advertisements and hire African American marketing specialists. David Sullivan was a
strong proponent of all three of these strategies, and in a Sales Management article he
wrote, "your planning today to include Negro specialists in the sales and distribution
picture certainly will insure your sales success with the consumer."58 Sullivan placed
particular emphasis on the importance of special ads and offered specific suggestions for
manufacturers and advertising agencies. He advised companies to steer clear of
illustrations that showed African Americans with "flat noses, thick lips, kinky hair and
owl eyes," or as "buxom, broad-faced, grinning mammies, and Aunt Jemimas." Blacks
in ads shouldn't use incorrect grammar and companies should "get away from ' Yas suh,
sho, dese, dem, dat, or dat'ere, gwine, you all." Additionally, racial stereotypes should be
avoided, such as African Americans eating watermelon or shooting craps, or black
children shown as "Pickaninnys."59 Sullivan warned his readers that using these
stereotypes in mainstream media, even if they were excluded from black newspapers,
could still have a disastrous impact on a company's ability to sell to black consumers. As
a cautionary example he told the story of "Nigger Hair" tobacco, produced by the
American Tobacco Company, makers of the popular Lucky Strike cigarettes. Although it
58
David J. Sullivan, "How Companies in Many Fields Cultivate the Negro Market," Sales
Management 15 December 1942, 66.
59
Ibid., 67.
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was only sold in the Northwest (where "few Negroes live") news of „ w
M
lh, blaok
press, and
.1 reeeived coverage
.., every major urban center. African Americans
Organized boycotts in several cities and the package was displayed "in many churches,
lodges, and halls of Negroes" where the company was labeled un A.nuu an and charged
with "disseminating Nazi propaganda." Even after apologizing to the blac k community
Pulling the product, the American Tobacco ( lompanj remained unpopular with many
All nan Anna k MIS.60
A new piece of advice given by many "Negro market" observers was to use the
radio" a marketing medium I rade journal .mules noted the prevalence oi radios in
black communities and Sales Management reported in 1 94 ! that ninety two percem of
black households in New Yotk owned al least one radio.61 During die war black appeal
radio programs multiplied, with black actors and musicians performing on many shows
sponsored b v govemmenl agent tea 01 black organizations in New York City, the mosl
famous of these shows was Mew WorldA ( 'omlng, which firsl aired on wmca in 1944,
The program was based on < Mllcy's book by Hie same name, and was co sponsored bv the
( !ity-Wide ( litizens Committee on I larlem.62 in thai same yeai 1944 Barbara Watson
became the city's first black radio producer, working for WNYC, and both NBC and
( US employed black musicians in their house bands/'
1
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81
Sullivan, "Don't Do This," 50; "The Negro Market and its Listening Habits," Sales
Management, 15 January 1943,40.
At least one episode on New WorldA '( 'omlng <io;iit directly with < onsumer issues, sec Martha
Biondi, To st,in,l and Fight, the Strugglefor ( 'Ml Rights In Postwar New York < 'lty(( lambridge i larvard
University Press, 2003), 89-90,
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Whenever blaeks appeared on shows with eorporate sponsors they earned positive
remarks from the blaek press, as when Sanka coffee sponsored the "Thin Man" show on
CBS, whieh featured the eharacter of a blaek scientist. The People 's Voice offered
thanks "to the Columbia Broadcasting system, to the Benton and Bowles agency, to
Sanka coffee and to Director Hyman Brown for having the courage to make this radical
departure from accepted radio practice to present a commercial radio program in which
Negroes appeared as other than comedians." The People \s Voice urged other advertisers
to follow suit, saying their efforts would appeal to "the intelligent Negro audience and
consumer."
64
Still, many programs continued to use African Americans in only
stereotypical roles or excluded black performers from their shows. A few companies
ventured into advertising on black-appeal shows, but radio was not yet the vehicle for
black consumer marketing it would be in the postwar years.
"Negro Market" Campaigns
The work of African American organizations and marketing specialists, national
advertising representatives, and trade journal writers all helped to increase attention to
black consumption. Advertisements in Harlem's black press increased substantially
during the war years, mostly from companies selling food and beverages, alcohol,
tobacco, and personal care products. More so than in the Great Depression, advertisers
created special campaigns featuring black models and celebrities to demonstrate more
directly their desire to court black consumers. Companies also showed a greater
WNYC," New York Age, 27 May 1944, 4; "Negro Announcer Slated for WMCA," New York Amsterdam
News, 6 January 1945, 9B. See also Savage, chapter 6.
64
"A Note of Appreciation to Radio," People 's Voice, 20 February 1943, 28
101
willingness to create very localized campaigns thai featured I larlemites ,.. their
advertisements.
Of the (luce black newspapers, the Amsterdam News benefited the mos1 from the
increased attention to I [arlem's consumer market, in pan because its circulation eclipsed
the other iw<> papers. By the end of the war dozens of national corporations placed
weekly ads in its pages. The Age had less sneccss gaining national adversers thai) either
ihe Amsterdam News or the People s Voice, with Pepsi one ofthe lew companies
regularly utilizing its pages. Other companies, such as Esso, Schenley, and St. Joseph's
Aspirin, ran occasional ads in Ihe Age, but most of these ads were small and laded to use
special
-Negro market" formats. I ike the Amsterdam News, the People s Voice was very
Successful at gaining corporate advertisers, and its pages quickly filled with ads of
national brand products, bond bread, ESSO, Pabst, Pepsi, and Vaseline were sonic of its
more frequent advertisers. Kuppci l beer was so intent on advertising in the People S
Voice that it successfully lobbied the brewers board of Trade to lilt the requirement that
newspapers publish lor one year before obtaining advertising from beer distributors.
Of the food manufacturers, bond bread waged the most extensive campaign m
I larlem, advertising weekly in both the People S Voice and the Amsterdam News, bond's
ads were large, often a halfpage in the Amsterdam News and ;i lull page in Ihe People S
Voice. Their formal copied Bond's mainstream press ads, with layouts that featured
families shopping lor and enjoying bond bread. Advertisement copy always emphasized
the product's taste, softness and "longer-lasting freshness," and war themes were
continually highlighted. Ads recognized the wartime consumer restrictions by
mentioning food rationing in each of its ads. The company maintained that its "vitamin
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enriched" product used a protein flour that could help compensate for the lack of meat
under wartime rationing, and emphasized that Bond Bread would help keep workers and
soldiers strong for their important jobs.
Unlike mainstream ads, which used unnamed whites, Bond's ads in the black
press always featured local African Americans. The ad in Figure 2.3, typical of Bond
Bread's campaign, includes several black New Yorkers, all buying, selling, and using
Bond Bread. As in their mainstream ads, roles for men and women were strictly
gendered and Bond shoppers were always women. Men, on the other hand, were most
often grocery store owners or experts offering advice about the health benefits of Bond
Bread, and only indirectly consumers as the husbands of Bond consumers. That these
husbands were also black soldiers and workers explicitly tied African Americans to the
war effort. In Figure 2.3 James Stuetley is identified as a worker in a "vital shipyard,"
and Albert Foster is a local grocer who confirms Bond's popularity by proclaiming:
"'New, soft Bond is my fastest-selling bread. My customers prefer it!'" In the context of
the "Negro market," Foster served a dual purpose in this ad in that he was not only a
product expert but also a local black business owner. This allowed Bond to associate its
product with support of black businesses and thus compete for loyalty with Harlem's
black-owned Brown Bomber Baking Company. Other male experts appearing in Bond
ads included a basketball coach who promoted the nutritious advantages of serving Bond
Bread to his team, a restaurant manager (labeled an "authority on food") who discussed
Bond's freshness, and a local baseball player for the Negro League's Black Yankees who
argued that Bond Bread helped him maintain his strength despite war food rationing.
103
Grocers report new, soft
Bond Bread huge success!
Folkt everywhere have discovered the extra-tender, longer -tatting freshness of this new, $oft loaf!
triad them all... It'* soft Bend for me I" says Mrs. Kay
Stuetley, wife of Jtmes Sturtlry who works in a vital shipyard. Trt
bought about every bread baked. And I haven't found a bread I ltke
near at much as new, aoft Bond. It'i fresher.
. , stays that way longer."
That's Important, folks, when you're putting up sandwiches for men like
Jltn Stuetley who are working hard In war plants.
"fervlee man H*«t **v« eamfwfehe* m*o» with awft •e»4 Br*a4«" I
agree Miss Rote, Mn Riley, and Mrs. Robinson, who are making land* 1
wichet for the Harlem Service Men's Center. "The boys want their .
aandwichea to be nice and fresh,* say these volunteer workers, "and new.
aoft Bond is perfect. Makes the temptingest sandwiches ever." Never
before has a new loaf of bread met with such qukk success as Bond. '
•fur-.'.
. A pBUClOUS
Source: People 's Voice (June 5, 1943)
Figure 2.3: Bond Bread Advertisement
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Other common grocery advertisements came from the soft drinks corporations
Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Coke's campaign, which ran solely in the Amsterdam News, failed
to create any special "Negro market" ads and instead used its mainstream ads. Although
none of the Coke ads featured African Americans, the company did create a campaign
using illustrations of people around the world drinking Coke, showing it as a way to
create friendly relations between people of different cultures. These ads featured white
American soldiers drinking Coke with people in various places, including Palestine,
Australia, Ireland, Iceland, China, the Bahamas, and the Caribbean. So while no African
Americans were used, peoples of color were shown as allies of American soldiers and
Coke was billed as the "high-sign of American friendliness around the world" and "the
happy bond between people of good will." Coca-Cola headlined all of these ads with
copy that equated the phrase "Have a 'Coke'" with a local expression of friendship; in the
Bahamas "Have a 'Coke'" meant "Happy Days," in Palestine it meant "Sa-LAM-oo s-
LAY-koom," or "Peace Be Unto You." In addition to its Amsterdam News ads, Coca-
Cola also sponsored a radio program called "The Coca-Cola Spotlight" which used
African American performers, prompting a great deal of positive publicity in Harlem's
black press. The People 's Voice, in particular, closely monitored the airwaves for radio
programs featuring African Americans, and reported on Spotlight programs featuring
Lionel Hampton and Duke Ellington bands.
Building on its campaign in the Great Depression, Pepsi waged a multifaceted
marketing drive in Harlem. Pepsi increased its advertising in the black press, utilizing all
three black papers virtually every week during the war. Most of these ads copied those
found in mainstream campaigns and featured a simple Pepsi bottle with copy urging
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readers to buy more war bonds. In 1944 Pepsi launched a new campaign that both
promoted the war effort and directly targeted black consumers. This campaign sponsored
a series of ads [Figure 2.4] encouraging black women to join the U.S. Cadet Nursing
Corps. They featured a black woman in a Corps uniform and promised recruits they
would enjoy a "free education, snappy nurse's uniform, your complete tuition, room and
board, and a regular allowance of $1 5 to at least $30 a month." In so doing, this
campaign connected Pepsi to increased war work for African Americans, a goal of the
black community in New York City and elsewhere.
Pepsi was also one of the first national corporations to employ large numbers of
African Americans on its marketing staff, earning it a great deal of positive press in
Harlem. The Age reported in May of 1943 that Pepsi "employs more Negroes in its Sales
Promotion Department than does any other major soft drink manufacturer in the world,"65
at that time seven black men and two black women working in their national office.
Pepsi also employed twenty three African Americans in white collar jobs and several
hundred other workers at independent Pepsi bottlers across the nation.
66
Its "Negro
market" staff led promotional campaigns throughout the country, like the one in Harlem
which awarded cash for the collection of beverage crowns.
67 Herman Smith, Pepsi's first
African American salesman, supervised the company's "Negro market" staff, and press
articles urged readers to buy Pepsi to support their efforts. As an article in the Amsterdam
News explained, "the fact that [Smith] has been able to increase his staff to its present
65
"Pepsi Cola Company Starts New Ad Drive in The Negro Press," New York Age, 8 May 1943,
Second Section, 7.
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67 Because of war-time shortages, many bottlers were reusing crowns, and Pepsi had local Harlem
churches collect these crowns for cash prizes.
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Source: New York Age (April 29, 1944)
Figure 2.4: Pepsi-Cola Advertisement
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number is proof that his work for the company has been successful and if his present
program here goes well there are plans afoot to add several more Negroes to the Pepsi
Cola staff."68 Buying Pepsi, then, benefited Harlemites by providing more jobs for
African Americans.
As part of their public relations efforts in Harlem, Pepsi established several
community service programs. One of its most popular projects was the creation of a
recreation*] center called the Pepsi-Cola Junior Club of Harlem, located on Lenox
Avenue. The club was "run on a system of self-governing by the youngsters themselves,
ranging in age from
1 5 to 1 9, through their own 1 louse Council," with an adult advisory
board. This center was set up in 1 945, the same year that Pepsi initiated a college
scholarship fund for black students. Pepsi handed out nineteen scholarships in the first
year to black high school seniors, and these awards included all tuition, fees, travel costs,
and $25 each month to help with living expenses; its importance to the black community
was significant enough to merit mention in the 1946-1947 Negro Handbook!" These
public relations programs, combined with Pepsi's sales force and marketing campaigns,
made Pepsi one of the most active companies in Harlem and created enormous good will
for the company. Pepsi was often praised in the local press as an egalitarian and fair-
minded business. For example, the Age reported,
Pepsi-Cola Company is well known for the strong policy it has always maintained
of opportunity for Negroes in its business practice. It includes in its personnel a
Negro sales director, I Ierman Smith. The Company has always insisted that its
community projects be for the benefit of all, without regard to race, creed or
color; these projects have included job awards for young people finishing school;
12.
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"Pepsi-Cola Firm To Give Away Cash," New York Amsterdam News, 26 June 1943, 14.
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"19 Negro Students Receive Pepsi-Cola College Scholarship," New York Age, 6 October 1945,
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service centers for service men and women; open air concerts; a new scholarship
program now operating in high schools throughout the country;.
. . and many other
generous community activities. 70
Like Pepsi, Vaseline had advertised to black New Yorkers during the Great
Depression, and expanded its black press ads during the war. Vaseline ads featured
African American models and used war-related messages [Figure 2.5]. With many
women entering war industries, the emphasis on safety took on heightened significance.
Although the people in the ad are smiling, the need to use Vaseline is almost a dire
warning and the copy reads, "Don't take chances . . . Buy ajar right now. NEVER BE
VVni lOUT IT!" This ad had special significance for the African American reader. First,
it depicted an African American man in the position of an expert. He appears to be either
a doctor or pharmacist and is giving the female customer medicinal advice. This ad not
only tied Vaseline to World War II it included African Americans directly in the war
effort. The woman is a war worker, signified by the copy telling her that Vaseline
"protects hands from war plant grease and grime," and by her use of a head scarf seen on
illustrations of female workers throughout WWII. For African Americans a head scarf
was associated with plantation life and mammy figures and as such was not a symbol that
was likely to appeal to African Americans. However, within the context of the war it
took on a different meaning and placed black women within the popular "Rosie the
Riveter" image of WWII. As in the 1930s, Vaseline failed to advertise its hair tonic in
the black press even though African Americans used Vaseline in hair-straightening
processes.
70
"Pepsi Cola Company Makes Gift of Teen-Age Club to Harlem Children," New York Age, 2
June 1945, 12.
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II
FOR YOUR SAFEITC SAKE
INSIST ON THE
genuine:
Source: People 's Voice (April 7, 1945)
Figure 2.5: Vaseline Advertisement
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Alcohol companies also heav,ly targeted Harlem's consumer market and ads for
beer and whiskey littered the pages of black papers; several compames advertised almost
every week in all three black newspapers. Some companies, like Hiram Walker,
Schenley, and Schaefer, did not employ black salespeople but placed ads in black papers.
Others, like Pabst Beer and PM Whiskey, employed black salesmen and also conducted
extensive marketing campaigns in Harlem. Pabst advertised throughout the war and
although it did not create special "Negro market" advertisements it placed large and
frequent ads in both the People \s Voice and the Amsterdam News. Pabsfs two Harlem
salesmen were both African American, the first, William Graham began selling in
Harlem in early 1 94 1
.
Graham created an entire "Negro market" campaign for Pabst,
including a radio program showcasing African American entertainers. By late 1942
Pabst was the largest selling beer in Harlem and Graham had hired Arthur Parris
second salesman. Like Pabst, PM Whiskey (a product of National Distillers) hired
African American salesman and advertised in the black press, creating special "Negro
market" ads that recruited African Americans into the Merchant Marines. These ads used
named sailors, such as Captain Clifton Lastic, and emphasized the opportunities available
in the Merchant Marines and the importance of these men to the war effort.
as a
an
Wartime Activism
Consumer activism around the nation and in Harlem continued during WWII.
With issues like product shortages and war production needs dominating the home front,
consumption was swept up into society's total war effort. Historian Lizabeth Cohen
notes that during WWII "new rituals of patriotic citizenship evolved" that required good
1 1 1
citizens to adhere to priee and rationing restricts, support conservation and reeyeling
efforts, plant Victory Gardens, and refrain from black market buying.
"Suddenly," she
writes, "tasks that had been viewed as private and domestic were brought into the civic
arena and granted new political importance."71 The government became more deeply
involved in monitoring consumption and expanded its role as a place where consumers
could turn for protection.
The government intervened into consumer affairs chiefly through the Office of
Price Administration (OPA). Subsumed under the War Production Board, the OPA
established rationing programs, set price ceilings on goods and rents, and even had the
ability to control wages and costs for professional services. The OPA set up regional and
local offices throughout the country, and relied on an army of volunteers to monitor
stores for OPA compliance, distribute ration books and consumer educational materials,
and set up consumer centers. 72 Black New Yorkers welcomed the OPA to their decades-
long fight against disproportionately high prices charged by local merchants. Having the
government involved in price and rent control gave African Americans added protection
not only from high wartime costs but from racist business practices as well. However,
Cohen argues that the OPA's effectiveness was diminished in most black neighborhoods.
Few African Americans were placed on OPA price boards or recruited as volunteer
policy monitors, and there was reduced enforcement ofOPA regulations in black
71
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neighborhoods: "consumer citizenship was held out as an .deal, and then made
unattainable."73 This held true in I larlem, too, and while the ( >PA did operate there it
failed to sc. up branch offices or a price control hoard. Working through local groups the
< )PA distributed information, held consumer classes, and monitored prices; ii wasn't until
another Harlem riot thai the government madeOPA's presence real lor black New
Yorkers.
In AugUSl l (>43 I larlem exploded in a riot and, as in 1935, it began over false
rumors that pol.ee killed an African American. This time the supposed victim was a
black serviceman, Pvt. Robert handy, who intervened in a dispute between white
policeman James ( ollms and Bandy's mother. Alter struggling with ( olhns, Handy
attempted to lice the scene and was shot by the officer. Although the bullet only grazed
Bandy's shoulder and he was immediately treated at a local hospital lor the superficial
wound, word quickly spread that a white officer had shot a black soldier and that the
latter was dying. Throughout the afternoon a crowd grew outside the West 123 rd precinct
station until it was over three thousand people strong; when night fell and someone
shouted that Bandy was dead, the crowd erupted into a violent rage. All through the
night the rioting continued, with most of it directed against while-owned stores on 125th
street and against the police trying to quell the disturbance. Many rioters looted stores
and carried off a massive inventory of goods. As Nat Brandt writes in I larlem at War,
looters had left taverns, jewelry stores, restaurants, and haberdasheries wrecked,
hour hundred stores had lost windows. Thirty of the forty liquor stores in I larlem
had been broken into and cleaned out. Five thousand dollars worth of liquor
alone was stolen from a store on 125 ,h street. Ten thousand dollars worth of
wearing apparel was taken fro Blumstein's window displays down the street,
livery suit in two clothing stores was lifted, l ivery bit of food and household
71
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As in 1935, black-OWned stores were Untouched by (he looters. During the riot Mayor
LaOuardifl rode up and clown the streets in a speaker ear urging citizens to return to (heir
homes, and blaek community leaders also worked to stop the violence. When morning
broke the enormity of the destruction sank in: six blaeks had been killed and
hundred people injured; properly damage was estimated between three and live million
dollars, mainly from the over fourteen hundred stores that had been attaeked.
I bis riot was not a race not in which white and black citizens fought one another,
but instead was what sociologists term a commodity riot, or 'an eruption whose main
target was white property and stores." 7 ' Observers at the time noted this as well. 'Must as
m 1935," wrote the People 's Voice, "the disaster wasn't a race riot." Although both riots
were commodity riots there were notable differences between them. According to the
People's Voice,the 1935 not was due to "unjustified discrimination in employment,
housing, and education," while the 1943 not "was the violent and terrible expression ol
the community against unjustified discrimination in the armed forces at a time when
national unity is vitally necessary for America's win-the-war program." The paper urged
"ten! control lor Harlem; the breaking down ofjimcro in the armed forces; the expansion
Of the OPA program m Harlem, making it possible lor housewives to obtain more
consumer information; [and] Unity of the Negro people and Negro leaders." 7 '' Rev. Adam
Clayton Powell agreed that the main grievani es were related to consumer discrimination
71
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rather than employment diserimination. His plan to prevent further violence included
rent control in Harlem as well as "OPA employment of more Negroes on rationing boards
and better advisory service on the use of ration books/'77 Official responses to the two
riots differed as well. In the wake of the 1935 riot many white-owned stores in Harlem
lined black employees, recognizing that employment discrimination and racist business
practices were the major driving factors of that disturbance. Wartime frustrations
centered more on consumer-related problems, forcing the government to improve
consumer services m I larlem by opening a branch OPA off.ee just a few weeks after the
riot. Certainly, consumer frustrations had arisen in the first riot, just as in 1943
I larlcmites continued to desire greater employment in local white-owned stores, but the
causes of, and responses to, the wartime riot indicate that the problems and demands of
I larleirfs consumers shifted during the war.
Harlem's OPA office took immediate action and in its fust month brought over
one hundred merchants up on charges of price violations. These cases made headlines in
all three of 1 larleirfs black weeklies, especially when one local butcher was sentenced to
five days in a workhouse. In October the OPA established a price control board in
Harlem to help better enforce rules violations, and news about OPA arrests continued
throughout the fall and winter. The OPA published consumer education information
through Harlem's black newspapers, included black New Yorkers on its policymaking
bodies, and met frequently with Harlem's consumer groups. Local African American
volunteers assisted OPA to monitor compliance with its policies, and like elsewhere,
many of these volunteers were women. Most black New Yorkers assumed that the OPA
77
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"women
was
.
resource thai would work with and lor housewives, and thcy urged ,he agency to
rely on the expertise of I larlcm\s women. The Amtordm Ncsrs advised
.hat
OUghl to he consulted in connection with any program ftboul food, doUling. ren.s and
Other items that allcc. the cost of living. ( >PA in it. program to do somc.lung to reheve
Eh* situation m .Ins diltrid wMI lad nnserahly il ,, neglects this nwaluahle source of
Infoimation and help."78 The ( WA listened, and m .he I larlcn, hranch women were
utilized as volunteers and as paid inspectors, with I Men Kamp running the branch's
COOlUmer education program. MoitOPA PrOfnmi targeted women and worked
especially with Negro Women, foe., and the < onsohdalcd I lousew.ves League lo
investigate local merchants. Both Ol these groups also held informational classes to
educate I [arlem's women on ( )I»A price ceilings, rationing and conservation campaign!,
and how lo be effective shoppers during wartime restrictions. 7<>
Although I [arlem's OPA branch had many successes it also had its failures, and
con. planus surfaced throughout the war that the agency was not doing enough m I larlcm
to enforce its regulations. In July 1945 several groups met with Alan Dingle, the- head oj
I [arlem'sOPA branch, lo discuss whal they perceived to be insufficient policies and
enforcement. Dingle blamed his branch's weaknesses on the refusal ofOPA to hue more
paid investigators for I larlcm. I )inglc also reported that he had trouble recruiting enough
volunteers, but that the main problem was that the national ( )I'A headquarters rejected his
requesl lor more local employees. Iwen though it wasn't as effective as many Harlemites
7K
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File, 1-2; "Local OPA Seeks Best Mel hod of Aiding Harlem Housewives Fight High Prices," People's
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wished, the OPA continued to educate consumers, bring cases again* local merchants,
end gave black New Yorker.
.
govemmem agency to tun, to m their confer battles."
As during the ( ireal I )epression, numerous I [arte Organizations involved
Ihcmse.ves with consumer issues, whelher as (he locus of (heir Olganizationi or par, of
Ch.ii larger minion. The naa ( :p conducted , survey in 1942 titled, "Food < fests M ( )RE
1,1
1
1« to." to publicize the highe, p, ices charged by i lai lem's merchants. This repon
.wealed thai price disparities between i tarlem and the rest of Manhattan's neighborhoods
continued despite I )?A price ceilings and regulations. 81 The ( !ity-Wide ( litizen's
( iornmittee on I larlem, whose membership included a Philip Randolph, Adam ( llayton
Powell, and Walk-, White, formed a ,k-u committee «>.. consume] problems and worked
closely With the OPA after (he 1943 liot One ol lhe mOSl ael.ve loeal Organizations was
the I larlem ( 'onsunu r ( oopcralive Soeiety, Ine., run by John I l.mnon I he Society -an a
black owned cooperative store which opened in Harlem in April 1942. Harmon was a
very visible advocate foi consume] issues in Harlem throughoul the war, speaking al
v ii ions consumer forums, writing weekly articles for the People 's Voice, and serving as
the chairman of the Wesi I [arlem Riverside I defense ( louncil's ( lonsumer ( tommittee.
i fader I [aimon's leadership (he cooperative conducted consumer education classes,
trained volunteers to help monitor OPA policies, and ran a community consumer center
where blaek New Yorkers went lor inlormalion and (o register complaints before the
Ramona I,owe. "Harlem Prices Still 1 lp Despite ( >PA Setup," New York Amsterdam News. f»
November 1943, 5A; "Dingle Heads Harlem OPA Branch Aimed at 'Curbing Kim-Aw n I'm, , ,, New
York Amsterdam News 8 April 1944. 1.5; "Groups Probe OPA Procedures," People's Voice 1 July 1945, 2.
See also lliondi, 89-90
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OPA offices opened in Harlem. Like other blaek-owned businesses the cooperative was
unharmed during the 1943 riot even though stores around it were destroyed. 82
The black press also involved itself in local consumer activism, mostly by
reporting on Harlem merchants and the OPA's policies and activities. The People 's
Voice was by far the most vigorous advocate for black consumers and conducted its own
investigations of I larlem apartments and stores for price violations. In its first year the
paper devoted an entire page to consumer issues, with a weekly column based on
published reports from the Consumer's Union, articles about OPA rationing programs,
tips on cooking efficiently and cheaply, and a column by John Harmon on consumer
cooperatives. Additionally, the paper published 'The People Indict" each week where it
reported complaints from shoppers on unfair business practices in Harlem. Black New
Yorkers wrote to the paper about butchers who used crooked scales, and about stores that
treated blacks shoppers with contempt. In May 1 942, for example, "The People Indict"
article ran an anonymous letter stating, "the popular soda water drinks - Pepsi-Cola,
Coca Cola, Mission, and other five-cent drinks - are now selling for six cents in many
parts of Harlem. Yet in other parts of the city there has been no increase in the item
except shortage now and then. I believe these distributors of the sodas have increased the
price to the retailer and the increase is passed on to Harlem citizens."83 Often, black
newspapers and local groups came together on consumer campaigns, such as organizing
82
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rallies to protest Harlem's high priees, eondueting eonsumer forums, or sponsoring
educational classes in the community.
For all of these groups, consumer activism focused on consumer rights, and
especially on ensuring that black New Yorkers spent their money on racially equal terms
with whites. More so than in the 1930s, advocacy groups in Harlem turned to the
government and its agencies for help fighting consumer-related problems, usually by
working with the OPA or the city's government officials to enforce policies. Local
organizations also lobbied Congress and the White House directly, and regularly sent
representatives to Washington, D.C. to support food subsidy bills, stronger consumer-
rights laws, and measures designed to strengthen the OPA. In 1943 Rev. Adam Clayton
Powell conducted a campaign to have Harlem included as a wartime rent-control district.
The campaign succeeded after he collected over 100,000 signatures supporting the
84
measure.
During the war black New Yorkers only rarely held consumer boycotts and in the
few instances where they did it was not because of discriminatory hiring practices, as it
had been the Great Depression, but because they had been insulted as consumers. One
example was the already discussed boycott against American Tobacco Company's
"Nigger Hair Tobacco." Another example was the 1943 campaign against the John
Eichler Brewing Company after it the ran an ad depicting an African American as the
"artful dodger." Portrayed with large, thick lips, the "artful dodger" was a target in a
circus game where participants threw baseball at his head and he told the audience,
"Scuse me, while ah gits an Eichler's." Harlemites joined African Americans across the
r
84
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country in boycotting Eichler's, and Sullivan made mention of this in a Sales
Management article titled, "Don't Do This - If You Want to Sell Your Products to
Negroes!" He reported that while Eichler's withdrew the ad in the wake of protests, they
failed to start a positive ad campaign in black newspapers with the result that "their
position among New York Negro consumers is now 1
5
th
among nineteen brands. They
might now be 1
0
th
or better, if they had the goodwill of the New York Negro market." 85
The decline in consumer boycotts and picketing reflects a general decrease in
direct action protests during the war. Historians August Meier and Elliott Rudwick argue
that even though black militancy increased, fewer activists turned to direct action protests
to aid their work - social pressures to demonstrate unity during wartime, combined with a
marked rise in employment for African Americans, helped reduce militant public
protests. To be sure, Harlemites continued to be concerned about issues such as fair
employment, rent controls, and high prices, but they turned more often to the FEPC or
OPA than to direct action or consumer protests. There were no equivalents to the "Don't
Buy" or "Buy Black" campaigns of the 1930s, and barely a whisper was uttered in the
black press when Brown Bomber Baking Company closed in 1943. Black consumer
activism in the 1 940s focused instead on consumer rights and government protection.
Foreshadowing consumer protests of the civil rights movement, on a national level
African Americans began using consumer spaces as a battle ground against racial
discrimination and segregation. Significantly, the first lunch counter sit-in was
86
conducted in February 1943 by three female students from Howard University.
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Conclusion
The demands of the war created a unique situation for consumers, the
government, and African Americans. The important role for consumer issues in the
home-front war effort gave African Americans a governmental ally in their work for
equal prices and fair consumer treatment. Additionally, corporate America expanded its
wartime "Negro market" campaigns, responding to the work of industry analysts, the
government, black businesspeople, and the rising incomes and visibility of African
Americans. Even more so than in the Great Depression, these campaigns depicted
African Americans as citizens, consumers, and workers. Many advertising and business
executives were involved in the "Negro morale" campaign where they helped create new
and positive images of African Americans; after the war many would take their
experiences back to the private sector. Black New Yorkers would also take their wartime
experiences into the postwar peace, setting the stage for the civil rights movement in the
decades that followed.
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CHAPTER 3:
ADVERTISING JIM CROW
Throughout the postwar era "Negro market" observers urged national
corporations to take more interest in black consumers and repeatedly argued that to
succeed they could not continue overlooking these important customers. Black
consumers were referred to as "forgotten," "untapped" and "neglected," and as late
1 960 Sales Management wrote, "in this day of highly refined marketing techniques there
is probably no single element as deeply cloaked in mystery, misapprehension, and
unfounded opinion as the Negro market." 1 Despite the continuous refrain that black
consumers were ignored, in the years following World War II many national corporations
did, in fact, enter the "Negro market," and by the late 1950s hundreds of brand products
advertised to black consumers. The period 1946 to 1960 was the heyday of the "Negro
market," and advertisers bombarded black consumers with retail displays, print, and radio
ads. Trade journals carried information from black consumer surveys, advice on how to
best reach black consumers, and case studies of marketing campaigns. African
Americans were hired by advertising agencies and manufacturers as "Negro market"
consultants, and many launched their own businesses and organizations which offered
expertise on black consumption or promoted the benefits of the "Negro market" both for
the black community and for American businesses. And as they had done in the 1930s
and in World War II, African Americans, including black New Yorkers, capitalized on
their power as consumers to gain employment, receive fair treatment as consumers, and
fight racial discrimination.
1
"Marketing to the Negro Consumer," Sales Management, 4 March 1 960, 36.
122
Chapters three and four look at this active time period from 1946 to 1960.
Chapter three focuses specifically on the advertising industry and the expansion of the
"Negro market." It examines the characterization and promotion of black consumption
by advertising experts, the activities of African Americans involved in the industry, and
the ways in which corporations worked to reach black consumers. Chapter three also
compares the campaigns of several companies who were among the most active in New
York's "Negro market." Chapter four turns to black consumer activism and how the
"Negro market" was used by African Americans in their struggles for economic and
political rights in the postwar era.
Defining the "Negro market"
Advertising trade journal articles about the "Negro market" multiplied in the
postwar era, and the market was characterized much in the same way it had been during
the Great Depression and World War II. Industry observers argued vigorously for the
significance of the "Negro market," and claimed that its size and wealth were rapidly
increasing. In a 1950 Sales Management article it reported that in one instance, "the
figures on packaged wheat cereal purchases by American Negro consumers nearly caused
apoplectic fits in both the client's home office and in the advertising agency handling the
account."
2 Edgar Steele of the Research Corporation of America told advertisers, "the
Negro, as a consumer, is forging ahead more rapidly than is the average American
2 David Sullivan, "Why a Handfiil of Advertisers Dominate Negro Markets" Sales Management,
15 September 1950, 154. The growing postwar attention paid to black consumers by corporations is
discussed in Robert E. Weems, Jr., Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the
Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 37-55
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citizen," and Fortune magazine reported that blaek consumers were the
"fastest-climbing
consumers in the Amenean market."3 Government and private surveys supported these
claims and reported that African Americans' employment, educat,on, and incomes were
on the rise.
4
These gains were a result of three simultaneous forces: continued migration
of African Americans out of the South and into urban areas where they had greater job
opportunities, advancement into higher skilled or salaried positions, and employment of
large numbers of married black women whose salaries added significantly to family
incomes. 5 While the incomes of white families remained higher than black families,
African Americans continued to narrow this gap throughout the postwar period. Tide, for
example, reported that between 1939 and 1949 African American incomes increased 192
percent, compared with a 146 percent increase for whites. Black homeownership was up
129 percent in that same time period, compared with an 81 percent increase for the
general population. In 1 952, one third of African American families owned their own
homes. 6 Black families still lagged behind whites in income and home ownership, but
these figures were enough to attract considerable attention by corporate America and
advertising agencies. The estimated size of the "Negro market" rose from $7 billion in
1 947 to $ 1 0 billion in 1 950, to $ 1 6 billion in 1 956. By 1 960 the market was close to $ 1
7
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billion. As one observer noted, "Marketing experts will agree that no product can enjoy
national leadership unless it has leadership in the large Metropolitan areas, and no
product can become a major factor in these urban centers unless it has a good share of the
Negro trade."8
Throughout the postwar era New York City remained the largest black consumer
market, both in population and in income. In 1951 there were one million African
Americans in the metropolitan New York City area, and by 1955 that number had risen to
1 .2 million, making it the size of the sixth largest American city. Income and
employment for black New Yorkers also rose during the 1940s, and by 1950 their
combined incomes exceeded $1 .25 billion. These increases reflected a rise in education
and employment access, and also an increase in the number of small businesses owned by
black New Yorkers. While Harlem remained at the heart of black New York, the African
American population shifted away from Harlem and Manhattan in the postwar era, and
New York City's "Negro market" was now understood to include all five boroughs and
northern New Jersey. While the total black population ofNew York City rose 63.1
percent during the 1940s, Brooklyn's black population increased 94 percent and the
Bronx's increased 315 percent. Manhattan still held the most African Americans, over
380,000, but an almost equal number now lived in the other boroughs, and almost
200,000 African Americans lived in northern New Jersey.
9
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These numbers may have been impressive, but "Negro market" experts argued
that the African Americans consumer's importance went beyond sheer income and
population figures. What is interesting about most of the reasons offered is that they
were a direct result of racial discrimination and segregation. For example, Edgar Steele
argued that "Negroes have higher relative spendable income than any other group in the
U.S. because their purchases are so restricted." 10 Many observers noted that because
blacks were most often limited to service jobs, such as domestic workers and railroad
porters, their own consumer preferences influenced white purchases. The exclusion of
African Americans from suburbs, and the resulting concentration of blacks into cities,
meant that they could be more easily reached through urban distribution and media
outlets. Furthermore, within cities African Americans were often restricted to specific
neighborhoods regardless of income. "This condition is not one of the Negro's own
choosing," noted one author, but "while this is a dilemma to the Negro, this very
concentration is an asset to the merchandiser. It makes for a market that is highly
concentrated and easily reached."
11
Segregation and discrimination were also credited with having created distinct
purchasing habits which resulted in a racially defined consumer market, and while most
argued that as racism disappeared the "Negro market" would cease to be separate from
the general American market, all agreed that time had not yet arrived. Marketing experts
argued, for example, that because African Americans faced discrimination and
segregation in public areas such as restaurants, hotels, resorts, theaters, and swimming
10
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pools, .hey tended to do most of their entertaining at home, prompting greater
expenditures on household furnishings and food. 12 In a Printer M article, "Negro
market" specialist Leonard Evans reported thai while the growth of a black middle class
would help erase raeially specific consumer patterns, the guying habits ofAmerican
NegrOCfl right now are remarkably different from the national average." 1
1
Another
universal argument about the differences between white and black Consumption was thai
African Americans bought more high priced and brand goods than the general market.
This argument had been made by "Negro market" experts since the 1930s, and most
asserted that blaeks bought these products due to the status and protection they offered,
few observers noted any variations within the blaek community Other than occasional
references to brand differences between black men and women, and the "Negro market-
remained a homogeneous and raeially distinct market throughout the 1940s and 1950s.
I )espite the claims of racially determined buying habits, some postwar studies
suggest that blaek consumer habits did not differ greatly from while habits in terms of
percentages spent on consumer Categories, In 1956 the University of Pennsylvania
released a multi-volume report. Study of ( 'onsumcr Expenditures, Incomes and Savings,
which included information about white and black consumption. The study found that
African Americans spent more than whites in the areas of food, clothing, alcohol,
tobacco, personal care, and home furnishings, but that these differences were slight:
blacks spent 2.4% more on food, 2.3% more on clothing, only .6% on alcohol, and .3%
on tobacco. Blacks spent less than whites in the categories of medical care and
12
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recreation, but again, these differences were small: 1 .6% less on medical, and 1 .2% on
recreation. Autos made for the largest difference in that whttes spent 4.9% more on cars
than did African Americans. The report showed that variations among black and white
New Yorkers were also minor. Whites and blacks spent almost identical percentages of
their incomes on housing, utilities, household operations, furniture, recreation, and
tobacco. The biggest differences were in food and clothing, where African Americans
spent three percent more, and in transportation and medical care, where they spent three
to four percent less.
14
Despite the purchasing similarities in this study, throughout the
postwar era "Negro market" experts continued to argue that race played an important
factor in consumption habits. Most observers did not offer specific information on the
differences between white and black consumers and only asserted that there were real
differences in the ways they spent their money.
Selling the "Negro Market"
Much of the postwar advice on reaching black consumers reflected earlier
strategies, and all observers agreed that general campaigns failed to effectively target the
"Negro market." Although African Americans were heavy readers of mass magazines
and newspapers (for example eighty percent of black New Yorkers regularly read the
New York Daily News), this media rarely included information about African Americans
or race relations. Surveys of African Americans found that because of this omission,
advertising in mainstream media failed to signal to black consumers that they were
14
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included. 15 Utilizing the black press, therefore, continued to be an important element in
any appeal to black consumers, and companies were advised to read black newspapers for
information on their buying habits and concerns. While some companies expressed a
reluctance to utilize the black press because it was considered too amateurish or
expensive, most agreed that any investment in black media ads would pay large dividends
}
for advertisers. 16
All three black newspapers in Harlem frequently highlighted their importance in
")
reaching New York's "Negro market," and throughout the postwar era they worked to
increase their own advertising revenues and promote the benefits of consumption for the
black community. The Amsterdam News remained New York's largest newspaper and
the most successful at attracting national advertising. Throughout the late 1940s and
I
1950s its pages were filled with national brand advertisements and the dominant product
categories were food and beverages, liquor, beer, cigarettes, and personal care. It carried H
ads from local businesses, too, and also continued to advertise products such as Dr.
Palmer's Skin Whitener, although these ads were less frequent and less noticeable in the
3)
presence of so many brand product advertisements.
The paper promoted consumption through its own ads which urged readers to
frequent local stores and buy from Amsterdam News advertisers. It ran columns such as
"City Shopper" and "Shopping Corner" which publicized products and sales offered at
31
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local businesses. Sometimes the Amsterdam News would feature an entire consumer's
page, devoted to shopping tips, recipes, and fashion advice. National brands, such as
Borden's American cheese, Duffs Muffin Mix, and Pepsi-Cola (as an ingredient in a
raisin cake) often appeared prominently in the recipes' lists of ingredients. The paper alsc
frequently highlighted "Negro market" advertising campaigns by major corporations,
such as the 1949 campaign launched by the Wise Potato Company in the Amsterdam
News and Ebony. 1
7
In 1 952 the Amsterdam News hired Fact Finders Association, Inc. to
conduct a detailed and thorough survey of New York City's "Negro market," and found
that black New Yorkers were heavy users of food products such as cold cereal (74.4%),
Hour (94.8%), canned fruits (84.2%) and vegetables (70.2%), canned milk (78%), canned
soup (79%), coffee (71
.8%), rice (96.6%), and soft drinks (60%). Sixty percent of the
families surveyed purchased beer, over fifty six percent of men and forty six percent of
women used cigarettes, and over eighty eight percent used toothpaste (versus tooth
powders). Numerous other consumer categories were also surveyed, along with income,
preferred shopping days and times, and favored media. Is
The New York Age ran frequent "Shoppers' Guides" and other columns about
local stores and buying trends. In April 1949 it teamed up with the Schenley distilleries,
explaining, "The Age is out for more business, more employment, more "pep" in Harlem.
So we're going out on a limb - helping our advertisers, starting with Schenley's whiskey
and not finishing until every great national corporation gives Harlem the attention it
17
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deserves." 9 In this contest the paper dispatched fifty "inspectors" to monitor local bars
and restaurants. Whenever someone ordered whiskey by repeating the Schenley
advertising slogan, "Schenley's - Of Course," the inspector would ring a gong and
present a cigarette lighter to the customer. During the spring and summer of 1949 the
4|V ran photos of contest winners with their lighters. Despite this and other similar
efforts, the paper was never able to attract much national advertising. In 1949 it was sold
to a white Englishman, Mr. V.P. Bourne-Vanneck. Bourne-Vanneck bought the paper at
the urging of his wife, whose mother was white and father was of African descent from 1
the British West Indies. The New York Times reported that Bourne-Vanneck "wanted to
live among Negroes and make their battles his battles."20 The Bourne-Vannecks, in turn, \
sold it in 1 952 to the Chicago Defender, and it became the New York Age Defender from
1952 to 1957. In 1957 it was bought by S.B. Fuller, a prominent Harlem businessman ]
J
but he was unable to sustain the paper and it closed in I960. 21
Like the Amsterdam News, and the Age, the People 's Voice included columns
offering shopping tips and information on local specials. In the summer of 1947 the
paper engaged Fitzsimmons Advertising and Research Agency to survey Harlem's
"Negro market," and ran copies of the survey questionnaire for its readers to send to
Fitzsimmons. The questionnaire was very simple and asked for income, savings,
household size, whether or not they shopped in local stores, and details on amounts spent
for food, utilities, and clothing. No results from the survey were ever published, and
19
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perhaps the project was abandoned as the paper struggled throughout the postwar period
to stay in business. Even though the People \s Voice used API as its national
representative, its advertisements declined substantially after World War II. Its most
regular ads came from Chesterfield, Pepsi, and Ruppert Beer, but even these ads were not
placed in every issue. The paper folded in 1 948, seven years after it started.
Many advertisers expanded their campaigns beyond the black press, and black-
appeal radio programs and stations played a much bigger role in the postwar "Negro
market." In Voice Over: The Making ofBlack Radio, William Barlow argues that after
World War II the radio industry was controlled less and less by national networks
because these networks turned their attention to television. "Radio again became a local
and laissez-faire enterprise," he writes, "in which stations had to fend for themselves
amid increasingly cutthroat competition. In these circumstances, the black radio
consumer could no longer be ignored."22 By the mid-1950s over five hundred stations
had at least some African American programming, and in 1956 forty seven stations had
complete black-appeal formats. 23 The 1950s also witnessed the launching of two national
black radio networks, the National Negro Network (NNN) in 1954 and the Keystone
Negro Network (KNN) in 1957. NNN was founded by Leonard Evans, a black
marketing executive from Chicago, and its initial membership included thirty five
22
William Barlow, Voice Over: The Making ofBlack Radio (Philadelphia: University of
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stations. Its first major program was Rudy Valentine, a soap opera starring Juanita Hall
which was sponsored by Pet Milk and Philip Morris. Wrigley gum was another major
sponsor ofNNN programming, but the network failed to attract many other sponsors and
closed after a year. 24 KNN was a part of the Keystone Broadcasting System, which was
an association of independent stations that cooperatively worked for national advertising.
In 1957 KNN had over 340 black-appeal affiliates and by 1960 had 463 affiliates with a
total audience of 12 million.25
Radio trade journals devoted increasing space to information and statistics on
black consumption, and on case studies of successful radio marketing campaigns. In
1949 Sponsor, the foremost advertising trade journal for radio and television, began
running regular articles on the "Negro market."26 It found that initially most national
advertisers were unwilling to risk alienating their white audiences by sponsoring black-
appeal programs, but that local businesses gained tremendous business advertising to the
"Negro market." As the postwar era wore on and stories of local advertising success
24
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filtered out in trade journals, corporate sponsors overcame their fears of white backlash
J
and increasingly advertised on black radio. Some of the most visible companies to do so
were Lucky Strike, Camel, Philip Morris, Pet Milk, Ford, Pepsi, Coke, Westinghouse,
and General Motors. Some companies even sponsored mainstream market shows which
to Tap $15 Billion in Sales," Time 5 September 1954, 70; Hall, "The Negro Market,"; David Flaserstein.
"Point of Purchase and the Negro Market," Spot, December 1957, 4-10.
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'-"•"-I Mack entertainers, such as Wildmot'i Nat King ( 'ole Show, and Kraft's Music
Hall which also featured ( olc. Maytag sponsored a show called Patterns oj Melody
which, alio- 1948, included African American musicians and singers as guests, reportedly
after much internal discussion aboul doing so.27 By the early 1950s all of the major
networks ran shows which included black entertainers. Even so, fewer advertisers
ventured Into radio than into the pages ofthe black press, and even in the mid-1950s
Sponsor reported thai most corporations were unwilling to take the chance of alienating
their while audiences.
In New York ( '.iy almost all stations regularly included some African American
musicians, singers, or actors on its programs, and throughout the 1950s stations began to
create more specific black-appeal programming, Although in \ { >^> there was still no
exclusively black-appeal station in Manhattan, WLIB aggressively courted a black
audience and had over seventy live hours per week in African American programming.
WLIB fust modified its formal in 1949, explaining thai its entry into black-appeal radio
"did not imply merely scheduling hit or miss programs. Rather it involved becoming a
pail of the Negro community, reflecting Negro aspirations, problems, interests and
interpreting events from a Negro point ofview."28 In May 1950 WLIB opened studios in
I [arlem's I iOtel Theresa, and their lineup included sports, news, music, interviews, and
housekeeping programs. The station aggressively courted advertisers lor its "Negro
market" programs and most ol its advertisers were local stores, such as Crawford
( llothes, although it also received regular sponsorship from ( Vntury fox and
' 7
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"A City Within n City,"
Safeway Stores. In New York City loeal businesses advertised heavily on these
programs, letting African Amerieans know their business was sought and welcomed.
While radio offered opportunities to black performers most of their roles were
limited to musicians or singers, or as actors in stereotypical servant roles. This held true
for television as well. In "Nat King Cole and the Politics of Race and Broadcasting in the
1 950S,W tnger Stole argues that because radio and newspapers could target selected
audiences more easily than television, the later medium was especially careful about
featuring black performers. "The advertising industry," she writes, "considered it self- ^
evident thai Southern whites would not tolerate positive images of blacks on television
and feared a white economic backlash should it finance African American talent in other '
than minstrel-based comedy roles." 2 " I lowevcr. Stole finds that television networks were
aware ol their Alncan American constituency and that "few advertisers, or network
executives for that matter, could afford to ignore reports of a rapidly growing African I
American middle class."'" l<ach network sought to balance appeasing mainstream
audiences with maintaining good relations with the black community. To this end. in
11956 NBC signed Nat King Cole to a contract which made him the Inst black show host
in television history. Unfortunately, Cole's show failed to gain a national sponsor.
Regional sponsors included Rheingold Beer, Colgate. Folgers Coffee. Gold Bond Beer,
and Coca-Cola, but without a national sponsor the show folded in December 1957. only
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thirteen months after i, began. Not nntil 1966 wonld another African American host a
national television show.
Whether they advertised in the black press or on black-appeal radio, companies
were offered a great deal of information on how to create campaigns which best appealed
to black consumers. Because of the growth of black income and the increase in
companies entering the "Negro market," several earlier pieces of advice were given new
importance in the postwar era. First, trade journals were full of stories of companies that
rushed into the market without conducting careful research or developing sensitive
campaigns, and whose money was wasted because their ads insulted African Americans.
As one marketer so vividly observed, "Ignore it, disdain it, insult it - even unknowingly -
and it will be easier to whistle Dixie through a mouthful of crackers than lure it back/'31
Businesses, then, were urged to carefully study surveys and data about black buying
habits, and to continually monitor the market to gauge advertising reception. Secondly,
companies were told that including African Americans in the formulation of advertising
campaigns was an effective safeguard against inadvertently insulting black consumers,
and in the postwar years an emphasis was put on finding well trained and experienced
black professionals. In 1955 the Advertising Age covered a speech given by Paul
Edwards to the Marketing Executives of American, and reported that "[i]n stressing the
desirability of employing Negro advertising, research, sales and promotional personnel,
Dr. Edwards at the same time warned against the fallacy of assuming that 'just because a
man is a Negro he knows everything about the Negro market.'"32 To prepare African
31
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Americans lor "Negro market" employment, many black organizations worked with
black colleges to develop curricula in marketing and advertising. Thirdly, while
companies had always been encouraged to create specal-appeal campaigns using African
American models and celebrities, they were also warned that these strateg.es were risky if
no. handled well. Ik-cause of the abundance of ads featuring famous African Americans,
lor example, some experts adv.sed companies to use unnamed black models instead.
"Negroes
. . .
smile unconvinced al the Ralph Hunch Jackie Kobuison garden of
testimonials," explained one expert. In a Tide article William ( iraham wrote.
In an ad, a copywriter mighl Hunk it a good idea lo feature a Negro
patriot. You won't hurt any feelings, but you probably won't sell
anything either. So many advertisers, trying to Stick to the middle ofthe
road, use this threadbare device and end up with only a lukewarm
response. Negroes are getting tired of Seeing Hie same old laces just as
you'd get tired of seeing George Washington tied up with a pie crust.
1
1
1BUI while famous African Americans could be problematic, all experts agreed that it was I
Ul*iu 'f,i 'v : - '* 1
still important to use black models, and in one Ebony survey over sixty two percent of
African Americans said they preferred to see black models over whites in
0
advertisements. Many companies used black celebrities and historical figures in their
postwar campaigns, but as the 1 950s wore on "Negro market" advertisers usually took 1
Graham's advice ami used black models instead.
Increased emphasis was also placed on public relations work in black
communities, and companies were advised that this was necessary in order to set them
apart from the pack and to promote a general feeling of goodwill toward their products.
"Selling the Negro Market," Tide, 20 July 1951, )9,
Flasersteia, 4- 1 o.
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•n ^hy Change the Rules When You I lire Negro Salesmen" David Sulhvan argued,
"any concern thai does no, have an established policy on [publicity and public relations]
IS almost Certain to have experienced embarrassing situations as a result ofbadly handled
publicity in printed Negro media."33 I [iring African American salespeople and marketers
was an added public relations benefit to any eompany beeause they were usually aetive
(or could be encouraged to be) in their loeal community groups and churches.36 "Negro
market" advertisers took part in a number ofpublic relations campaigns in the postwar
era. Some companies, such as Sehenley and Pepsi, sponsored educational scholarships
lor African American students, generating goodwill and free advertising through articles
in the black press highlighting these activities. 37 Companies with good employment
records also received free publicity in the black press, and several observers noted that
"the liberal policy of the l ord Motor Co. in hiring and upgrading Negroes, and in
appointing Negro dealers, has increased l ord sales among Negroes."' 8
With the expansion of the "Negro market" in the postwar years, many involved in
it began to consider its larger social role and promoted it as a benefit both to the black
community and to American society. As they had in the Great Depression and World
War II, many believed that it was good lor the black community because it gave African
Americans jobs as salespeople and marketing experts, increased advertising revenue in
black media, and demonstrated their importance to the American economy. For example,
in an article discussing its consumer survey, the People 'v Voice argued that, "scientific
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knowledge of spending power, and the full utilization of consumer purchasing power, has
more equality back of it than a million thoughts of social equality,"39 and that knowledge
of black consumption habits would help "in raising economic standards."40 Many
African American marketers, in particular, argued that the "Negro market" gave
increased status and attention to the black community. In a Sales Management article,
David Sullivan wrote, "the Negro press has recently played up the importance of the
Negro consumer's expenditures for goods and services - which give him a new sense of
his importance in the economic life of the country."41 By gaining recognition as
consumers, then, African Americans would gain economically and socially.
Some also argued that the "Negro market" helped demonstrate racial
egalitarianism to nations around the world, a political imperative in an era of intense Cold
3
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>
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)
>
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cWar rivalries. A capitalist economic system, many experts explained, should treat
consumers equally regardless of their race, and the "Negro market" was the arena for this
consumer equality. In an Advertising Age article, Ebony founder John Johnson argued
that "[at] present the American democratic system is being judged throughout the world," I
and that in marketing to the black community, "American business men can play an 1
important role in helping this nation improve its foreign relations. They can grant the
Negro recognition which unquestionably should be his under our economic system by
treating him just as they do everyone else - to accord him the same attention they do their
white consumers." Doing so would mean increased sales and profits to businesses, and
"Expert Conducts Harlem Survey," People's Voice, 19 July 1947, 14.
40
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would also "enable our country to achieve the favorable world opinion which it
deserves."42 Joe LaCour, head of the black newspaper representative Associated
Publishers Inc., cited Cold War necessities even more directly when he told the
advertising journal Tide:
The American business community should realize that Asia, Africa, and a
great part of Latin America judges the American enterprise system to an
important degree by its attitude towards the Negro group here. In the
worldwide struggle in which this nation is now engaged with the Soviet
Union to capture the minds and allegiances of men everywhere, it would
seem of the utmost importance that American business realize its
responsibility to grant the Negro recognition which unquestionably should
be his in the American economic system. The net result, greater profits
and a strengthening of world opinion favorable to America.43
Despite these claims that the "Negro market" fostered and demonstrated positive
race relations, during the postwar era the "Negro market" remained an extremely
segregated market. No one in the industry suggested that black marketing representatives
be used for anything other than "Negro market" campaigns, and presumed that their
expertise was limited to knowledge of the black community. Articles warned companies
that using racially insensitive ads in mainstream campaigns would negatively impact their
position in the "Negro market," but no advice, whether given by whites or blacks,
advocated using black models or celebrities in mass media ads. There were rare general
market ads which showed African Americans in non-servant roles, such as Jackie
Robinson's 1950 ad for Wheaties. This full page ad appeared in the Saturday Evening
Post, and showed a Robinson in his Brooklyn Dodgers uniform, holding a bat and
42 John H. Johnson, "Does Your Sales Force Know How To Sell the Negro Trade? Some Do's
and
Don'ts." Advertising Age, 17 March 1952,74.
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identified as the year's Most Valuable Player in Major League Baseball. This type of ad.
however, was extremely uncommon and Robinson's mass market ad only ran a few
times. Furthermore, even within black media models remained segregated in that they
were either black or white, but were never shown in any integrated situations. And while
some companies removed the most blatantly offensive characterizations of African
Americans, blacks still appeared as servants in mass media - when they appeared at all.
Studies indicate that there was an over-all decline in the images of blacks in mainstream
ads: from 1950 to 1956 ads including African Americans dropped from .88 percent to .48
percent in mass-circulation media. So while many companies were willing to use more
positive images of African Americans in black media, the advice to refrain from
stereotyping or demeaning blacks translated into less total visibility in mainstream
consumer spaces.
44 A 1950 article in In Fact cited as an example an ad which was
originally drawn by the artist to include a group of people, including African Americans,
gathered around the Liberty Bell. Before the ad went to press the faces of African
Americans were "whited out." 45 The article quoted one advertising account executive as
arguing, "You'd lose your audience if a colored man appeared in the ad. However, in a
picture of the Old South, whiskey ads, and so forth, you'd put in an Uncle Tom for
atmosphere. We use Negro servants to suggest the Old South, Kentucky, gracious living,
and all that." 6 At the height of the "Negro market," then, mainstream advertisements
continued to depict African Americans as servants or ignored them entirely. In this way
4
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they remained visual symbols that constructed consumers as white while excluding
African Americans from this important postwar social category.
The only groups to challenge this segregation were the leftist organizations, the
National Negro Congress (NNC) and the Committee for the Negro in the Arts (CNA).
As we will see in chapter four, these groups criticized the advertising industry for
creating a distorted picture of American society, even as they drew on the power of the
"Negro market" in their campaigns. Their criticisms were extremely rare, however, and
failed to penetrate other black rights organizations or the business community. Most
people connected to the advertising industry, white or black, congratulated themselves on
the benefits of the "Negro market" for the black community. Edgar Steele even
suggested that the separateness of the black consumer market was a good and vital part of
it, writing that "in our market activities we need to set the Negro market off by itself for
purposes of study and development, and we must rigorously analyze this market and all
its elements in order that it can be built up to its highest potentialities. In this way we
shall not only help the Negro tenth of our population, but we shall greatly expand and
improve our national market as a whole."
47
African Americans in the Advertising Industry
The first national advertising agency to employ an African American executive in
the 1950s was Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne (BBD&O), which hired Clarence
Holte in 1952 to develop its Negro Consumer Marketing Unit. Holte, who was
constantly referred to as the "Jackie Robinson of advertising's major leagues" got his
47
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start in the industry in 1944 when he was hired by Lever Brothers as their salesman in
New York City, and during his tenure there he worked a great deal with United African
Company, Lever's largest subsidiary. 48 At BBD&O Holte developed marketing
programs for agency clients interested in reaching black consumers, and within two years
increased the agency's "Negro market" accounts from two to forty. Holte wrote
numerous trade journal articles and spoke at advertising and marketing conferences. In
his dissertation, "Getting a Job and Changing an Image: African-Americans in the
Advertising Industry, 1920-1975," Jason P. Chambers argues that Holte used his role to
change the advertising industry's approach to African Americans. Chambers points out
that Holte was one of the few "Negro market" specialists to argue for distinctions within
the African American community and that his work challenged the idea that African *
Americans comprised one large, undifferentiated market. He frequently urged
"J
businesses to be "realistic" when they approached the black consumer market, meaning ]
they should understand the reality of African American lives. In a 1954 speech delivered I
to the Merchandising Executives Club, Holte further explained what he meant by the call I
for realism:
You cannot merchandise a promotional campaign that, for example, involves
prizes of trips to exclusive resorts where the Negro knows he is not welcome.
When the Negro can't associate or identify himself with a promotional campaign,
don't expect him to support it for there is no appeal to his interest. 49
"The Negro Market: As Customers and Citizens, its People are Still Making Significant
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I lolte also directly confronted the fear by some advertisers that "Negro market"
ads would create a backlash among white consumers. In a Printers ' Ink article, "The
Negro Market: To Profit From it, Recognize It and Service Its Needs," Holte cited a
survey about the impact of "Negro market" advertising. Over one third of surveyed
African Americans could name companies that conducted "Negro market" campaigns,
and over one forth could name companies that did not market to black consumers.
Whites, on the other hand, could rarely name a company advertising to black consumers,
and of the eight percent of Southern whites who could name a company involved in
"Negro market" activities, fewer than half indicated they would boycott a company for
advertising to African Americans. Therefore, Holte argued that the benefits far
outweighed any potential problem for advertisers. 50
Another well-publicized hiring at a major advertising agency was Roy Eaton, who
was hired as a commercial jingles writer at Young and Rubicam (Y&R). Eaton was a
classically trained pianist with graduate degrees in music from Yale and the Manhattan
School of Music. Unlike Holte, Eaton worked on mainstream advertising campaigns,
writing jingles for Chef Boy-Ar-Dee and Kent Cigarettes. In 1959 he became the
musical director at Benton & Bowles. 51 Most of the major advertising agencies,
however, failed to hire African Americans during the 1 950s, and those that did kept them
at the lowest levels. J.W. Thompson, the largest advertising agency in the 1940s and
1950s, included African American families on its national consumer panel and used
50
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can
David Sullivan as an occasional consultant, but in terms of employing African Americans
the agency remained largely out of the "Negro market" until the early 1960s.
Manufacturers were more willing than advertising agencies to hire Afri
Americans marketing experts and salespeople. As one advertising executive told Sales
Management,
If a company can have an export manager, or vice president in charge of export
markets, then I can see ample reason for a concern having a vice-president in
charge of Negro market operations. Certainly our export markets as they now
stand nowhere match the size of the American Negro market. We get our money
back easily in the Negro market and substantially raise the level of our economy
at the same time.
Soft drink and alcohol companies were the leaders in hiring African Americans, and in
1948 Modern Industry reported that all national liquor, wine and beer companies
employed African Americans in sales or promotional capacities. 53 In that same year
Pabst led the field and employed eleven salespeople on its "Negro market" staff. Pepsi
was universally recognized as the most active soft drink company in the "Negro market,"
and maintained a sizable African American marketing staff throughout the postwar years.
Other product categories with major "Negro market" sales forces included food,
cigarettes, drugs and proprietaries, and oil.
Companies did not have to hire their own marketing staff to create "Negro
market" campaigns, and many looked outside their organizations for expertise. African
American marketing consultants and advertising agencies sprung up across the country.
Leonard Evans Associates, Vince Cullers Advertising, Nash and Scott Agency, and
Sullivan, "Why a Handful," 1 54-1 60.
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Benson-Brooks were just a few of the agencies opened in major cities. 54 In New York
City there were several firms owned by African Americans, and the most successful was
W.B. Graham & Associates, which started during World War II. W.B Graham had been
Pabst's first "Negro market" salesman, and he retained Pabst as a client when he left to
form his own company. Graham also developed and promoted Joe Louis Punch, getting
Louis, Duke Ellington, and a number of other African Americans to invest in and
advertise the product. Graham's company remained active throughout the postwar period
and aided many manufacturers and advertising agencies marketing to African
Americans. 55 David Sullivan's Negro Market Organization (sometimes called David. J.
Sullivan Advertising) was another New York City-based firm which opened during
World War II. Sullivan's postwar career demonstrates the limits to black advancement in
the advertising industry. Unable to find many corporate clients his firm closed in 1 949,
and although he remained active - serving as a consultant to various manufacturers and
advertising agencies, and authoring numerous articles on black consumption - he
reportedly sent out over 1,200 resumes in the 1950s but was unable to obtain a job at an
advertising agency.
56
In addition to advertising agencies, the "Negro market" helped initiate a black
modeling industry in New York City. The first of these agencies, Brandford Models Inc.,
opened in 1 946 and was owned by commercial artist Edward Brandford, Barbara Watson,
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and Louise Yarbro. Barbara Watson took control of the agency in 1953 and renamed it
Barbara Watson Models. The agency trained models for fash,on and commercial work,
and their models were used by Beech Nut Gum, Colgate, Lucky Strike Cigarettes,
Madam C.J. Walker, Noxzema, Schaefer Beer, and Vaseline, among others. One article
noted that in the late 1940s Brandford models were making between $10 and $20 per
hour. Other black modeling agencies in New York City included Sepia Arts Models,
Danzler Models, The Gwyn-Lo Agency, and Bailee Models, although none of those
agencies lasted into the 1950s. 57
Outside of New York City the "Negro market" was aided by the work of several
individuals and organizations. The most prominent "Negro market" promoter in the
postwar years was John H. Johnson, founder of Ebony, Jet, and Tan magazines. His first
magazine, Ebony, was launched in November 1945 with $500, and was dubbed the Life
I
magazine for the African American community. Ebony was a self-consciously middle \
class publication and Johnson's stated mission was to show "that Negroes got married
had beauty contests, gave parties, ran successful businesses, [and] carried on normal
0
living activities. We try to present the good things that Negroes are doing, with emphasis
on what can be done, not on the handicaps, in a lively colorful way that appeals to our
readers."' At Ebony Johnson solicited advertisements from national manufacturers and
promoted the "Negro market" to companies and advertising agencies. Johnson created
pamphlets, slide shows, and movies about how to reach African Americans and
57
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conducted numerous surveys of black consumer habits. In 1951 Johnson launched a
merchandising program and hired black marketing specialists in most major metropolitan
areas to help Ebony advertisers sell their products in local black consumer markets. Their
role was to "create good will in Negro communities
. . . conduct surveys to establish the
sales potential of products in Negro areas; [and] make recommendations on the handling
and distribution of these products in Negro communities."59 Ebony's specialists often
took salesmen to meet African American retailers, and helped them develop displays for
these stores. National corporations quickly utilized Ebony as a marketing resource, and
by 1 95
1
over two hundred corporations advertised in Ebony's pages, making it thirteenth
among national monthlies in advertising. 60
Several black organizations also helped promote the "Negro market." The
National Negro Publishers Association (NNPA) continued its work in the "Negro
Market." As it had before, it included forums on advertising and marketing at its yearly
conventions, and worked with black newspapers on raising their advertising and
journalistic standards. 61 Associated Publishers International (API) and Interstate United
Newspapers (IUN) also continued their work as black newspapers' advertising
representatives throughout the postwar years. In New York City IUN represented the
Amsterdam News while API handled national advertising for the People 's Voice. After
59
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People 's Voice folded API was without a client in New York City, and in brochures such
as "A Practical Guide to Basic Selling in 21 Key Urban Negro Markets," and "Quick
Facts About Selling The Negro Market," any information about black New York
consumers was conspicuously absent. Both organizations conducted surveys and studies
of black consumption, and published reports on "Negro market" statistics and marketing
strategies. Although between them they represented more than ninety percent of the
nation's black newspapers, many observers at the time accused them of scaring away
advertisers because of their intense and bitter rivalry. IUN usually received the majority
of the blame because they paid their salespeople only on a commission basis, which
encouraged them to use aggressive techniques to gain clients. 62 IUN worked for the
Amsterdam News throughout the postwar era, but by the early 1950s the paper established
its own national advertising division - perhaps due to IUN's reputation as being overly
assertive.
In 1953 the National Association of Market Developers (NAMD) was founded to
specifically help increase the knowledge, expertise, and numbers of African Americans in
the advertising and public relations fields. The NAMD was the brainchild of five men -
Walter Davis, H. Naylor Fitzhugh, Moss Kendrix, Samuel Whitman, and Herbert W.
Wright - and became "the central organization through which blacks active in public
relations, marketing, and advertising would promote the black consumer market."63
Moss Kendrix, the acknowledged leader and driving force of the NAMD, also ran a
133; "Negro Newspapers Publishers Assn. Holds Eighth Annual Convention; To Incorporate New Bureau,"
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Washington, I3.C. based agency, the Moss ft Kendrix Organization, which counted
among its clients Coca-Cola and the Carnation Company. The NAMI) hosted annual
-Negro market" conferences, offered training and marketing clinics at black colleges,
provided networking opportunities for African Americans in (or interested in) the
advertising industry, and provided advice to corporations and advertising agencies
involved in NAMI) activities. Executives from major manufacturers and advertising
agencies frequently gave speeches and sat on forums at NAMD conferences, and it was
an important arena for "Negro market" discussions and interactions. 64
"Negro Market" C ampai^ns
Corporate America responded quickly to the reports on black consumption trends,
and during the postwar era hundreds of companies approached the "Negro market" with
advertisements, promotions, and public relations initiatives. By 1949 national
advertisements in black print media totaled over $2.5 million, and in 1956 they were over
$16 million/' 5 Since New York C ity remained the largest black consumer market, and
because many advertising agencies and corporations were headquartered there, black
New Yorkers were exposed to many of these campaigns. The largest advertisers to black
consumers were also the leaders in over-all advertising expenditures, and many different
types of products were represented. Both nationally and in New York, most
advertisements came from companies selling alcohol, tobacco, food and soft drinks.
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cleaning products, medicines, and toiletries. Print ads were the most common strategies
for reaching black consumers and many companies simply ran their standard mass market
ads in black media. More involved were those companies that adapted their mass market
ads to a black audience by using black models or celebrities. Only a few companies
created campaigns for exclusive use in the "Negro market," and those that did usually
emphasized black history or featured prominent African Americans. In addition to print
ads, some companies employed a variety of other strategies to reach black New Yorkers:
hiring black salespeople, placing ads on black radio, installing point-of-purchase displays
in black neighborhood stores, and taking part in public relations work.
Pepsi continued its vigorous and wide-ranging program throughout 1940s and
1950s. At the end of World War II Coca-Cola controlled eighty four percent of the
national soft drink market, and although Pepsi made up some ground in the 1950s, Coke
was the clear industry leader. Alfred Steele, who left a middle management position at
Coke to become president of the Pepsi-Cola Company in 1949, told Business Week that
Pepsi did not seek to challenge Coke's predominance, and instead would happily settle
for a "healthy second place position in the cola field."66 Pepsi's second place status,
however, did not extend to the "Negro market," where Pepsi led in both advertising and
market share throughout the postwar era. In May 1948, in its company newsletter Pepsi-
Cola World, Pepsi explained, "the Negro market can mean the difference between
success and failure for Pepsi-Cola bottling companies in many U.S. communities." The
article discussed the importance and size of this often-overlooked consumer market, and
argued that it could not be approached through general mass marketing campaigns:
"Pepsi-Cola (Finally) Hits the Spot," Business Week 5 July 1952, 56.
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"[African Americans] are beginning to question the wisdom of spending their money
where they cannot earn. They are discriminating between merchandise produced by
companies whose goodwill programs take them into account and those which do not.
They are taking note of advertisers in their own publications, and they are calling for
those brands."67 In the postwar era Pepsi catered to black consumers by trying to address
all of these areas - advertising campaigns, employment practices, and public relations.
In 1 948 Pepsi launched a new "Negro market" program in which it set up a
national black consumer marketing division, advertised heavily in black newspapers,
magazines, and radio, and commenced several community service programs. Walter
Mack, Pepsi president during the late 1940s, told the New York Age,
67
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Inauguration of this program is another tangible demonstration of
PepsiCola's basic business philosophy, which is to encourage
opportunities for Negroes, as well as for all races, in both its business
activities and its community and social projects. . . . Now, with the
!j
employment of Negroes in its national marketing staff, Pepsi-Cola
Company has taken the initiative in still another direction. It is with a
great deal of satisfaction that we are able to announce a program of this
character and magnitude, and we are confident that it will fulfill our every
expectation.
68
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Edward Boyd was named the head of the "Negro Sales Department," and he instituted an
intensive training program for his staff, including designing and building point-of-
purchase displays. The main function of Boyd's team was to assist local bottlers in
expanding their "Negro market" sales, and they launched their work in the metropolitan
New York City area. They accompanied bottlers to local retail stores to open accounts.
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installed point-of-purchase displays, conducted local contests, and contacted "Negro
churches, schools, Boy Scouts, the local Urban League Chapter, and other public
organizations particularly concerned with Negroes, in order to build good will for Pepsi-
Cola by explaining the community service projects of the Company."69 By the early
1 950s Boyd's group was assisting bottlers around the nation. Pepsi also increased its
advertising in black media, and in 1948 created a special campaign called "Leaders in
Their Fields." These ads appeared in Ebony and fifty black newspapers, and ran in all
three of Harlem's papers. While many companies featured famous black celebrities,
Pepsi used "successful but little-known Negroes in fields like chemistry, medicine,
business, banking, etc."70 The ads featured a photo of an African American, labeled a
"leader" in his or her field, and then reported that Pepsi was also an leader in its field.
Many of the featured black professionals demonstrated a commitment to the African
American community. For example, an ad using Dr. Theodore Howard proclaimed that
he was a surgeon and had built a recreational center for children in Mississippi. Other
African Americans used in ads included Ralph Bunche, P. Bernard Young (editor of the
Norfolk Journal and Guide), Rachel Ratcliffe Wilson (Executive Director of a Texas
Association for the Blind), and Joseph S. Dunning (Aeronautical Engineer). Although a
few, like Dr. Bunche, would be easily recognizable by many even outside of the black
community, most were unknown to black and white audiences.
The "Leaders in Their Fields" approach was the only Pepsi campaign uniquely
created for the black consumer market, and it received widespread attention in the
"Ten Billion Dollars?," 6.
"How Big is Your Negro Market," Modern Industry 15 April 1948.
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advertising industry, Printers ' Ink featured a story on Pepsi m its September 1949 issue,
titled "PepsM lola's ( lampaip to the Negro Market," and commented thai Pepsi's
strategy was one of "implied emulation" which recognized people "who had overcome
the adversities of racial discrimination" and therefore served as inspiration "to Negroes in
positions Of lesser public esteem." By associating the people in the ads with Pepsi, the
company wanted to "stimulate the desire among Negroes to emulate present users of the
product." Pepsi also indicated that raeism itself led to the idea ol the "Leaders"
campaign, arguing, "the omnipresent attitude of hostility, the discouragement of Negro
Hade by store owners and the universal policy of segregation provided the germ for a
profitable advertising venture. Pepsi-Cola would develop a theme to compensate for the
Negro \s general feeling of suppression and lie this in with the product. 1,71 Since African
Americans did not experience equality in many aspects ol American society, Pepsi would
compensate lor this by showing African Americans who were able to gain success in
society, and by offering access to their products. Therefore, Pepsi was hoping to exploit
the connections between consumption and status that advertisers believed manifested
itself in a race-specific way for African Americans. I he creation of a specific "Negro
market" campaign, they hoped, would create a positive attitude about Pepsi within the
72
black community. In all of its "Leaders" acls Pepsi was careful to use photOS instead ol
As Carl Nightingale has shown, by the late 1960s this type of compensatory consumption ethic
WOUld have devastating economic anil psychological costs lor urban black youth whose identities weie
increasingly tied to commodities. This ethic was a self-conscious creation ol corporate America in the
1940s and would, in (he 1970s and 1980s, target black youth even more specifically. See < ail I [usemollcr
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Basic Books, 1993), chapter 5.
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drawings, and the Printers
'
Ink story noted that "line drawings of Negroes sometimes
caricature Negro features and sometimes make it uncertain that the portrait is of a
Negro."73 In fact, throughout the postwar era all of Pepsi's "Negro market" ads used
photographs of African Americans. This was in stark contrast to its ads for mainstream
media, which most often used illustrations.
Although it did not create any other special "Negro market" campaigns in the
1 950s, Pepsi always modified its existing ads in black media to include African American
models. A frequent ad campaign, "More Bounce to the Ounce," mirrored its mainstream
ad format except that it used African Americans. These ads used students at black
colleges who were often identified by name and school, for example the ad featuring
Natalie Stuart of Howard University [Figure 3.1]. The ad copy reads, "Pretty Natalie
Stuart, from Indianapolis, majoring in English, will teach. This lovely Howard girl, 1
J
*
member of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Fellowship Council, Campus Pals, knows Pepsi's
popularity is deserved, demands the BEST in colas, enjoys Pepsi!" Stuart's friends also
appear in the ad and were described as, "vivacious Helen Brown," "lettermen Fred
3
Turner, Jr., football and swimming star," and "Edsel Hudson, Student Council Head."
While the "Leaders" campaign mostly featured men, the "More Bounce" ads more often
highlighted young college women, all ofwhom were slim, attractive, and popular. By
showing these women socializing with men from their campuses, these ads included
African Americans within the popular postwar images of youth, college, heterosexuality,
and dating.
Hirschhorn, 40.
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Figure 3.1: Pepsi-Cola "More Bounce" Advertisement
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Along with the "More Bounce" ads, Pepsi also created ads for black consumers in
the format of its "Why Take Less," and "Light Refreshment" campaigns. As m the
"More Bounce" campaign, these ads used photos instead of drawings, this time featuring
unidentified black models. Like their white counterparts, these models were young,
attractive, and modern, and were always depicted at parties or other social gatherings.
Pepsi received a great deal of favorable press with its liberal hiring practices, in
contrast to Coke which did not employ any African American salespeople in New York
City. Black newspapers often reported that Pepsi employed African Americans at its
corporate headquarters and in its bottling plants, and Ebony quoted Walter Mack as
stating that Pepsi, "has a firm and established policy of encouraging opportunities for
Negroes in all its business activities."74 Articles in trade journals and black media often
noted that Pepsi was one of the first companies to hire black salesman, and their "Negro
Sales Department" gained much attention. In 1 952 Edward Boyd was fired from his i
position as head of this department, and although many black salespeople were retained
the group became less coordinated until 1954. In that year Harvey Russell, who had been [
;
hired by Boyd in 1950, reorganized the group into the Special Markets Division. Russell
was promoted to the position of Special Assistant and he answered directly to the head of
the Domestic Markets Division. Russell got his start in the advertising industry working
for W.B. Graham & Associates in the 1940s where he helped launch Joe Louis Punch, a
background which he later credited with landing him the job at Pepsi. As head of the
Special Markets Division he supervised eighteen African American salesmen and
marketers working on Special Markets activities, and as before this department's main
74
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function was to help local offices conduct promotional activities in black communities.
In an interview conducted in the 1980s Russell remembered, "the job of people in [the
Negro Sales Division] was to go out and work with bottlers, to work primarily in the
Negro neighborhoods, to promote [Pepsi], ... and to do the advance man job and
everything else."75 In 1961 Russell was named Vice President of Special Markets,
becoming the first black Vice President at a national corporation. He recalled that some
bottlers objected and that Pepsi "didn't know what they were getting into. But it brought
such good response that they really began to be a little proud of it, until six months
later."
76
This was when the Ku Klux Klan started a campaign saying that Russell's wife,
a light-skinned black woman, was white - and urged whites to boycott the company. The
boycott never materialized, however, and the Klan's activities against Pepsi became part
of a North Carolina investigation that eventually "scared them off," according to Russell.
Under Boyd, and then Russell, Pepsi conducted a number of public relations
initiatives in the black community and made a concerted effort to foster positive attitudes
about the company. As mentioned in chapter two, in 1945 Pepsi opened a Junior Club in
Harlem, one of four in New York City. Open to kids aged fourteen to seventeen, the club
sponsored dances, parties, and after-school games and activities for young Harlemites.
Two representatives from Harlem's club sat on the Interclub Council, and Pepsi included
photos and an article about this integrated group in its internal newsletter, Pepsi-Cola
World. The club closed in June 1947, although the reasons for its closure are unclear.
The Amsterdam News reported that Walter Mack "claimed that the club has not done the
75
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job for which it was intended" and that, "during the time he sponsored the center, he has
received only severe criticism from Harlem. Regardless of the number of gang wars that
the club has undoubtedly prevented, the robberies that have not been committed, and the
number of teenagers that have been kept of the streets after school hours and during
vacations, the community has never shown its appreciation."77 Its closing received
limited adverse publicity, however, perhaps because Pepsi continued its large advertising
schedule in both the Amsterdam News and the Age.
Pepsi also received much praise for its college scholarship program, especially its
policy of setting aside scholarships for African Americans in the South where segregation
prevented white and black students from competing directly for the awards. Pepsi named
Dr. Paul Lawrence, noted black educator, to its scholarship board, and in 1948 it also
began offering scholarships to graduate students. All of Harlem's black newspapers, and
many journals such as Crisis and Opportunity, ran numerous stories about black
scholarship winners. Russell acknowledged that these public relations activities were a
financial benefit for the company, but argued that Pepsi was not racially progressive just
to gain market share. Throughout his time at Pepsi he found that there were "those in
management who [felt] responsibility above and beyond; for instance, the contribution of
$1 million to [the United Negro College Fund], [was] much more than publicity." He
said that there were many other programs supported by Pepsi that didn't have a direct
benefit to the company but that there was a "sense of heart" among many of his
colleagues. These public relations activities created much goodwill in the black
"Harlem's Kids to Lose Fun Center," New York Amsterdam News, 28 June 1947, 1
.
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community. Pepsi was the acknowledged soft drink leader among black consumers, a
fact which held true in New York City as well. 78
Coca-Cola, which had initiated a flurry of activity during World War II, almost
completely withdrew from New York's "Negro market" for ten years following the war.
Although it hired Moss Kendrix as a consultant and occasionally advertised in Ebony, it
failed to place ads in Harlem's newspapers and did not employ local African American
salesmen. In the spring of 1954 The United African Nationalist Movement launched a
boycott to pressure Coke into hiring African Americans in its New York area bottling
facilities. The boycott was unsuccessful but did receive a great deal of local publicity, as
did the fact that several Coke bottlers were prominent members of the White Citizens
Councils in the South and were very vocal about maintaining segregation. Not until 1955
would Coke employ an African American marketing specialist or include any African
Americans in their ads, and that was only after the NAACP threatened a national boycott
of their products. Their attention to black New Yorkers remained slight even into the late
1950s, and the ads they ran in the Amsterdam News were infrequent and did not include
African American models.
One explanation for Coca-Cola's absence from the "Negro market" was its
dominance of the soft drink industry. Unlike Pepsi, which depended on sales to black
consumers, Coke was the cola leader without spending very much money in black media.
Even without ads or salesmen Coke was the second most popular soft-drink in Harlem.
Another explanation may be that the company was based in Atlanta and therefore more
inclined toward Southern racial ideology, or at least more sensitive to alienating white
78
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customers. Harvey Russell recalls that even at Pepsi it was difficult to get Southern
bottlers to market to African Americans and that they would only do so if they "could
keep white customers out of it." He believes that Coke did not get involved in the
"Negro market" both because it wanted to keep the "old, Southern, conservative
image," and also because they "had the market" and didn't need to reach into new areas.
He recalls that representatives from NAMD met with Coke in the early 1950s about
getting more engaged with the black consumer market but that their position was, "we'll
let Pepsi keep that ten percent of the market and we'll keep the other ninety percent."79
When The Crisis ran photos and an article about segregated Coke machines in the
South it argued, "the Coca-Cola company should be deeply disturbed at this juxtaposition
of its product with segregated signs." Moss Kendrix, at the time Coke's "Negro market"
consultant, told the NAACP that the machines were not the fault of Coca-Cola itself but
instead the creation of independent bottlers. "It is the privilege of a vending machine
owner to add to his equipment whatever attachments he may wish," wrote Kendrix in a
letter to the NAACP; "if he has to have separate water fountains in conformity with local
laws or customers such, you will admit, is a matter beyond [Coca-Cola's] control." The
NAACP, however, argued that "as long as such machines are in operation Negroes are
going to believe that the Coca-Cola Company (especially since it originated in Atlanta,
Georgia) approves the practice. It is up to the Coca-Cola Company to clear its name." 80
Throughout the postwar era Coke remained associated with Southern segregation in the
minds of many black consumers.
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Another product with connections to slavery and racism was Aunt Jemima, whose
very product name and image were offensive to African Americans. The Quaker Oats
company, makers of Aunt Jemima products, maneuvered around this problem by
modifying its ads in black media in the late 1940s and early 1950s while maintaining
their traditional ads in white media, complete with head-rag and slang speech. "Negro
market" ads minimized the image of Aunt Jemima and instead prominently displayed
Freda De Knight, Ebony's food editor. De Knight was a modern "expert," who spoke in
standard English, wore stylish clothing and hair styles, and created a more positive image
for black consumers. Occasionally Aunt Jemima was used in black media, but instead of
her traditional "happifying" she said, "Everything's in but the Shortening!" J.W.
Thompson (JWT), Quaker's advertising agency, conducted studies of white and black
consumers throughout the 1950s, and found that African Americans were higher users of
pancake mix than whites, a statistic that took on added significance as the ready-made
pancake industry, and Aunt Jemima's share in it, significantly declined in the postwar
era.
81
Robert LaVine, editor of trade journal Dun 's Review and Modem Industry,
reported in 1957 that leaders from the black community met with Quaker Oats to change
Aunt Jemima's offensive image. He noted, "whereas she was originally depicted as a
stout, extremely black, somewhat slovenly kitchen slavey [sic], today her skin color has
been lightened, and her features and costume have been made more attractive." In
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consumer surveys JWT found that while African Americans disliked the Aunt Jemima
character, white consumers considered her more favorably. To them she was, "the lady
who makes the very best pancakes. She is fat, jolly and such a good cook. She is clean
and happy and makes other people happy."83 However, they also found that in the 1950s
even whites began to believe that Aunt Jemima was old-fashioned and that the product
failed to keep up with modern food trends. "The calorie-conscious dietary revolution
[has] made Aunt Jemima's middle-age spread unattractive to many former fans,"
explained a Printers ' Ink article distributed throughout JWT. JWT and Quaker,
therefore, had more at stake than their "Negro market" customers when redesigning Aunt
Jemima's icon and advertisements.
Other food and beverage products that advertised to black consumers included
Pillsbury, Maxwell House Coffee, Uncle Ben's Rice, and Quaker Oats. Pet and
Carnation milk companies both marketed heavily to black New Yorkers. Like Aunt
Jemima, Carnation Milk ads featured Freda De Knight, where she was promoted as "one
of America's leading authorities on the art of cooking." Black models were used in other
Carnation ads, which replicated the layouts and copy of mass-circulation ads. Like their
white counterparts, African American women were shown as mothers, usually holding
their children, and were given the voice of authority and maternal knowledge. Pet Milk
also copied its mass-circulation campaign for the "Negro market," and designed ads
which featured triplets or quadruplets. The most common ad in black media used the
"Famous Fultz Quads" of North Carolina. Fultz ads began running in 1 948 when the
children were two, and followed their lives throughout the early 1950s. The ad in Figure
S1
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3.2 shows a photo of the Fultz quads as babies and as young girls sitting around a table
playing tea. The headline reads "Four Little Babies Become Four Little Ladies" and the
girls are dressed in white cotton dresses, hair bows, and patent leather shoes. This image
is a far cry from the "picanniny" depictions in the regular press that so offended African
Americans, and these young girls appear instead as housewives-in-the-making who are
looking forward to a future that was usually reserved for white children. Pet used many
other families in their ads, and they were all portrayed as typical middle class families.
In these ads men were white collar professionals and women were stay-at-home mothers,
despite statistics which demonstrated that many married black women engaged in wage
work. Ads also described black children in stereotypical ly gendered ways with boys
shown taking part in athletics while girls received instruction from their mothers about
how to cook and do household chores. Additionally, these Pet families engaged in
activities associated with the postwar middle class - leisure outings, community athletic
events, the PTA, and the Mother's Club. To supplement their print ads, Pet and
Carnation also targeted black consumers through radio advertisements, and Pet was one
of the first sponsors of the National Negro Network. Carnation's "Contented Hour" radio
show on N.B.C. often included African American musicians, a fact which they
highlighted in many of their black media advertisements. Both companies were
extremely popular among black consumers and ranked first or second in almost every
national and New York City "Negro market" survey, far outpacing Borden's.
Another product which continued its postwar courtship of black consumers was
tobacco. Cigarette companies vied strenuously for black consumer market share, and
many of them modified existing advertising campaigns by using black models or
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Source: Ebony (November 1949)
Figure 3.2: Fultz Quads Pet Milk Advertisement
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celebrities. Interestingly, while Camel cigarettes placed very few ads in black print
media it was usually the most popular cigarette in the "Negro market," and the
Amsterdam News survey listed it first among men and third among women. Camel was
one of the biggest advertisers on black radio in the postwar era, which explains its
popularity elsewhere, but the extent of its advertising on black radio in New York City is
not known. If it did sponsor a program it failed to receive any notice in Harlem's
newspapers. Given the extensive "Negro market" campaigns waged in metropolitan New
York by most of the other national cigarette brands, Camel's popularity raises questions
about the extent to which factors other than marketing and advertising techniques shaped
the consumer habits of black New Yorkers.
Philip Morris had been marketing to black New Yorkers since 1941 and continued
to maintain a strong presence in the postwar era. In 1955 the company announced it was
launching a major advertising program, and indicated that Ebony and Our World were
among the publications it scheduled for this extensive initiative. 84 It also advertised
continuously in the Amsterdam News, both by using its general market ads and by
creating ads featuring photos and endorsements from non-celebrity African Americans.
All of the people in its ads were identified by name and occupation, and were shown
holding Philip Morris cigarettes. In each description their occupations were listed and the
ads claimed they performed their jobs better because they avoided "cigarette hangover"
by smoking Philip Morris cigarettes. Many were professionals, such as Chicago law
professor William Ming, production manager Charles Young, architect James Garrott,
and manager of Harlem's Hotel Theresa William Brown. However, Philip Morris also
84 i,
Philip Morris Cyclic Advertising Explained," Editor & Publisher, 2 April 1955, 20,
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used a few working class representatives among its African American endorsers,
including crane operator Clifford Willis and pump operator James Webb. Philip Morris
was also a big advertiser on black radio shows, and was the first sponsor of a radio
program on the National Negro Network. The company received a great deal of positive
publicity when African Americans appeared on two of the mass market shows it
sponsored, "Eddie Cantor - Show Business" and "This is Your Life."
But Philip Morris's "Negro market" activities extended far beyond radio and print
advertising. Like Pepsi, Philip Morris's employment practices generated good-will in the
black community and in "Selling Race Relations in King-Sized Packages," which
appeared in Color magazine in April 1955, Philip Morris was proclaimed, "second to
none among American industries in the field of equality." 85 The company employed
African Americans in its factories and fields, and also as salespeople and artists in its
marketing department. The Color article noted that it was the first cigarette company to
grant benefits to its seasonal workers, and employed over 1400 African American
unionized workers. Philip Morris was a regular contributor to the Urban League,
sponsored journalism awards which included African American contestants and winners,
and held activities at black college campuses. 86 In the Amsterdam News survey Philip
Morris the leading cigarette among women and third among men, and was usually in the
top three of "Negro market" surveys conducted in other cities.
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Chesterfield also advertised heavily in the "Negro market" and was Ebony s first
major client, running full-page back cover ads and reportedly placing more ads in black
media than any other cigarette manufacturer. 88 Chesterfield did not create special
campaigns, such as Pepsi's "Leaders" ads, but they did modify their mainstream celebrity
ads to include famous African Americans. Chesterfield "Negro market" ad layouts were
exactly the same as in white media, and like mainstream ads they used mostly
entertainment and sports figures. Joe Louis was one of the first celebrities used in
Chesterfield ads, and was featured in several different ads that ran in Ebony, the People 's
Voice, and the Amsterdam News. Ads depicted him in a suit and tie holding a pack of
Chesterfield cigarettes, and several also showed him boxing. The ad in Figure 3.3 is one
with a general sports theme, and behind Louis are scenes of African American men
boxing, playing baseball and basketball, and running. Most ads associated the product
with Louis with copy that read, "Chesterfield the Champ of Cigarettes," or "The
Winner." The ad includes Louis's signature and quotes him as saying, "Chesterfield is by
far the Largest Selling Cigarette in My New Restaurant." Highlighting Louis's restaurant
in Harlem would have had a special appeal for black New Yorkers, and to other black
consumers the ad demonstrated his achievement not only as an athlete but as a
businessman. Chesterfield's association with Louis, therefore, connected the product to
his celebrity status and popularity, and also to black entrepreneurship. In addition to
Louis, other black celebrities appeared in Chesterfield ads and they were all either sports
stars or entertainers. Ads included such notable black figures as actress and opera star
88
"Ebony: Making a New Market Pay Off," Business Week, 22 March 1952, 43; "The Brown
Hucksters," Ebony, May 1948.
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Source: Ebony (February 1947)
Figure 3.3: Joe Louis Chesterfield Advertisement
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Muriel Smith, Broadway actress Sheila Guyse, Bill Robinson, Ray Robinson, Sara
Vaughn, and Jaekie Robinson. Printers
'
Ink reported that these "testimonial" ads were a
very effective strategy for Chesterfield because, "the Negro, like everyone else, likes to
read about people of his own group."89
In the early 1950s Chesterfield also ran occasional ads featuring African
Americans who were not celebrities but, instead. Chesterfield employees. One ad [Figure
3.4] includes three African Americans, listed as foreman James Adkins, inspector
Cornelia I lerndon, and salesman Walter White, Jr. White was the son of the famous
NAACP president, linking Chesterfield with African American political causes and
demonstrating race-friendliness outside the consumer realm. While White is listed
without specifying a location, Adkins and I lerndon are both located in southern
Chesterfield factories - Richmond, Virginia and Durham, North Carolina respectively. In
their photos they are all dressed in professional attire, are smiling and looking directly
into the camera, and are accompanied by a headline that reads, "We say smoke OUR
BRAND." Because they work for Chesterfield the implication is that it is their brand
because of employment as well as purchase. The copy, "the cigarette that's good to you
- good to smoke," echoes the popular mass-circulation Chesterfield campaigns of the
early 1950s which emphasized the healthfulness of the cigarettes. This slogan, however,
could hold a double meaning for black consumers in that Chesterfield is also good for the
black community because it employs African Americans.
In addition to advertisements in black media Chesterfield also created point-of-
purchase advertising featuring black celebrities and in the mid-1950s produced
K')
.
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Source: Ebony (December 1951)
Figure 3.4: Chesterfield Advertisement
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documentary films on the achievements of African Americans in many areas of society.
One series of films was called the "Chesterfield Reporter," and featured the African
American actor John Marriot interviewing black celebrities and prominent community
members. These films were shown in black theaters, schools, and colleges, and reached
over three million black customers. When shown at colleges Chesterfield also distributed
free cigarette samples to the audience. 90 These combined efforts were extremely
successful. In 1 948 Ebony reported that Chesterfield went from fourth to first place in
Harlem after they ran ads featuring Joe Louis, and the Amsterdam News survey placed it
second among both men and women smokers, vying closely for first place with Camel
(16.3 % to 16.5%) among men. Throughout the 1950s Chesterfield remained one of the
most popular cigarettes in the "Negro market," almost always among the top five in all
consumer surveys.
91
The American Tobacco Company was the last cigarette maker to target black
New Yorkers, and it had suffered from notoriety and boycotts in the black community
because of its manufacture of "Nigger Hair Tobacco." Its chief product, Lucky Strike
cigarettes, did not place ads in black media until 1948, but it did so in that year by
creating a special marketing campaign: "Famous Firsts in Negro History." These ads
featured black historical figures, such as Booker T. Washington and George Washington
Carver, and also lesser-known African Americans such as John Russwurn, the first
publisher of a black newspaper. "Famous Firsts" ads appeared in the Amsterdam News,
and paired the story of a notable African American with the claim that Lucky Strike
90
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cigarettes were a "Famous First in Cigarette History" because they were the most
preferred cigarette. In 1950, after two years of its "Famous Firsts" ads, Lueky Strike
adapted its general market ad campaign, "Be Happy, Go Lucky" to include African
American models
- and began running these ads in the Amsterdam News. For years
industry experts had explicitly argued that African Americans did not like to be portrayed
as happy-go-lucky, and in a 1957 article, "The Negro Market: A $16 Billion Sales
Challenge," Robert LaVine wrote that African Americans "are weary of always being
depicted as servants or happy-go-lucky minstrels." He went on to point out that
"resentment of [this] theme is considered one reason why Lucky Strike cigarettes, with
his 'Be Happy, Go Lucky' slogan, has failed to catch on with this market."92 In the
Amsterdam News survey Lucky Strike cigarettes ranked a distant fourth, well behind
Camels, Chesterfield, and Philip Morris, however there were no indications in the black
press that this was because black New Yorkers resented the "Be Happy, Go Lucky"
slogan. By 1952 the slogan was replaced in the Amsterdam News by the "Lucky Strike
Tastes Better" ads, although the "Be Happy, Go Lucky" slogan continued in mainstream
media throughout the 1950s.
Beer and liquor distributors were also major advertisers to black New Yorkers.
The story of local breweries and New York's "Negro market" is a complicated one, and
in the early 1950s black New Yorkers launched a campaign to increase black
employment in area plants. Chapter four discusses this campaign in detail, which was
largely unsuccessful at persuading employers or unions to break down racial employment
barriers. Nevertheless, many alcohol companies hired African American salespeople to
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court black New Yorkers. Cecil Cooke for Ruppert Beer, James Adams for Pabst Beer
(who ran an 1
1
person national black sales staff), Billy Howard for Miller Beer, Joseph
Christian for Seagram's, and Herman Smith for Schenley Whiskey, were just a few of the
dozens of black beer and alcohol salesmen that worked in New York City and the
surrounding metropolitan region. None of the companies created unique "Negro market"
advertisements but almost all modified their existing ads to include African American
models, ordinary people, or celebrities.
Rheingold, produced by Liebmann Breweries, was the most popular beer among
black New Yorkers into the mid-1950s, followed closely by Schaefer and Ballantine.
Since Liebmann relied heavily on metropolitan New York for its total sales revenue, New
York's black consumers were extremely important to the company. Interestingly,
Rheingold did not invest heavily in black print media, and their ads in Harlem's black
papers were infrequent throughout the postwar era. So, how did Rheingold gain and
maintain its popularity in the postwar era without investing in print advertisements?
First, in 1952 it began including African Americans in its Miss Rheingold contest. This
contest was the cornerstone of its mass market advertising strategy and was extremely
popular; articles reporting on the contest invariably mentioned that only the Presidential
election received more votes than the Miss Rheingold contest. In 1951, for example,
over 12 million people voted for Miss Rheingold. The contest winner received a cash
prize, appeared in Rheingold advertisements and attended publicity events, and was
supposed to be "the type of girl the average man would like to marry - pretty,
James L. Hicks, "RheingolcTs Front Line Men," New York Amsterdam News, 4 July 1959, 24-
25; "How Miss Rheingold Died," Newsweek 31 March 1969, 60.
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wholesome, and young."94 When Rheingold opened the competition to include African
Americans it received widespread attention in the black press. The Age and the
Amsterdam News gave a great deal of coverage to Rheingold even though it was not
advertising in either paper. And it was hailed as an event that was more democratic than
the "Miss America" pageant which excluded African American women. 95 Liebmann
supplemented its Miss Rheingold appeal with extensive point-of-purchase displays in
black neighborhood stores and through its regional sponsorship of both the Nat King
Cole television program and the local Jackie Robinson radio program.
Additionally, Liebmann built a race-conscious reputation through its employment
practices and public relations programs. By the mid-1950s the company employed
African Americans as data processors, clerks in the ordering department, truck drives,
salespeople, and even the executive secretary to the company president. Liebmann
garnered tremendous publicity in the local black press through its contributions to black
civic organizations and sponsorship of awards at annual NAACP dinners, and company
president Philip Liebmann was a member of the National Urban League's Commerce and
Industry Council. It wasn't always necessary, then, to conduct an ad campaign in print
media if one was willing to be aggressive in other areas. 96
Schaefer, the second most popular beer among black New Yorkers, reached out to
Harlemites through numerous advertisements on local radio and in the black press,
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event
especially the Amsterdam News, and also contributed to local charities and employed
African American salespeople. Beginning in 1940 Schaefer sponsored a local
called the "Beaux Arts Ball" which benefited the National Urban League. In the months
leading up to the ball Schaefer conducted a Miss Beaux Arts contest in the city's black
neighborhoods where "the loveliest model among Negro women"97 was selected by
popular vote from a Held of six contestants. Each year the Miss Beaux Arts winner
received clothes, trips, and most importantly a modeling contract from Schaefer for an ad
campaign in black media. This campaign mirrored the Miss Rheingold contest except
that it was conducted exclusively in the black community and therefore more specifically
targeted black New Yorkers.98
Hard liquor companies, especially whiskey makers, also developed multifaceted
approaches to court black New Yorkers, and Seagram's and Schenley were two of the
most successful and active corporate advertisers. Seagram's, whose products included its
namesake and also Carstairs and Calvert whiskey, continued its long-standing practice of
placing ads in Harlem's newspapers. The Carstairs' campaign emulated its mainstream
ads by using sets of identical twins to highlight the two reasons to drink Carstairs: it had a
"premium taste" at a "popular price." To appeal specifically to black New Yorkers
Carstairs used local black twins for these ads in the Amsterdam News and Age.
Memorandum from Caroline Robinson to Dorothy Worcester, 26 January 1965, box 10,
Caroline R. Jones Papers.
For information on Schaefer's "Negro market" activities see Carol Spielvogel, "Advertising:
Recognizing Negro Potential," New York Times 10 August 1958, F10; Thomasina Norford, "'Gaslight
Follies' and Jo Baker Make Beaux Arts Ball Best Yet," New York Amsterdam News 20 February 1960, 12;
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Additionally, Seagram's, Calvert, and Carstairs all had their own African American
salesmen in New York City. Although statistics aren't available for New York,
Seagram's reportedly had 50% of the national black consumer market."
Schenley was often listed as the second most successful whiskey in the national
"Negro market," and had been advertising in Harlem's black press since World War II.
Although its Schenley Reserve whiskey appeared in the most ads, its other products -
McNaughton's Canadian Whiskey, Dewar's Scotch, Creme of Kentucky Whiskey, and
Carioca Rum - were also featured occasionally in the Amsterdam News and the Age.
Schenley Reserve ads depicted African American personalities such as Harlem radio disc
jockey Willie Bryant, sports columnist and radio announcer Joe Bostic, and composer
Dusty Fletcher. The company ran local contests for "Harlem's favorite entertainer," and
teamed up with the Age in the lighter give-away contest in 1949. Additionally, Schenley
employed fifteen to twenty African American salesmen to promote their products, with
sales arranged by product instead of geographic region.
Conclusion
As these campaigns demonstrate, many companies waged extensive "Negro
market" programs in the postwar era and aggressively courted black consumers in New
York City and across the nation. The expansion of the black consumer market opened up
employment opportunities for African Americans in sales and advertising, and helped
create a black modeling industry in many cities. The "Negro market" brought revenue to
black newspapers and magazines, and spurred the expansion of black-appeal stations and
99
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programs. Whether selling milk, pancakes, soft drinks, alcohol, cigarettes, or medicine,
postwar "Negro market" ads were a striking contrast to the depictions of African
Americans in mainstream media and showed blacks as professionals, students,
celebrities, and middle-class families. In this way, the "Negro market" included the black
community in the prevalent consumer culture of the 1950s.
However, despite the tremendous expansion of the "Negro market" it remained
very segregated. African American experts, organizations, modeling and advertising
agencies were all black-owned ventures that served clients interested in the "Negro
market." They were active partners in the advertising industry but were not able to
challenge the segregation of the "Negro market" from the mainstream one. Their
existence, in fact, depended largely on this segregation. In mass media ads the use of
African Americans declined in the postwar era, and when they were included they
remained in stereotypical servant roles. Although the advertising industry heartily
congratulated itself on what it perceived to be the egalitarianism of the "Negro market,"
most agencies kept their black employees at the lowest levels and confined them to black
media campaigns. But the expansion of the "Negro market" did not occur in a vacuum,
and in New York and across the nation African Americans capitalized on their consumer
importance to fight against racial discrimination and segregation.
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CHAPTER 4:
CONFIDENT BUT CAUTIOUS
Black New Yorkers emerged from World War II determined to expand upon the
gains they had made during the conflict. Increased employment, greater government
access, rent controls, consumer rights, and heightened social recognition were only some
of the more positive changes the black community hoped to maintain. Their attitude
could best be described as "confident but cautious," a phrase used by Roi Ottley in a
1 947 New York Times article on the state of black New York. African Americans in the
city felt their confidence rested on several postwar developments - the Cold War's
"international implications in the treatment of the Negro," the New York State Ives-
Quinn bill which prohibited racial discrimination in employment, and "the efforts of an
enlightened section of the white citizenry." The Ives-Quinn bill, in particular, was the
"catalytic agent" to create more and better jobs for African Americans, thereby ensuring
their future security. These developments, however, came at the same time as more
ominous postwar trends. The plight of blacks in the South, especially the increase in
lynchings and other violence, cast a pall over the entire black community. Closer to
home, many black New Yorkers lacked the skills or training needed to get better jobs,
and felt that "Negroes [were] cruelly handicapped, no matter how much good-will is
extended by the white community." As Ottley explained, "the man in the street hopes
k
the good times will roll forever,' yet, as he counts his wartime gains his optimism is
tinged with anxiety." 1 In postwar New York, African Americans worked to extend their
wartime gains in consumer rights and other areas of society.
Roi Ottley, "Harlem is Confident But Cautious," New York Times 1 June 1947, SM20
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Consumer Rights Campaigns
African Americans' cautious optimism was dealt a severe blow in 1946 when
both the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) and the Office of Price
Administration (OPA) were eliminated. The black community had looked to these
organizations as the major guarantors of equal employment and equal consumption,
respectively, and as a signal by the federal government that it was interested in protecting
the rights of black citizens. Despite the discrimination African Americans often
encountered in OPA neighborhood presence and enforcement, black New Yorkers saw it
as an important tool in their struggle for consumer equality. Throughout the war black
activists had focused many of their efforts on supporting and extending the powers of the
OPA, and in the postwar era they were determined to keep this important ally. 2
Since its inception the OPA had been a political battleground between the
proponents of government regulation of the economy and the champions of a free market.
As the wartime emergency ended, support for the OPA waned in Congress. Around the
country black and white activists launched an extensive campaign to save the agency -
including large rallies and marches, Congressional lobbying, and consumer boycotts.
When Congress passed a watered-down version of the OPA in July 1 946, activists
increased the intensity of their work. In New York City activities were coordinated by
the New York City Consumer Council, an organization that included over sixty local
For a discussion of the OPA see Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in
Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers'
Republic: The Politics ofMass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003),
chapter 2.
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groups. The Council conducted demonstrations, rallies, and buyers' strikes, and black
New Yorkers and then organizations took part in these activities. In late July Harlemites
held a buyers strike, called "Buy Nothing Day." A neighborhood rally featured speeches
by local consumer advocates and African American state senate candidate Charles
Collins, and activists paraded down 8 th Avenue with signs which read "We Have the
Buy-Bye Blues." They also collected signatures for petitions and boycott pledges, all of
which were sent to Congress. 3
As they had done during the war, in their struggle to save the OPA black activists
called attention to the racial nature of consumer discrimination, and argued that African
Americans were especially susceptible to price gouging, recognizing that for the black
community high prices were as much a racial problem as they were a consumer problem.
A front page article in the Amsterdam News, "Citizens Band to Halt Price Rise After
OPA," by Constance Curtis, described consumer meetings taking place in Harlem, and
the plans for a buyers' strike to bring back price ceilings. She wrote that Harlemites were
"deeply concerned with the high prices of food and clothing," adding that those prices
were "often at the top extreme in this section."4 Likewise, when Charles Collins spoke to
the July rally he argued, "the Negro people are plagued by high prices and low pay - the
removal of price control is the last straw and represents one of the greatest economic
setbacks the people have suffered in years." 5
3
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Unfortunately, the nationwide campaign to save the OPA failed. Congress passed
a weak bill which extended the OPA in the summer of 1946 but removed many price
controls, substantially decreased the agency's ability to enforce those controls still in
place, and closed many local OPA offices and price boards. By December 1946 the OPA
was effectively gone. Even though the battle to keep the OPA was unsuccessful,
consumer activists continued to fight for low prices and other consumer issues throughout
the late 1940s, refocusing their efforts from federal intervention to state and local
government action, and also pressuring the business community directly.
Some black merchants in Harlem capitalized on the mounting anger of black
consumers by offering themselves as a remedy to the exploitative prices and practices of
white merchants. In the 1930s black-owned businesses had been at the forefront of the
"Buy Black" campaigns, arguing that shopping in black-owned stores created more jobs
for African Americans and therefore led to greater stability in black neighborhoods. In
the postwar era, however, black merchants shifted their arguments to focus on the
benefits for black consumers. Edward White emerged as a leading spokesperson for this
movement. In the early 1940s White had worked for the Federal Department of Labor
but left his job there in the spring of 1946 to open White's Pure Food Store, a grocery on
1 34th street. He echoed the reasoning of many consumer activists by arguing that
Harlem's consumers fell victim to high prices and inferior food because they were black,
charging local stores with racist business practices. He told the Amsterdam News, "when
a Harlemite buys in Harlem he pays a higher price in one of two ways, namely: he pays a
high price for a standard brand commodity or he pays the price of a standard brand
commodity for a sub-standard brand item." The result was that "the people of Harlem are
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virtually robbed of millions of dollars annually through high prices and inferior goods."6
White vowed to keep his prices low, his shelves well-stocked, and his store clean and
sanitary. His resolve was tested a few months after his store opened, as the OPA's power
was on the wane and many businesses quickly raised their prices. In July the Amsterdam
News reported that White's store was the only grocery which adhered to the OPA price
ceilings even though it reduced his earnings because wholesalers were raising their
prices, too.
7
Throughout the 1 940s and 1 950s White fought to keep his store open. In January
1948 he joined with other local black businesses to form the Harlem Retail Grocers,
which sought to form a cooperative wholesale outlet to make black-owned stores more
competitive with chains such as A&P and Safeway. The organization never got off the
ground, but in May of that same year he joined a veteran's buying group and began a
public campaign to educate shoppers about retail grocery practices and urged them to
frequent black-owned businesses. He took out ads in the Amsterdam News which were
titled, "How to Get Lower Prices in Harlem," and proclaimed that "Citywide (Fair) prices
in Harlem is my business." The ads told Amsterdam News readers that only 150 of 500
retail grocery stores in Harlem were owned by African Americans, and urged black
grocers to purchase their goods directly from meat packers and farmers in order to keep
costs down. He also urged black grocers to "come together," proclaiming, "I stand ready
to meet with you any time, anywhere." He indicated that two other grocers, L.L. Philips
6
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and George Washington, were also ready to work with other black-owned grocery
stores.
8
White's efforts to form a grocer's cooperative were continually rebuffed, but he
found other ways to promote his cause. In January 1949 he began running a series of
price clinics at the Mother Zion AME church in Harlem, bringing together activists and
consumers to monitor city-wide prices and wage an "all-out fight against the cost of food
in I Iarlem as compared to other sections of the city."9 He held these clinics throughout
the early 1 950s, and although he could not attract many other grocers to his clinics he did
manage to keep his store operational.
White's experience with cooperatives was indicative of their failure among black
New Yorkers during the 1940s and 1950s. Short-lived cooperatives sprang up, such as
the Modern Consumer Cooperative Society in Harlem, or Your Store, Inc. in Brooklyn,
but none of these ventures were successful or long-lasting. 10 In general co-ops did not
receive widespread grassroots support among black shoppers or other local organizations.
Other "Buy Black" campaigns were equally unsuccessful. This movement
declined significantly in the postwar era and became almost the exclusive domain of
black nationalist groups, in particular the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement
(ANPM) led by Carlos Cooks. Cooks had been a part of Marcus Garvey's UNIA, and
after Garvey's deportation he became one of the most outspoken, and controversial, black
nationalists in New York City. Cooks founded the ANPM in 1941, and beginning in
"Grocers in Move to Reduce Prices," New York Amsterdam News, 3 1 January 1948, 21 ; "Harlem
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1948 it conducted ongoing "Buy Black" campaigns in Harlem." Initially the ANPM's
campaign received only modest attention, but came under fire in 1950 when the
organization began distributing posters to local black-owned businesses which read "Buy
Black: Patronize Black Merchants; this will be one step to the Solution of our Economic
Problems." Cooks, described by the Amsterdam News as a "37-year-old- black
nationalist, Harlem soapboxer, and rabble-rouser for 22 years," argued that black New
Yorkers needed to develop "racial unity" and that their lack of racial consciousness led to
severe economic consequences for the community. Citing Harlem as the only area of the
city where the people who inhabited the neighborhood did not own the businesses, and
Cooks advocated a "Buy Black" campaign that would eventually rid Harlem of white
merchants. "The 'Buy Black' campaign is the key," he argued; "It will scientifically
transfer the commerce, business life and body politic of the alien parasite to its rightful
owner, the Black communities." 13 After the distribution of the "Buy Black" posters,
police questioned Cooks both at his jewelry store on 1 15 th street and at the local police
precinct, and told him they feared his "Buy Black" campaign would start a Harlem riot.
Cooks responded by arguing that the campaign had already been conducted for three
years, and that if a riot happened it would be due to high unemployment of African
Americans and police brutality, not his "Buy Black" movement. In 1955 Cooks
intensified his "Buy Black" campaign and even advocated the use of a "Lead Pipe
Brigade" to enforce his vision of a self-sustaining black economy: "as the criminal Black
" See Biondi, 261-62.
12
"Cops Try to Stop 'Buy Black' Drive," New York Amsterdam News, 16 December 1950, 39.
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consumer walks or arrives home, the Lead Pipe Brigade moves in, destroys the
merchandise, breaks a rib or two, or cracks the Negro's or Negress' head open slightly.
In a short span of time a psychological metamorphosis will take place. The Black
consumer will be convinced to patronize only Black businesses in Black communities." 14
The ANPM continued to promote its "Buy Black" campaigns throughout the
1 950s, but like black cooperatives they were never widespread or effective, and failed to
attract enough community support to create Cooks' vision of a separate black economy.
His promotion of violence against black consumers likely discredited the entire "Buy
Black" concept and, as we will see in chapter five, by 1960 local black organizations
balked at any association of their work with the "Buy Black" movement.
Throughout the postwar era the majority of businesses in black neighborhoods
continued to be owned by white merchants. Black consumer activists repeatedly
complained about consumer exploitation and worked to lower prices and raise
merchandise standards. The local black press ran numerous articles about the high cost
of food and other consumer goods, often blaming these prices on the absence of the OPA
and its price controls, and on racially discriminatory practices of merchants in black
neighborhoods. 15 In the summer of 1947 the Uptown Chamber of Commerce (UCC)
went on the offensive against these charges and launched a public relations campaign
encouraging Harlemites to shop in neighborhood stores instead of going elsewhere in the
city in search of lower prices. The campaign proclaimed "Prices are Down Uptown!,"
14
Harris, et. al., Carlos Cooks, 69
15 u.Survey Shows Hike in Food without OPA," New York Amsterdam News, 13 July 1946, 13-14;
'"Depression Hits' Harlem As Prices Keep A-Jumpin," New York Amsterdam News, 20 July 1946, 1;
"Harlem Has Meat But Few Buying," New York Amsterdam News, 19 October 1946, 1, 25; "Plenty Meat
Now None On Table," New York Amsterdam News, 2 November 1946, 2.
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and kicked off With a dance at the Apollo, where a Miss 125 ,h Street was crowned,
followed by a parade and a special week long "Bargain Jubilee," billed as "the mightiest
Sale in 1 25th Street I Iistory." Both the People s Voice and the Age participated in the
campaign, and ran ads from the UCC and from local businesses highlighting their sales.
Many UCC ads portrayed the organization as a consumer champion, with headlines such
as "We Lead the Fight to Bring Prices Down." All ads and dyers contained the slogan,
"Save Time, Save Money, Save Fare." The two papers featured articles about the
campaign and parade, and ran front-page photos of the crowning of Miss 1 25 th Street. 16
Interestingly, the Amsterdam News opposed the campaign, running ads that
questioned the sincerity of the campaign and argued that local merchants were not living
up to promises made by the UCC. Many of their arguments centered directly on the
paper's own mistreatment by local businesses, including the failure to adequately utilize
the Amsterdam News as an advertising venue: "Our advertising solicitors and editorial
reporters are not receiving the cooperation and business respect that is due them in their
daily routine assignments. They are being given the 'run-around,' many insults and lack
of business consideration and cooperation." To these criticisms they added that black
New Yorkers were not receiving fair treatment, noting, "In the face of rising complaints
from the community, present attitude on the part of many merchants, and unfavorable
sentiments on the part of members of our organization, we cannot expect business and
civic advancement." The paper claimed that it stood "ready and willing to initiate and
cooperate in a promotion program," but that such a program had to be beneficial to black
Ads ran in both the People 's Voice and the New York Age throughout the summer of 1 947;
"125 Street Moving into High Gear in Campaign to Send Values Up, Prices Down," New York Age, 14
June 1 947, I ; Miss 125th Street' And Her Running Mates on the Apollo Stage," New York Age, 2 1 June
1947, 1.
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New Yorkers, not just the business community. The paper's coverage of the UCC
campaign often referred to past promises from the Chamber and local merchants that
mostly went unfulfilled, and warned that "if there is no more mutual cooperation in the
future than there has been in the past, we are sure that our future business progress will be
in jeopardy." Despite these criticisms, several local stores placed their "Prices are Down
Uptown" ads in the Amsterdam News, including W.T. Grant and Blumstein's, and in its
articles the Amsterdam News always made sure to single out these stores as honest and
fair businesses. 17
In reaction to the UCC campaign a group of Harlem women came together to
form the Consumers Protective Committee. Directing their attacks against both the
Uptown Chamber of Commerce and white-owned businesses, their charges were the
same ones leveled against local merchants for decades: high prices, inferior quality, and
high-pressure selling techniques. To this they added that white-owned merchants gave
nothing back to the community, and failed to join or support charities and civic
organizations. Although a few men were associated with the CPC, it was
overwhelmingly a women's organization, and most of its members identified themselves
as housewives and by their husbands' names, including the group's leaders, Mrs. Roger
Flood and Mrs. Walton Pryor. Newspaper articles also repeatedly characterized the CPC
as a group of housewives who represented "the average woman shopper on West 125 th
Street."
10 The CPC" s campaign integrated a variety of techniques: sending complaints to
17
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the Uptown Chamber of Commerce, conducting shoppers' surveys and price
investigations, staging rallies, and picketing individual stores. In late October they
threatened a community-wide boycott and planned a massive rally set for November
15th.
|c;
Local leaders and groups initially endorsed the CPC campaign. Support came,
especially, from ministers' organizations. On November 3 rd
, for example, the New York
Baptist Ministers' Conference posed for a photo that ran on the front page of the
Amsterdam News; in the photo dozens of ministers were shown shouting "Down With
Prices in
1 larlem" to signify their endorsement of the CPC.20 The ministers pledged their
assistance in staging the November rally, which the Amsterdam News anticipated would
be, "the most gigantic demonstration ever attempted by any group of people in a fight to
improve their economic welfare."21 Days before the rally took place, however, the
merchants invited both the CPC and ministers groups to a conference to discuss the
escalating situation. While the ministers agreed to meet, CPC activists refused to attend
the conference or cancel their direct action campaign. It was at this point that the CPC
and ministers publicly parted ways. The three Harlem newspapers chose sides in the
dispute, with the People 's Voice and the Age backing the ministers and the Amsterdam
News supporting the CPC. As historian Martha Biondi argues, black male leaders turned
against the CPC for a variety of reasons. They feared their own loss of power and control
19
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over the protests, but also believed that a mass boycott would hurt local stores which
employed African Americans and made financial contributions to their own
organizations. 22 Throughout November and December a bitter struggle ensued as the two
sides fought over goals and tactics, and over which group could legitimately claim
leadership of Harlem's consumer activism. Most importantly, the conflict, expressed in
highly gendered terms, crystallized around competing conceptions of women's
acceptable public role.
Having originally supported the CPC as a group of activist housewives, the
ministers now set out to discredit them by ignoring their claims to consumer expertise
and employing negative gender stereotypes. In the Age and the People 's Voice CPC
activists were no longer referred to as "the housewives" but were instead "the women,"
and were characterized as unreasonable, unruly, and unsafe. The adjective "hysterical"
was repeatedly used to describe their activities. Street demonstrations, which had a few
weeks earlier been supported by the ministers, were now portrayed as a dangerous
activity. The Age warned "the CPC's threat of mass picketing is irresponsible in that it
can cause serious results - such as possible rioting, straining of racial tensions, and
dismissals of Negro workers, not only on 125 th street, but also throughout the city, in the
case of chain stores which employ Negroes in other areas."23 Instead of being the natural
protectors of the home and Harlem's consumers, the women of the CPC were now a
threat to the community's stability and economic vitality.
22 See Biondi, 89-91. Biondi effectively places the CPC campaign within the context of political
activism in late 1940s Harlem. See also Julie Gallagher, "Women of Action, In Action: The New Politics
of Black Women in New York City, 1944-1972" (Ph.D. diss, University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
2003), 37-42.
"Leading Citizens Express Views on Consumers Protective Comm. Plans; Warns Against
Picketing," New York Age, 15 November 1947, L
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Their refusal to negotiate with the merehants was especially criticized and
portrayed as the response of irrational women. In an article titled "125th St. Merehants
Invited Women to Conference Twice," Reverend John Johnson told the Age "there ought
to be negotiation and all the facts ought to be learned before anyone goes off half-cocked.
Every possible step should be taken to work the thing out reasonably."' 1 Ministers and
the men who joined them were, by contrast, depicted as I [arlem's true leaders, and
although they opposed high prices and cheating merchants, they took more sensible steps
to bring about a solution to these problems. Their strategies favored negotiation and
working within the political system. They petitioned the city to open a public market in
Harlem (which would be regulated by the Department ol Markets), lodged complaints
about high prices with local business associations, and lobbied Truman and Congress to
reestablish price controls. In late November they met with the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce without the CPC, and negotiated an agreement requiring local stores to clearly
mark prices, stop their "pulling-in" techniques, and display all policies on refunds,
exchanges, and lay-away plans. The agreement also set up a Shopper's Mediation Board
with representatives from the Uptown Chamber of Commerce and the black community,
to act as an intermediary in disputes between shoppers and merchants. 25
f or their part, CPC activists were unwilling to concede their leadership on
consumer issues, and supported their campaign by continually emphasizing the
2
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knowledge and experience they drew on as shoppers and housewives. The Amsterdam
News, a close ally in their struggles, described the CPC as representing all Harlem
housewives, and as working to protect their own families and the entire community. The
CPC also openly directly and challenged the leadership claims of the ministers' group,
and one activist argued, "No one knows better than the women of Harlem that prices
generally are high. But
.
. .
what is happening in Harlem is not merely high prices as are
evident elsewhere, but downright cheating and stealing. Any Harlem leader who doesn't
know this, is unfit to lead whether he heads a church organization or a social club
[emphasis added]." "It is hardly conceivable,'" she continued, "that in the face of
admissions from the merchants themselves that many of the stores operate two-price
policies, certain Harlemites have sought to obstruct our program."26
The CPC defended its refusal to negotiate with Harlem merchants, calling
arbitration a "political solution" that would not produce any real change in the
community. Referring to previously broken promises, one activist argued, "We don't
intend to permit our program to become bogged down in any series of discussions and
studies. We remember too well the 1935 Report of Conditions in Harlem, which the late
Mayor LaGuardia pigeonholed." The Amsterdam News conducted numerous woman-
26 As quoted in, "Some Stores Rival Hall's 40 Thieves in Grab for Money," New York Amsterdam
News 22 November 1947, 1, 27. Interestingly, the CPC activists used gendered logic but did not draw on
maternalist rhetoric in their campaign. For a discussion of black female activism see: Elsa Barkley Brown,
"Womanist Consciousness: Maggie Lena Walker and the Independent Order of Saint Luke," Signs Spring
14, no. 3 (Spring 1989), 610-33; Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the
Strugglefor Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Ula Y. Taylor, "Negro Women are
Great Thinkers as Well as Doers': Amy Jacques Garvey and Community Feminism in the United States,
1924-1927, Journal of Women's History 12, no.2 (Summer 2000), 104-137; Ula Y. Taylor, The Veiled
Garvey: The Life and Times ofAmy Jacques Garvey (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press,
August, 2002).
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on-the street interviews about the CPC campaign, and all those quoted gave it their
enthusiastic support. Like the CPC, Harlem's other housewives were tired of calls for
negotiations and meetings, and instead of viewing the boycott and public demonstrations
as threats, they urged the CPC to move forward with their plans. "The sooner it starts,
the better," was their frequent response. 28
By December it was apparent that the CPC was not going to end their direct
action protests and so the city government decided to intervene through the Mayor's
Committee on Unity (MCU). The MCU was comprised of white and black New
Yorkers, and was the mayor's organization for investigating and managing the city's
racial issues. The MCU was initially reluctant to accept Harlem's consumer complaints,
and argued that consumers themselves were responsible for whether or not they were
cheated. Edith Alexander, the African American assistant director of the MCU, told the
New York Times "persons trained to know quality and to look for it were no worse off in
Harlem than elsewhere."29 Additionally, in its initial report to Mayor O'Dwyer, the
committee sought to downplay any racial aspect to the high prices, arguing repeatedly
"the issues are not basically interracial," and that Harlemites paid more because they
weren't discerning shoppers and because more women worked outside the home, leaving
little time for "selective shopping."30
But the Mayor's Committee knew it needed to act, and in late December
succeeded in persuading the CPC to meet with the Uptown Chamber of Commerce and
28
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ministers organizations in a series of conferences. The women activists continued their
public demonstrations even as they negotiated, arguing "we intent to continue our siege
until we get results."31 Out of the conferences all parties agreed to a nine point program.
Businesses pledged to conduct fair business practices such as clearly marking prices,
identifying product quality, publishing policies on refunds and exchanges, stopping the
use of "pullers in," and when applicable, discontinuing the practice of charging higher
prices in Harlem than in their lower Manhattan stores. Additionally, businesses agreed to
"cooperate with local newspapers," which meant they would increase their ads in the
black press, and also to set up the Harlem Community Chest to funnel donations to civic
and charitable groups. Lastly, the negotiations established the Harlem Merchant-
Consumer Arbitration Board as a place where shoppers could lodge complaints and
receive a hearing. On the board were UCC representatives, community leaders, Pryor
(the CPC's founder and president), and Edith Alexander of the mayor's committee who
would serve as an "impartial chair." On the whole the agreement was very similar to the
one negotiated between the ministers and the merchants in November, the major
difference being that the second time around the CPC's direct action protests brought the
city to the negotiating table. Both in terms of its sponsorship of the conferences and,
more importantly, its agreeing to chair the arbitration board, the mayor's committee
became an active player in Harlem's consumer struggles. 32
31
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In the wake of this settlement the CPC once again secured the support of ministers
and Harlem's men, and throughout the postwar era remained at the forefront of consumer
rights activities. After the establishment of the nine point pledge the CPC continued its
activities, pressuring merchants to sign the pledge and issuing emblems to all those who
did so. They also held consumer education classes about spending money wisely and
reading labels, monitored businesses for honest business practices, and sponsored talks
by government officials and other experts on consumer-related policies. They were aided
in their work by the Amsterdam News, which published information on their seminars and
on their campaign to sign up more merchants to the nine point pledge. In 1950, for
example, the Amsterdam News ran a front page article, "Merchants Rob Harlemites;
Rotten Food, High Prices Take Huge Weekly Toll," in which it detailed the activities of
the CPC. The article noted that more than half of Harlem's merchants had still not signed
the pledge, and that the CPC was currently targeting the Chockful O' Nuts chain to lower
its prices.
33
Throughout the 1950s the CPC remained a visible presence in Harlem and in
1953 Pryor was chosen one of the most popular black New Yorkers in an Amsterdam
News poll. The paper noted that Pryor's selection as the sixth "leading Harlemite" was
due to her inexhaustible work on local consumer issues. 34 But even though the CPC and
other consumer activists continued to work for lower prices, there were no more direct
action protests on the scale of CPC's campaign in the late 1940s. In the 1950s much of
33
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the CPC's work focused instead on getting state and local agencies more involved in
consumer issues affecting black New Yorkers. They often joined efforts with Dr. Persia
Campbell, Consumer Counsel to Governor Harriman, to arrange conferences on
consumer issues and to push for consumer-related legislation, and Pryor even testified
with Campbell before a U.S. Congressional committee about high food prices in Harlem.
The CPC set up a legislative committee within its organization, led by Paul Zuber, to
work specifically for consumer laws. One of their victories came in May 1957 with the
passage of the Retail Installment Sales Act, often referred to as the "All Goods Bill." The
act set up regulations requiring the full disclosure of all terms and conditions of credit
and installment programs. In that same year the New York State Attorney General's
office established a division to monitor consumer issues and Pryor was named to the
committee. 35
A Public Market in Harlem
A major consumer rights goal of the Consumers Protective Committee and other
organizations was the establishment of a public market in Harlem. Because merchants
there would be closely regulated by the New York Department of Markets, activists saw
a public market as a remedy to dishonest business practices, ensuring better quality,
prices, and shopping conditions for Harlem consumers. Since the mid-1 930s city
administrations promised Harlemites a public market, but in 1950 those promises
35
"Consumers Group Sees Bill Signed," New York Amsterdam News 18 May 1957, 40; Food
Marketing Costs: Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on
Consumers Study, Eighty-Fifth Congress, first session, on Oct. 8, 9, 1957 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1957), 1-45; Persia Campbell to Miss Jean Blackwell, 14 November 1957;
"Lefkowitz names 16," 42; "Consumers to Meet"; "Harlem Consumers, Businessmen to Meet," 3.
196
remained unfulfilled. Adam Clayton Powell spearheaded the fight in the 1930s, and he
was aided in the postwar era by the Mayor's Committee on Unity, the City-Wide
Citizen's Committee on Harlem, the People's Civic and Welfare Association,
Councilman Benjamin Davis, and the Urban League of Greater New York. These groups
argued that a public market brought government regulation to consumer issues and that it
also served the community in other ways. As an editorial in the Amsterdam News
explained,
A public retail market would guarantee accurate weights and measures, honest
and marked prices for quality merchandise, and bring within the reach of poor
housewives the merchandise they need in their immediate community. It should
also provide an opportunity for the investment of the little man's savings, under
his own operation and management, thereby creating a new source of employment
within the community. 36
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s the market was again promised by
Mayors O'Dwyer and Impelliterri, the City Department of Markets, the Board of
Estimate, and the City Planning Commission. During this time the city repeatedly set
aside funds for the land and market, but delayed actual construction of the building. In
1948, after its successful campaign on 125 th street, the Consumers Protective Committee
(CPC) turned its attention to the establishment of a public market, and worked closely
with the Mayor's Committee on Unity (MCU) to ensure its passage. In December 1952
the Board of Estimate was reportedly ready to approve the site and fund allocation for the
public market, and CPC members were assured by Board members that the market would
be approved. However, at the Board meeting the United Real Estate Owners Association,
a group led by Samuel Schachter, made a last-minute attempt to block it. Schachter
36 «
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argued that erecting a new building was unnecessary and the city could instead use the
existing building at the purchased market location. Although Schachter did not argue the
public market shouldn't be established, to Harlemites his proposal meant that the original
public market plan was being delayed and altered, and his proposal raised enough
questions that the Board of Estimate tabled the vote until January. The Amsterdam News
argued, "to say that a market should be set up in the old building now on the market site
is to reveal that [Schachter] believes that 'any old thing is good enough for Harlem.'
No makeshift will do. Neither should this community lose a modern market because
some interests would prefer collecting rent from the city than having the city construct its
own building."37
The Board's decision to postpone its vote outraged black New Yorkers, who had
endured these types of delays for decades. The CPC, Mayor's Committee, Urban League
of Greater New York, and other local organizations sent representatives to the January 1
5
meeting of the Board of Estimate. On the day of the Board meeting, the CPC held a
public demonstration and led a police-escorted bus caravan to the Board meeting, where
the Board agreed to allocate $500,000 for the market.38 Unlike previous allocations this
one was carried out, and on September 5, 1955 the public market opened on 142nd street
and 8 th Avenue. The market replaced an open-air market and street push-cart vendors,
and housed over one hundred stands which were supervised by the Division of Markets.
Mayor Wagner presided over the ribbon-cutting ceremony attended by over 3,000 people.
"Public Market a Must," New York Amsterdam News 27 December 1952, 14.
"Harlem Gets Ready for Market Fight," New York Amsterdam News, 10 January 1953, 1.
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Speakers at the event included city officials, Robert Moses, and two local activists: Pryor
of the CPC and Glester Hinds, chairman of the People's Civic and Welfare Association. 39
The public market was seen as one of the most direct ways in which the city
government aided the cause of black consumers, but other city and state government
agencies helped black consumers as well. Consumer activists turned to the Attorney
General's office, the Health Department, and the Department of Markets to lodge
complaints against unscrupulous merchants, and worked with government agencies to
pass consumer-rights legislation, monitor compliance, and run consumer education
workshops. 40 Dr. Persia Campbell worked throughout the postwar era to help New
York's black consumers. In 1957 she brought together state and local government
agencies, the YMCA and YWCA branches in Harlem, local Parent Teachers'
Associations (PTA), the Harlem Nurses Association, Harlem labor unions, and the CPC
to establish the Harlem Consumer Advisory Committee (HCAC). In forming the
committee Campbell declared, "consumers in the Harlem area have expressed concern
that they do not get their money's worth." Campbell and the HCAC worked to open a
dialogue between the Uptown Chamber of Commerce, local businesses, and Harlemites,
and often held consumer education workshops or sponsored meetings where businesses
and consumers could discuss problems and issues. 41
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Integrating Public Spaces
The final type of consumers rights campaign conducted in the postwar era was
against de facto segregation in the city's public commercial spaces. Although integration
of lunch-counters, pools, restaurants, and hotels is often considered only a Southern
phenomenon, blacks in the North waged early and frequent battles to gain access to these
public commercial spaces. In New York, state and city laws barred discrimination in
most public spaces, but segregation continued, and remained a thorn in the side of black
New Yorkers. A 1947 Mayor's Committee on Unity survey revealed that segregation in
public accommodations in lower Manhattan was the second highest complaint of black
New Yorkers. To fight these practices black New Yorkers used a strategy that combined
legal action and grassroots activism. Many cases were started by individuals who were
refused service or treated poorly in local restaurants, hotels, or stores, and then grew into
larger public protests and lawsuits. Because of the reliance on legal strategies the
NAACP often became involved in these protests. In 1948 the local branch announced
that its programmatic focus for the year included "enforcement of the New York Civil
Rights Act, especially in the use of skating rinks, swimming pools, bowling alleys, and
other recreational facilities in downtown Manhattan."42 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s
the NAACP and other organizations won cases against many establishments in the New
York City metropolitan region.43
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One of the most visible battles of the postwar period was the campaign to
desegregate the pool at the Palisades Amusement Park in Fort Lee, New Jersey - just
across the Hudson River from Harlem. This campaign was led by two organizations, the
Modern Trend Progressive Youth Group, which coordinated local activities for Harlem
youth, and the local Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) branch. CORE had started at
the University of Chicago in the early 1940 and was an interracial group of pacifists
dedicated to social justice and racial equality. Throughout the summer of 1 947, Modern
Trend and CORE activists conducted "stand-ins" and other protests at the Palisades' front
gates, to which the park responded by hiring security guards to disperse the protesters.
These interactions often became violent, with the protesters repeatedly arrested for
disorderly conduct. The Palisades defended its right to keep African Americans out of its
park pool by arguing it was a private business, a claim which CORE successfully fought
in the courts. Despite its legal victory and the passage of state legislation in New Jersey
which prohibited discrimination at swimming pools, throughout the 1950s the Palisades
resisted the presence of African Americans in its park pools. Its open harassment of
black patrons succeeded in limiting black attendance.44
Other battles to break down racial barriers in public accommodation were more
successful, and they helped establish legal precedents for desegregation. Campaigns
were often waged by interracial organizations, such as CORE and the Committee on Civil
'"Playground segregation to end gradually," New York Amsterdam News, 25 June 1949, 28;
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Rights in Manhattan (CRRM). 45 The latter, composed of representatives from twenty-
three local groups, such as the American Association of University Women, the Uptown
Chamber of Commerce, the Urban League of Greater New York, the National Council of
Negro Women, and the American Jewish Committee, worked to improve the treatment of
black New Yorkers in restaurants and stores in mid-town Manhattan. In late forties and
early fifties the Committee sent out volunteers to compare the treatment of black and
white patrons. For example, in 1951 it sent one white couple and one black couple into
restaurants to compare their seating and treatment by restaurant staff. The survey found
that almost fifty percent of the restaurants "treated Negroes 'discourteously' or accorded
them 'poor service and inferior treatment.'" The group then worked with restaurant
associations to educate their employees and improve service toward African Americans.
CRRM reported a significant drop in discrimination in mid-town Manhattan as a result of
their work. 46
The campaigns for consumer rights met with mixed success in the postwar era.
The Consumers Protective Committee won a favorable agreement from the Uptown
Chamber of Commerce and compelled the Mayor's Committee on Unity to become a
permanent player in enforcing that agreement. It also helped Harlem win its long
struggle for a public market. The campaigns to integrate restaurants and amusement
parks helped decrease, although not entirely eliminate, de facto segregation in public
consumer spaces outside of black neighborhoods. Most of these campaigns went on in
45
This organization is also sometimes referred to as the Committee on Civil Rights in East
Manhattan.
46 u
Bias is Charged to Restaurants" New York Times, 19 March 1951, 18; "Letters to the Times:
Combating Racial Discrimination," Letter to the Editor by Edna Merson and Max Delson, New York Times,
23 March 1952, 20; "Rights Group Plans Benefit" New York Times, 9 September 1956, 121; Olivia Frost,
"CCRM - Grass Roots in the Big City," The Crisis, February 1958.
202
the late 1940s and early 1950s, and their effectiveness was enhanced by activists'
willingness to engage in direct action protests. On the other hand, the movement to save
the OPA was defeated even though it had spawned massive direct action protests by
black and white consumer activists throughout the city. These types of public, sometimes
radical, protests tended to produce changes more often at the local than national level.
The Black Freedom Movement
Consumer rights were only part of the focus of black New Yorkers in the postwar
era. Activists used consumer weapons in their wider campaign for black rights. Their
work reveals a growing awareness of corporate America's attention to the "Negro
market," and a willingness to use spending power both for local goals and to challenge
white supremacy as a cultural and national phenomenon. Consumer power was one tool
in a diverse, wide-ranging, and sometimes contentious movement that included struggles
to increase employment, to combat racism and segregation, and to promote positive
portrayals of blacks in mainstream American culture.
One of the principal ways New York activists used spending power in the postwar
era was to push for black employment. Like the OPA, the Fair Employment Practices
Commission (FEPC) was abolished at war's end. African Americans had looked to the
FEPC as an instrument in their fight for equal job opportunities, and worked throughout
the war to maintain and extend its power. When those efforts failed activists turned to
other strategies, combining consumer boycotts and picketing with a number of other
tactics, including lobbying for antidiscrimination legislation, integrating trade unions, and
staging grassroots protests and demonstrations. Although federal enforcement of equal
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employment ended, the Ives-Quinn act, passed in February 1945, made New York the
first state to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in private sector employment.
The act also established the State Commission against Discrimination (SCAD) to monitor
compliance with the law and respond to individuals with discrimination complaints.
Black activists continually pushed SCAD to enforce equal employment but were
disappointed by the agency's unwillingness to act. SCAD's ineffectiveness forced black
New Yorkers to search for other ways to ensure equal access to jobs.47
Many postwar employment campaigns continued earlier struggles for jobs in
black neighborhoods, but now spread out beyond Harlem to other boroughs. This new
residential segregation led African Americans to use their spending power in the same
ways they had done in Harlem in the 1930s and early 1940s. There were many small,
local actions in different black neighborhoods, and groups would often combine efforts to
form an ad hoc organization to coordinate campaign activities. In 1948 the interracial
Bronx Citizen's Committee Against Job Discrimination formed out of a coalition of
leftist organizations, including the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America, the
Civil Rights Congress, the Bronx Council on Rents and Houses, the Jewish Peoples
Fraternal Order, and the Bronx Communist Party. Using picket lines at the 149th street
store, a community boycott, and negotiations with store management, the Committee led
a successful fight to integrate employment at A&P grocery stores in the Bronx.48 These
and numerous other local employment drives used consumer boycotts and picket lines as
47
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their main weapons and proved very effective at gaining jobs where African Americans
were the principal customers. In the 1950s stores made big displays of hiring and
promoting black New Yorkers, and retailers such as W.T. Grant, A&P, and Safeway took
every opportunity to publicize their African American managers in the black press.
Black New Yorkers also used consumer boycotts and pickets in campaigns
outside of black neighborhoods, although these were infrequent and less successful. The
postwar movement against racial discrimination in the city's brewing industry
demonstrates the possibilities and limitations of using consumer and direct action tactics
in employment campaigns. It also demonstrates how black organizations with entirely
different ideological perspectives approached the same goal. This campaign was unusual
in that unlike the "Don't Buy" type of campaign, it worked for blue collar production
jobs in businesses outside of black neighborhoods, and challenged white-owned
corporate manufacturers and industrial unions.
In 1950 ten thousand workers were employed by eleven breweries in the
metropolitan region but only fifty of these workers were African Americans - and out of
those fifty, sixteen were employed by one company, Liebmann Breweries. Most black
brewery workers were in low-level clerical and janitorial jobs and none were employed in
higher paying production work. Many of the city's breweries employed African
Americans on their "Negro market" sales forces, a fact often publicized in their
marketing strategies to black New Yorkers. These sales jobs, however, were rarely
mentioned in job estimates or as a goal of the activists. Perhaps sales jobs were left out
of the campaigns because they were controlled by corporate headquarters instead of the
local production plants, or perhaps because activists were looking for a large number of
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working-class production jobs instead of a few sales positions. In any case, the "Negro
market" strategy of utilizing black salespeople did not prevent those companies from
becoming targets of employment drives.
The campaign began in 1 95 1 and was waged by three groups: the black
nationalist organization United African Nationalist Movement (UANM), the Urban
League of Greater New York, and the leftist Greater New York Negro Labor Council
(NYNLC). These groups did not coordinate their activities and, in fact, often lashed out
at one another in the press. UANM focused its efforts in Harlem and on Liebmann
Breweries, makers of Rheingold beer, and was the only group to include sales jobs for
African Americans in its employment drive. The group demanded jobs for "beer truck
drivers and helpers; brewery workers,
. . . office workers, more salesmen and district
managers."49 They launched a consumer boycott of Liebmann and also set up picket
lines in front of Harlem grocery stores, which compelled the Harlem Grocer's
Association to also pressure Rheingold for a quick resolution.
The Greater New York Negro Labor Council (NYNLC) was an affiliated member
of the National Negro Labor Council, an organization of leftist and communist activists
that formed in the early 1950s. Historian Martha Biondi notes its unique position as one
of the few leftist groups formed during the McCarthy era. 50 The NYNLC used many of
the same techniques as the black nationalists, but concentrated their efforts in Brooklyn
and against the Schaefer Brewing plant located there. The group organized consumer
"Launch Boycott in Job's Drive," New York Amsterdam News, 29 September 1951, 32.
See Biondi, 263-268. Biondi also discusses the brewery employment campaign, see 256-60.
206
boycotts and picketed Ebbets Field, urging fans not to drink "jimcrow beer." 51 Targeting
Ebbets Field was particularly symbolic in that it was the home of the Brooklyn Dodgers,
the team which integrated major league baseball when they signed Jackie Robinson in
1947.
Unlike the nationalist UANM and leftist NYNLC, the Urban League avoided
direct action tactics and instead conducted an employment survey and negotiated with the
CIO to increase black employment and union membership in all New York City
breweries. They formed the Citizens Committee for Integration of Negroes into the
Work Force of the Brewing Industry and held conferences with company and union
representatives. Although they favored negotiation they were not above utilizing the
more radical and volatile public demonstrations of the nationalist and leftist activists in
order to give their negotiations more leverage. In warning management and unions of the
importance of reaching an agreement, they argued it would "calm the many clamorings
and agitations in non-white communities in Greater New York City which, at this point,
could certainly flare up into trouble of tremendous proportions."52
Despite differences among the three groups all three emphasized the importance
of the "Negro market" to the brewing industry. As African Americans made up fifteen to
twenty-five percent of the beer consumption in New York City this argument was not lost
on brewery management. The United African Nationalist Movement and the Greater
New York Negro Labor Council rested their entire campaigns on the power of consumers
to influence hiring practices. In press releases and leaflets both groups stressed the large
51
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size ofNew York's "Negro market" in comparison with the small number ofjobs and
menial types of employment given to black workers. Likewise, the Urban League's
employment report included analysis of black consumer habits, arguing "although
Negroes consumed a proportion of [beer] far in excess of their ration in the population
.
they represented only one-half of one percent of the total work force." Urban League
press releases often described black New York's "lush market for the Brewing
5 3
Industry.'" The Amsterdam News put the issue most succinctly, arguing "Since we drink
beer, we should also have a hand in earning a living making it."54
In March 1953 an agreement was reached between the Brewers Board of Trade
and the unions. The breweries, including Liebmann, Schaefer, Piel Brothers, Jacob
Ruppert, and Joseph Schlitz, agreed to hire at least one hundred "seasonal permanent"
workers by July 1953, open up other union jobs to equal opportunity hiring practices, and
set up a committee to monitor black hiring. 55 Although the nationalist UANM and the
Urban League remained at odds during the campaign, the importance of all groups was
understood by many in the black community. An editorial in the Amsterdam News
credited the multiple approaches, and the paper's own involvement, with winning the
brewing industry agreement:
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Some groups picketed, some held conferences, the AMSTERDAM NEWS
consistently kept the campaign to open the industry from being forgotten There
is enough credit to go around - for both the "shock troops" and pioneers and for
those who formalize victory and progress. We may forget the role played bv theAMSTERDAM NEWS because, as a community organic were4£Jthe desires of its citizens. None can forget, however, the militant role of Mr
James R. Lawson and his UANM; nor can anyone forget the continued
negotiation and 'making friends and influencing people' which the Urban League
of Greater New York has done, culminating with the formal arrangements for
many jobs.
After the agreement was reached the Urban League acknowledged the activities of other
groups, stating, "the Urban League has not been alone in this campaign and credit should
also be given to other organizations and their efforts."57
Unfortunately this hard-fought agreement did not last long, and the brewers and
unions asked the State Commission Against Discrimination to review the settlement.
SCAD outraged the black community by labeling the agreement a quota system and
nullifying it on the grounds that it violated the state's color-blind antidiscrimination laws.
The Amsterdam News reported that SCAD told the breweries they were "impressed with
the spirit and desire to promote the integration of Negroes into the brewing industry, but
that that the state "does not look with favor on any agreement . . . with the concept of
quota employment."58 Throughout the rest of the 1950s the Urban League, UANM, and
other groups called for consumer boycotts against the breweries but were unsuccessful in
their attempts to sustain these boycotts or reach another employment agreement. Not
until the mid-1960s would African Americans be employed in large numbers in New
56
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York's brewing industry. The lack of success against the brewers was indicative of other
attempts to integrate local employment at national corporations' production facilities. In
1954, the UANM led another campaign, this time against Coca-Cola's bottling plant.
The campaign received a great deal of publicity but was short-lived and unsuccessful, as
were attempts to win jobs from other corporations with plants in New York City.
So while black New Yorkers had success integrating employment on a small scale
in black neighborhood retail jobs they had little success elsewhere in the city. Several
factors account for this, and part of the reason lies with the State Commission Against
Discrimination's habitual unwillingness to support campaigns that called for race-
conscious hiring practices. This policy was strengthened by a judicial system that
declined to protect black picketers; in 1950 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against black
activists who picketed a Lucky' s grocery store in California in order to gain employment.
Biondi notes that businesses in New York also successfully defended themselves in the
courts against picketing campaigns, and that SCAD "frequently ruled that both
affirmative action and direct action tactics, like boycotts and picketing, were
impermissible."59 This didn't entirely stop black activists from using these strategies, but
certainly limited their ability to sustain long-term campaigns.
Another factor limiting the success of these movements was the reality that even
though African Americans were a growing consumer base in urban areas, they still did
not wield enough economic clout outside of black neighborhoods to challenge
discriminatory employment patterns there. This would change in the 1960s, but until
then consumer boycotts and pickets were less of a threat to white employers in
59
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210
predominantly white neighborhoods/'" A final explanation lies in the general suppression
ol dissent during the Cold War era, which red-baited some rights organizations out of
existence and limited the radical activities of others. Historians have found this to be
particularly destructive to black organizations, and as the postwar era progressed the
possibilities lor radical changes in New York's racial status quo declined significantly/' 1
Racial Discrimination and Violence
In addition to their campaigns for employment, black New Yorkers also used
consumer weapons to protest the Southern system of white supremacy. Two protests in
particular merit attention and they both occurred in 1955, the same year that the bus
boycott started in Montgomery, Alabama. The first, called the "Big Squeeze" by the
Amsterdam News, was launched in response to the acquittal of Roy Bryant and J.W.
Milam for the murder of Emmett Till. Initially, the campaign started out as a boycott of
any goods from Mississippi and was first proposed by Congressman Powell at a Till rally
in I larlcm.
1
It soon grew into a "Buy Black" campaign, the only such postwar campaign
that received widespread support outside of black nationalist groups. This "Buy Black"
campaign was more about punishing white-owned stores than helping black merchants.
Edward Murrin, who covered the story for the Amsterdam News, reported that white-
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owned businesses and while salesmen who sold to black business owners, were
'•beginning to feel the effects where ii hurts most, ,., .he,,- pocketbooks and cash
drawers."63 AMiough no specific black nationalists were associated with the campaign, ,.
was encouraged by foot! '%0ap box orators," who spoke on numerous street eorners m
I larlem, and whose arguments linked white dominance of businesses in black
neighborhoods ,n the North to Southern violence against African Americans. "What are
you going to do about the disgrace in Mississippi?," they asked. "I low long are you
going to Continue financing the white supremacists here m the North, while our brothers
are being murdered by their brothers south of the Mason-Dixon line'/ Wake up. Lei the
white merchants of this city and every city sweat it out like the Negro farmers in the
South." These "Buy Black Oracles" as Murrin called them, were very successful; their
"'Buy Black' doctrine met with instanlaneons assent throughout [Harlem]."64 Although
the Till boycott was short-lived it did compel local businesses to contribute to the
NAACT's legal defense fund and to designate particular shopping days when their entire
store receipts would be given to the fund.
A second campaign was waged against Coca Cola, a company long associated
with Southern segregation and discrimination. As discussed in chapter 3, in the summer
Of 1953 The ( 'risis ran a photo and story of a "Jim Crow Coca Cola Machine." Although
the machine dispensed soda bottles through one door, it had two coin slots and two
attached drinking fountains labeled "white" and "colored." In 1955 the NAACP decided
to take punitive action against Coca Cola, removing a Coke vending machine from its
01
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national headquarters and calling for a boycott of Coca Cola products "because of the
racial attitudes of some southern distributors."65 The NAACP was soon joined by the
African Methodist Episcopal Church which explained that it wanted to give "help to our
beleaguered brothers in the South by fighting with the collective purchasing power of the
church membership.-6 The effects of this boycott are difficult to measure and there was
apparently no official response from Coca Cola. Neither it, nor the Till boycott, had a
lasting impact on the targeted businesses but they did prefigure much larger and effective
boycotts against Southern white supremacy that would take place in the 1 960s.
Black Cultural Portrayals
The final area in which black activists in New York City used consumer weapons
was over the issue of positive black images in advertisements and entertainment media.
One of the most visible, if unsuccessful, campaigns about black cultural portrayals was
the NAACP boycott against the television show, Amos 'n ' Andy. The radio version of
Amos 'n ' Andy had long been a point of controversy within the black community,
supported by some and protested by others. One of its biggest supporters was the
prominent black newspaper, the Chicago Defender, while one of its most vocal critics
was the equally influential Pittsburgh Courier. In 1931 the Pittsburgh Courier worked
with the NAACP on a campaign to collect over 700,000 signatures on a petition sent to
the Federal Radio Commission asking that it cancel the show. The Commission refused
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to act and support for the protest waned, with many in the blaek eommanity continuing to
defend the program. 67
When CBS decided to turn Amos n
'
Andy into a television show, an all-African
American cast was hired and the program began airing in 1 95 1 . As with the radio show,
the television program appealed to some African Americans while offending others, and
once again the NAACP took the lead in national protests. In the fall of 1951 the NAACP
worked unsuccessfully through legal channels to get a federal court order to shop the
show and also launched a boycott of Blatz beer, the show's sponsor. The NAACP argued
that the show offered a distorted vision of the black community and portrayed them in
stereotypical and unflattering ways. If allowed to continue the show would, "strengthen
the conclusion among uninformed and prejudiced people that Negroes are inferior, lazy,
dumb and dishonest.
.
.
.
Millions of white Americans see this Amos 'n ' Andy picture and
think the entire race is the same."68 The show's black actors countered the NAACP's
claims and argued instead that it offered good jobs for African Americans in an industry
where black employment was low, opening the door for others to follow. The NAACP
boycott was unsuccessful and quickly ended, and the show's popularity in the black
community is demonstrated by the numerous Blatz beer ads in black newspapers
featuring the television cast.
69
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The NAACP also protested demeaning advertising images in mass media and
retail stores, with most situations quiekly resolved by the corporate offenders. In 1947,
for example, the NAACP sent letters out to the Blum Candy Company for its production
of a candy called "L'il Darkies," and to Lord and Taylor for selling the candy in its
stores. The product, whose label contained caricatures of two African American
children, was quickly withdrawn from the shelves of Lord and Taylor and discontinued
by Blum. Both corporations wrote letters of apology to the black community. Protests
about derogatory advertising images, however, were infrequent during the 1950s because
corporate America's growing awareness of the "Negro market" led to a decrease in any
images of African Americans in mass market advertisements, a fact rarely discussed by
the NAACP or other black New Yorkers. Many local groups - especially black media
and African Americans involved in the advertising industry - worked instead to increase
advertisements in black media and to encourage businesses to use African Americans in
their "Negro market" ads. Corporations that did so were well-publicized and
congratulated by the black community.
Two notable exceptions were the National Negro Congress and the Committee for
the Negro in the Arts - leftist organizations that addressed the segregated nature of the
"Negro market" in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Their activism combined a concern
about mainstream black images with an appeal for increased employment for African
Americans in these industries, reasoning that more African Americans involved would
lead to more positive portrayals. In March 1947 a group of black and white artists in
ed, American History/American Television: Interpreting the Video Past (New York: Ungar Publishing
Company, 1983), 33-54; Melvin Patrick Ely, The Adventures ofAmos V Andy: A Social History ofan
American Phenomenon (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
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sion
various fields, including actors Paul Robeson, Kenneth Spencer, Margaret Webster and
Frederic March, writer Carl Van Doren, composer William Schuman, and producer
Cheryl Crawford, held a conference in New York City to establish a cultural divi
within the National Negro Congress (NNC). Although much of the conference and the
division that sprang from it focused on improving black employment, stereotypical black
images were also attacked. With panels on art, advertising, literature, music, radio,
screen and theatre, the conference issued several reports criticizing the failure of
entertainment unions to include black members, the segregation and low salaries given to
black musicians, and the demeaning depictions of blacks in entertainment media and
advertisements.
To study advertisements the NNC decided to review the previous year's editions
of the Saturday Evening Post, and while it found that editorial content and artist
illustrations were somewhat racially progressive, the advertising industry "trie[d] to
depict a world without Negroes." Some improvements had been made in the postwar era
and the Committee reported finding "none of the stock exaggerations of the negro's
physical characteristics that were prevalent several years ago. Even Aunt Jemima has
been made less offensive, pictorially at least." African Americans still appeared as
mammies and servants in some ads, but the advertising industry's "greatest offense is to
deny [the] Negro's proportionate existence in our population. In street scenes, crowded
railroad illustrations, groups of workers, other cross-sections of the public, [there is]
never a figure of a Negro." Related to this omission was the lack of employment of
African Americans in the advertising industry. Although it admitted its figures weren't
official or complete, the NNC identified only thirty-six African Americans out of twenty
216
thousand advertising industry employees. The NNC advoeated establishing training
programs and a placement service for aspiring black advertising personnel, generating
publicity about racially offensive ads, and setting up "annual awards of honor and
dishonor to agencies according to their attitudes on Negro questions." 70
The NNC was unable to carry out its proposals, and even at the time of the March
conference the group was under attack as a communist-front organization. It disbanded
in the fall of 1 947 when it was added to the federal government's official list of
communist-influenced groups. The work of the NNC's cultural division was carried on
by the Committee for the Negro in the Arts (CNA), whose primary goals were to "wipe
out the persisting racial stereotype and to create employment for Negroes in the various
art fields."
71
Like the NNC, the CNA sponsored concerts, plays, and other events to gain
exposure for black artists, and in the early 1950s offered scholarships to black
performers. One of CNA's activists was Walter Christmas, a writer who in the early
1950s would help found the Harlem Writers Guild. In 1949 he wrote an article for
Masses and Mainstream titled "Advertising Jim Crow," in which he offered race and
class analyses of the advertising industry. He argued that advertisers created a world in
which Americans were "all tall, blonde, God-like creatures, well-proportioned and happy.
They smell of fragrant soaps and seductive perfumes, live in well-appointed, sun-filled
70
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Homes with fngidaires, space-saving, shunless steel kitchens. The children, smaller
editions Ofthe adults, mature on vitamin-filled paekage foods and sleep on air-loam
mattresses under eleetrieally-heated blankets." Within this idealized vision ofAmerican
soe.ety, "no economic disturbances threaten the security of this world where the poor are
anomalies and labor 1 is a hyphenated word used only with 'management; Every day
two million dollars are spent to maintain our belief and acceptance of this world. ... it is
a vital propaganda weapon in the hands of the nation's rulers." 72 The CNA, like the NN(
'
before it, focused on training and employment for African Americans to combat this
exclusion of African Americans from advertisements, and in the early 1950s it offered
classes in commercial art and copywriting lor black New Yorkers. 71 I Inlortunately, these
criticisms from the Left did not penetrate the work of other black rights organizations or
the advertising industry, and would not be take up again until the early 1960s. The
"Negro market" remained a segregated one.
In the mid-1950s another leftist group, the Coordinating Council for Negro
Performers in I larlem (CCNP), also worked to decrease demeaning portrayals of blacks
in mainstream media, but it confined its work to the entertainment industry, founded by
actors Lester Walton, Frederick O'Neal and Dick Campbell, the CCNP did not attack the
advertising industry, and in fact drew on the "Negro market" as a justification for its
work. In its 1954-55 annual report it explained:
Although we feel that we have a moral right to jobs in the theatre, variety, motion
pictures and other fields, we also have in the case of radio and television an
72
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economic right as well, since our purchases help to pay the cost of this type of
entertainment. Negroes spend over 15 billion dollars annually for products mostof which are advertised on radio and TV, and when you realize that the great
majority of Negroes are employed in positions where they purchase millions of
c^nsTmb?^
186
°
ther gr°UPS PUrChaSmg P°Wer iS™d
The report cited examples where script writers were told to eliminate roles for African
Americans in radio and television, even for traditional black characters, and remove them
from crowd scenes, giving "the impression that one-tenth of America's population does
not exist." These activities were damaging to black community and told African
Americans that they "have no place in American life." It was also bad for American
society in general and was not "good propaganda for a nation on whose shoulders the
leadership of a floundering world has been thrust. Communists and exponents of other
ideologies will certainly make the most of it." 75
The CCNP's efforts included working with unions to admit black members,
lobbying political parties, holding conferences with network officials, and with the help
of other organizations, staging "black-out nights" when African Americans would refuse
to watch television or listen to the radio. In 1955, for example, the CCNP, NAACP, and
the National Urban League met with representatives from ABC and NBC and their
advertising agencies, to discuss expanded employment and more diverse roles for African
Americans in radio and television. Although the corporations expressed sympathy for the
situation of black actors they refused to act, and the groups called for a boycott of all
radio and television programs during specified hours. They spoke to civic organizations,
4
"CCNP Report to Community," 12 November 1954, Clippings Files: "Coordinating Council for
Negro Performers."
75
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churches, and other local groups to gain support for the boycott, and their arguments
often focused on the strength of black spending power. 76
Throughout the 1950s, then, both leftist and liberal groups worked through
negotiation and periodic "black out" nights to pressure the major networks and movie
studios to include more African Americans and to portray them in diverse roles. But
these campaigns were difficult to sustain, and many networks and movie studios only
made token demonstrations of compliance, such as the short-lived Nat King C 'ole show,
and more widespread changes in entertainment would not happen until the 1960s.
Increasing black roles was difficult because each part of the industry - networks,
corporate sponsors, and advertising agencies - would express sympathy for the situation
but would blame the others for a lack of commitment to the black community. They also
blamed the Southern market and fears of a white consumer backlash. Those fears were
not completely unfounded, as Southern segregationists targeted several national
corporations in the mid-1950s. The National Citizens Protective Association (NCPA)
boycotted FalstafT Brewing, Philip Morris, and Ford for donating to the NAACT and
Urban League, employing African Americans, and, in the case of Philip Morris,
advertising in the black press. The NCPA and its leader, John Hamilton, charged, "When
you drink Falstaff beer, you are aiding the integration and mongrelization of America," 77
after the company purchased a lifetime membership in the NAACP for one of its African
American salesmen. The Nation, which covered the boycotts, reported that they had little
impact on total company sales and that many Southern whites did not support them
7
"
"NAACP, Others Call tor Two-Hour Boycott of TV, Radio, Saturday," Daily Worker 23
•'ebruary 1955.
77 As reported in "The South: The Land of Boycott," Time, 2 April 1956
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because "boycotts beget boycotts." And African Americans could, and often did, react
with their own consumer protests, as when Falstaff withdrew its contribution to the
NAACP on the heels of the NCPA's boycott. Coverage of these boycotts differed
regarding their impact on targeted companies, with some arguing that Ford, Philip
Morris, and Falstaff suffered dramatic losses in Alabama and Mississippi, while others
reported the boycotts were not tremendously widespread or effective. 78 Even though
their effectiveness is hard to measure they did receive a great deal of publicity and likely
contributed to advertisers' reluctance to include African Americans in mainstream
consumer or entertainment spaces. So while advertisements in black media expanded
enormously in the postwar era, as did the number of black radio programs and stations,
they both remained segregated attempts to attract black consumers while avoiding the
sometimes dangerous attention of white America.
Conclusion
Black New Yorkers hoped the postwar years would bring tremendous changes to
the city's race relations, and worked to make that dream a reality. They showed a
willingness to use every weapon at their disposal, including consumer power, in their
fight for racial equality. They also sought equality in the consumer realm itself, focusing
on issues like low prices, integration of commercial spaces, and improved treatment of
black shoppers. These battles continued the consumer campaigns of the Great
Depression and World War II eras, and would extend well beyond the 1950s, reflecting
78
See Ibid.; Betty Perkins, "Boycott Weapon Hits Hard for Negro Rights," Labor Action, 23 April
1956; J.J. Seldin, "The Dixie Boycott: Is Your Brand 'Pure White'," Nation, 25 April 1956, 360; "Business
in a Troubled South," Business Week, 24 March 1956, 31-33.
221
the black community's desire to participate fully in this important aspect of American
society. That New York City was home to the nation's largest "Negro market" was also
an important element in their postwar movement - and whenever they could black New
Yorkers used the attention of corporate America in their campaigns.
Black gains, however, were limited. Harlem got its public market, city and state
government agencies helped crack down on unsanitary stores or unscrupulous merchants,
laws were passed desegregating public commercial spaces, and many downtown
restaurants and hotels began to treat black customers with respect. But some businesses,
like the Palisades Amusement Park, resisted attempts at integration, and laws and city
ordinances didn't always ensure equal access. In black neighborhoods consumers had to
maintain constant vigilance against high prices and inferior goods, and reports of
dishonest practices surfaced repeatedly in the black press. Struggles for employment
were successful mostly in black neighborhood retail stores, but segregation in unions and
industrial employment persisted. And while African Americans fought for integration in
other aspects of American life, the segregated nature of the "Negro market" remained
largely unchallenged. To be sure, the solution to "jim crow" the black consumer market
didn't always work, as evidenced by a few Southern black and white counter-boycotts,
but on the whole it was an effective strategy. It was, that is, until the 1 960s when black
New Yorkers would turn their consumer sword upon the "Negro market" itself.
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CHAPTER 5:
UNSHEATHING THE CONSUMER SWORD
Protest Meeting Every Monday - 8:30 P.M." So read a sign over the door of the
Chureh OfGod and True Holiness on 135 th Street in Harlem, a sign that was highlighted
in a New York Times series on civil rights activities in New York City in August 1963.
Times writer Layhmond Robinson reported that these protests had "arisen in a region that
has more laws to protect the civil rights of Negroes and other citizens than any other
place in America." Despite these laws, the article continued, black New Yorkers faced
sustained and widespread racial discrimination and segregation, and 'in scenes similar to
those in Birmingham, Ala,; Jackson, Miss., and other centers of racial strife, sit-ins,
kneel-ins, pray-ins, sleep-ins, hunger strikes, selective-buying campaigns, boycotts and
freedom marches have taken place." 1 The streets of Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant
(Brooklyn), and Jamaica (Queens), were no stranger to demonstrations, rallies, and the
sounds of black protesters, but in the early 1960s an explosion of activity swept through
New York City.
Across the nation the pages of black and white media were filled with stories of
discontent and frustration at racial discrimination in every aspect of life. In 1 960 African
Americans' unemployment rates were twice that of whites and they were largely
prohibited from moving to postwar suburban developments. "If the boss don't
discriminate against you the unions do," explained one black New Yorker. "You live in a
1 Layhmond Robinson, "New York's Racial Unrest: Negroes' Anger Mounting," New York Times,
1 2 August 1 963, 1 , 10. Martha Biondi, To Stand unci Fight: the Strugglefor Civil Rights in Postwar New
York City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 89-90, 276.
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hole the landlords call an apartment and your children go to nothing schools."2 Legal and
legislative victories by civil rights organizations in the 1950s had created heightened
expectations for a revolution in race relations. Real change, however, came much more
slowly and many African Americans expressed impatience with the gradualist and
legalistic approach. Philip Robinson, an unemployed metal worker from New York
voiced the frustrations of many black New Yorkers when he said, "no white man's going
to tell me when I'm ready for my rights ... I'm ready for my rights now and I'm going to
get them one way or another."3 Frequent disturbances broke out in New York's black
neighborhoods throughout the early 1960s and even organized protests could quickly
grow out of control. This was the case in the summer of 1964 when protests over police
brutality and the fatal shooting of a Harlem youth, James Powell, by an off-duty police
officer set off six days of rioting in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Launching what Robinson called "possibly the last massive assault against
'Northern style' discrimination and segregation in New York,"4 activists' protests there
mirrored the work undertaken by African Americans around the country. Black New
Yorkers were galvanized both by their own tradition of rights work and by the Southern
civil rights movement to increase the scope and frequency of these black rights protests.
Local branches of the Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) were the most
active of the established civil rights organizations in the city, but many civic, religious,
2
Ibid., 10.
3
Ibid.
4
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and other groups conducted campaigns for racial equality in the early 1960s. Sometimes
these groups coordinated efforts but other times they were bitterly divided over goals,
tactics, and campaigns. Additionally, black Muslim and black nationalist groups
expanded their activities in I larlem, and the corner of 7th Avenue and 125th Street rang
with the sound of street orators espousing social and economic separatism lor black
America. Malcolm X, who grew increasingly disenchanted with the Nation of Islam
during the early 1960s and in March 1964 formally broke with the group, was one of the
most charismatic leaders in I larlem. I lis famous speech, "The Ballot or the Bullet,"
resonated with those black New Yorkers frustrated by integrationist philosophies.
Whether they were liberals, radical, leftists, unionists, or nationalists, African
Americans in New York attacked racial discrimination with determination and vigor in
the early 1960s. As they had done before, black New Yorkers wielded their consumer
power for a variety of goals, especially to gain equal employment. In the early 1960s
they also used consumer power to directly support Southern civil rights organizations and
campaigns. They continued, as well, to promote consumer equality itself as an important
goal. I Mike the postwar era, black New Yorkers now launched a widespread and direct
attack on the segregated nature of the "Negro market." Chapter five explores the work of
black New Yorkers in each of these three areas - Southern white supremacy, employment
discrimination, and "Negro market" segregation - considering the use and effectiveness
of consumer power as a weapon in those struggles. It concludes with a case study of the
brewing industry in New York that explores in detail the effects of 1960s black activism
on businesses selling in the city's "Negro market."
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Aiding the Southern Civil Rights Movement
When the first sit-in to desegregate lunch counters began in North Carolina in
February 1960 few could have predicted its galvanizing impact on the civil rights
movement. Sit-ins quickly sprang up in other Southern communities, and support for the
protesters spread throughout the nation. Before the end of the month the New York
NAACP and CORE branches began picketing S.H. Kress and F.W. Woolworth stores in
the metropolitan region. Although the stores in New York and other northern cities did
not practice segregation, these protests were designed to pressure the companies to
integrate their Southern stores. These demonstrations not only aided Southern protesters
but also helped boost the black freedom movement in the North, especially CORE's work
there. CORE branches sprang up New York City's black neighborhoods in the early
1960s, and while the groups were composed of white and black members, by 1962 all of
the chapters had black chairpersons. 5
Many other groups, white and black, joined in the protests in New York City,
including local churches, the Lower Harlem Tenants Council, the American Jewish
Congress, the City Central Labor Council, and the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union. These protesters rejected the arguments of Kress and Woolworth management
that in the South, "the customs are already established. As individual merchants, we
can't change a thing. When in Rome, do as the Romans do."6 While the stores initially
5
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reported that the New York pickets did not affect sales, as the protests wore on many
picketers claimed almost vacant lunch counters whenever they marched. 7
Civil rights groups also urged a national boycott of the chains, and the term
"selective buying," appeared more and more in speeches and articles about the
movement. Ignoring decades of black consumer protests, one observer remarked that
boycotts were a "brand new right, ... the right not to buy." 8 At an April 1 960
conference in North Carolina Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. urged a selective-buying
program that favored racially progressive businesses while boycotting those that
practiced racial segregation. "It is a moral necessity to select, to buy from these agencies,
these stores and businesses where one can buy with dignity and self-respect," King
declared. "It is immoral to spend one's money where one cannot be treated with
respect."
9
Although chain stores in some Southern communities continued their
segregationist policies, the sit-ins and selective-buying campaigns proved effective in
many areas that quietly desegregated without a great deal of fanfare or violence.
For information on chain store boycotts see Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: A History of
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Whenever Southern desegregation protests emerged, such as the campaign to integrate
Birmingham in 1963, they were supported by boycotts and picket lines in New York.' 0
Black New Yorkers also joined in punitive protests against Southern racism and
violence, the largest of which was the Christmas Boycott in 1963. This boycott was
proposed by the leftist Artists and Writers Committee for Justice in response to the
September bombing of a church in Birmingham that killed four African Americans girls.
The Committee, led by James Baldwin, Ruby Dee, and Ossie Davis, argued that "this
attack on the nation's pocketbook was the sure and effective way to demonstrate to
America's white leadership that Negroes were through 'begging for their rights' and
would now hit where it would hurt the most." 1
1
In addition to the economic argument,
the Committee added a moral imperative as well: "We are guilty. Not only those who
condone injustice and segregation and thereby give it sanction; those who profit from it
and those who do not work to eradicate it. We are all guilty. And who among us can
participate in life as usual, in business as usual, or even Christmas as usual?" 12
The idea of a Christmas boycott received mixed reception in the black
community, with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference supporting it, the
NAACP opposing it, and CORE allowing individual branches to decide for themselves
how to respond. Many black New Yorkers supported the boycott and formed the
Citizens Committee for Christmas Boycott in New York City. The Committee urged
African Americans to support the retail boycott and to join with Birmingham mothers in a
10
For information on New York City protests supporting the Birmingham campaign see "New
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"National Season of Mourning." It also extended the campaign beyond the Birmingham
bombing, calling on activists to use their unity and economic strength to protest police
brutality and draw attention to the "Ignored Demands for Equal Opportunities in Jobs,
Housing, and Education." 13 These goals showed the connections made by these activists
between economic, social, and political racism. Boycott supporters refrained from
buying holiday gifts, leafleted in black neighborhoods, and raised money to support civil
rights activities in Birmingham. CORE protesters in Brooklyn picketed Fulton Street
businesses during the holiday season, demanding that "businessmen's groups in [the] area
do their part to end such incidents as the church bombing in Birmingham," and "to win
greater consideration for Negroes and Puerto Ricans for employment in the stores." 14
Although on a national level the campaign was considered a failure, it received a great
deal of publicity and support among leftist and nationalist groups in New York. 15
Campaigns for Fair Employment
In 1960 black New Yorkers had no fewer than sixteen government agencies and
civil rights organizations working to end employment discrimination, including the New
York State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD), the New York City
Commission on Human Rights (CCHR), and the New York State Division of
Investigation. The CCHR, first established in 1954 by Mayor Robert Wagner as the City
13
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Commission on Intergroup Relations (COIR), was reorganized in 1960 under the
leadership of Stanley Lowell. Historian Gerald Benjamin argues that as Wagner faced
reelection in 1960 he appointed Lowell because he was the one man acceptable to Jewish
and African American leaders - constituencies Wagner needed to win. Under Lowell's
guidance CCHR expanded its focus beyond housing issues into employment
discrimination, and took a more active role in enforcing anti-discrimination laws and
agreements. 16
Despite the work of the CCHR and the passage of anti-discrimination laws, black
New Yorkers still faced hiring discrimination, low wages, and unemployment. African
Americans had made strides in the 1940s and 1950s, but in 1960 the national black
unemployment rate was still twice that of whites. 17 As one Pittsburgh Courier article
explained, "The employment picture for Negroes in New York City and in the state has a
'Jekyll and Hyde' tint. Legally, the picture is beautiful ... but hidden discrimination and
winking at the law are still prevalent and the cause of much bitterness among Negroes in
the highly competitive job market. Everything from boycotts to rent strikes have been
threatened in Harlem in order to relieve unemployment." 18 Like African Americans in
communities around the nation, in the early 1960s black New Yorkers successfully used
consumer boycotts and picket lines to support these campaigns, fighting for employment
in local businesses, chain stores, and national corporations located throughout the city.
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were
Most of the campaigns in Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Jamaica
conducted by ad hoc coalitions of neighborhood activists and black ministers, and they
were sometimes joined by activists from local branches of the NAACP, CORE, and
Urban League. White merchants and their organizations usually capitulated to these
boycotts and pickets. In Brooklyn the Ministers Movement of Bedford-Stuyvesant
launched a selective-buying campaign in the spring of 1962 in order to force white
merchants to hire more African American employees, holding protests and two "no-buy"
days in April. On the heels of the second boycott the merchants yielded and with the
ministers' help formed a Fulton Street Merchants Association. The Association worked
to train and hire more African American employees and also pledged financial support to
neighborhood civic groups. Participating businesses were given identifying signs to
place in their store windows. 19
A similar training program was launched in October 1963 by the Jamaica
Chamber of Commerce (JCC) in Queens after neighborhood activists threatened a
boycott there. Although no specific employment promises were made the Chamber
agreed to sponsor a series of workshops that trained participants for retail work, offering
a graduation certificate and job-search assistance upon completion of the course.
Dissatisfied with these plans, the Rochdale Movement Selective Buying Committee, an
organization that drew its membership from the Long Island branch of CORE, split from
other neighborhood activists and continued its pressure on the JCC. Herman Ferguson,
the committee's leader, demanded five hundred non-menial jobs for African Americans
19
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in Queens. In breaking with the other groups Ferguson showed dissatisfaction not only
with white merchants but with the strategies of the ministers' organization. He argued,
"We are calling for economic militancy. More and better jobs for Negroes. Our weapons
are boycotts, sit-ins, mass demonstrations, not moderation. Our forum is in the streets,
001 m the court."
2
" Throughout the fall and early winter of 1963 the committee picketed
Jamaica Avenue businesses, held rallies, and urged all African Americans to boycott
local businesses. Responding to this pressure the JCC established a civil rights council
within its organization and hired African American Gerald Meggett to run it. In January
1%4 Meggett met with local activists, including Herman Ferguson, and promised to offer
other job training programs and more aggressively promote the hiring of African
Americans among its member businesses. Apparently satisfied with JCC efforts,
Ferguson and the Long Island CORF discontinued their protests against the group. 21
Throughout the early 1960s activists in Harlem also worked diligently to increase
black employment on 125th street. In February 1961 the Fair Employment Observation
Committee, led by Reverend O.D. Dempsey, threatened a general boycott of white-
owned businesses in the neighborhood. Dempsey, assistant pastor at the Abyssinian
Baptist Church and Locality Mayor of Harlem (an elected but non-official position),
argued, "we are not interested in headline token employment given for the purpose of
20
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hiding
. . .
unfair employment praetiees in other areas."22 In March the organization
Changed its name to the Locality Mayor's Committee of New York, Inc., and launched an
investigation into employment practices. At the end of the month it held an awards
banquet where it cited the fair employment practices of three national corporations, Pepsi,
Ward Baking Company, and Liebmann Breweries. While praising these companies,
Dempsey warned I larlem businesses that his group was prepared to start a selective-
buying program to force greater local employment. Although these boycotts never
surfaced, the Committee continued its work to promote employment in Harlem, holding
conferences, conducting surveys, and sharing information with government agencies
about employment discrimination in the neighborhood. 23
A general boycott threat in I larlem surfaced again in late 1963, aimed specifically
at the I Jptown Chamber of Commerce (UCC). In November two different groups, the
Youth freedom Marchers and the Independent Community Improvement Association
(ICIA), called on the UCC to increase employment for black youth in Harlem stores.
Their main proposal was an on-the-job training program to be funded by the UCC and
run through the Harlem Youth Opportunity Unlimited (HARYOU), an organization set
up the year before to address the issues of black youth in Harlem. Rev. H.M. Kinloch
was the leader of the ICIA and the lead spokesperson for the protest campaign. The
groups and the UCC met no fewer than fourteen times during November 1963 and
January 1964, and on January 29 the City Commission on Human Rights stepped in and
negotiated a settlement. Under this agreement the UCC and the Harlem Labor Union
22
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would sponsor a .job training program open to
. larlcmites between seventeen and twenty-
live years old. In November 1964 protests again surfaced on 125 1 " Street as Kinloch
aeeused the UCC program of being a "farce" that had only led to a few menial jobs. The
UCC defended its program and elaimed that over one hundred and forty black youth had
found jobs through the program. This second campaign foundered, however, especially
after it and Kinloch were attacked by other civil rights groups. An activist from the local
NAACP branch questioned Kintoch's legitimacy as a minister and activist, arguing: "he
leads no Hock, he's a publicity seeker and seems to be disgruntled because he wasn't
given a paid position on the I larlem-on-the-.job project." 21 I lis proposed boycott was
publicly denounced by an assembly of community groups at a November 21 meeting, and
was unsuccessful at gaining further actions by the UCC. 25
These campaigns increased employment for African Americans in black
neighborhood retail stores, much as similar protests had done for the previous three
decades. In the 1960s activists also focused on businesses outside of black
neighborhoods, especially retail chains and department stores. In Downtown America: A
History ofthe Place and the People Who Made It, historian Alison Isenberg argues that
by the late 1950s urban retailers were faced with the reality that their businesses
depended on black consumers, and that this was true for businesses inside and outside of
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black neighborhoods.26 Many white-owned businesses in Manhattan and the city's other
boroughs, then, were confronted with the same issues that retailers on 125th street had
laced since the 1930s.
Two successful campaigns occurred in the Bronx and settlements were negotiated
with the help of State and local government agencies. The first began in 1959 when the
Bronx NfAACP picketed and boycotted Sears for its failure to hire African Americans or
Puerto Ricans in sales jobs. After month of picketing, and the intervention of the State
Commission Against Discrimination, Sears relented and agreed to integrate its sales
forces in the Bronx and to co-sponsor a conference of all retail merchants in the area to
discuss equal employment practices. 27 The second Bronx campaign took place in the
summer of 1 963 under the direction of the local CORE chapter and targeted White Castle
restaurants in that borough. White and black CORE activists boycotted and picketed
White Castle restaurants during June and July, gaining much publicity in the New York
Times and the local black press. One demonstration turned violent when members of a
neo-Nazi group, the National Resistance Party, interrupted the demonstrations and
attacked CORK members. For four days in July white youths carried their own picket
signs ("Vote Right Wing Conservative' 1 ), threw rocks and food at picketers, and
physically assaulted the group of white and black CORE protesters. Eight neo-Nazis
were arrested after police reportedly found a "cache of arms" with group members.
CORP' continued to protest, however, and similar protests sprang up at White Castle
lb
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restaurants in New Jersey. Fearing the escalating violence, in August the City
Commission on Human Rights brokered a deal between White Castle and CORE whieh
led to the hiring of African Americans and Puerto Ricans at White Castle restaurants
throughout the metropolitan region. 28
The CORE branch in Brooklyn was also busy and, more so than the other local
CORE groups, it actively recruited working-class African Americans from the local
community. Brooklyn CORE activists worked to improve the enforcement of health and
sanitation laws in Bedford-Stuyvesant, took action against area slumlords, and fought for
greater employment in the borough. 29 In 1962 the group demanded that the Ebinger
Baking Company hire African American and Puerto Rican saleswomen in all of its
metropolitan stores, not just the ones in black neighborhoods. For over a year it picketed
and leafleted the company headquarters in Brooklyn and at stores around the city. The
campaign expanded in August 1963 when the Brooklyn CORE chapter was joined by
other metropolitan CORE groups in picket lines at thirty four stores in the metropolitan
region. The protesters also obtained almost four thousand pledges to boycott all Ebinger
products. A week later seven protesters sat down in front of trucks at the Ebinger bakery,
refusing to allow them passage. As Ebony reported, "nothing moved at the bakery, not
even jellyrolls and raspberry twists" until the police arrived and arrested the
demonstrators. The arrests received a great deal of publicity in the local press and
28
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Ebinger reluctantly met with CORE activists. The settlement reached included the
immediate hiring of twelve African American and Puerto Rican saleswomen, with the
promise that an additional twenty eight would be hired by year's end. 30
New York groups also stood ready to protest racial segregation and discrimination
whether or not it occurred in the city. Because many corporations were headquartered or
had offices in New York City, groups and activists there could draw attention to
exclusionary policies in ways that African Americans in other cities could not. For
example, in the spring and summer of 1964 New York's local branches and national
leaders from CORE, NAACP, and the Urban League joined a nationwide campaign
against General Motors (GM) because of employment discrimination in Detroit plants.
Black New Yorkers demonstrated at GM's New York headquarters on 57 ,h Street, which
was also the location of a massive automobile showroom and the company's financing
department, the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Eugene Sharpe, chair of the
New York NAACP 's Labor and Industries Committee indicated that these
demonstrations would continue, and that, "[s]ome sort of campaign will be going on all
the time among the New York branches."31 Additionally, CORE's Seven Arts Chapter
(which focused on discrimination in the performing arts) picketed GM headquarters and
the International Automobile Show held in the city to protest the company's exclusion of
African American models and demonstrators at the show. On April 8 GM executives
flew from Detroit to New York City and met with national civil rights leaders Whitney
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Young, Roy Wilkins, and James Farmer, as well as Franees Foster and Clarence Funnye
of loeal New York CORE chapters. When GM refused to set up a committee to
encourage the hiring and promotion of African Americans in its plants, the three
organizations continued their protests. They would not succeed until 1967. 32
"Buy Black" Protests
As in the postwar years "Buy Black" campaigns of the early 1960s were usually
conducted by black nationalist groups, such as Carlos Cooks' African Nationalist Pioneer
Movement (ANPM) and James Lawson's United African Nationalist Movement
(IJANM). In fact, black nationalists were often referred to as "Buy Black Boys" by many
commentators and newspapers articles of the era. And while the ANPM and the UANM
had conducted "Buy Black" campaigns for decades, in the early 1960s this work received
support from numerous other black nationalist groups in the city. In 1961 Lawson told
the New York Times that there were twelve to fifteen black nationalist groups in New
York, and that his own group had between two hundred and three hundred members.
"Even so," he explained, "my group and all the others have a great many followers or
sympathizers who take part in our demonstrations without officially joining."33 As Dean
Robinson argues in Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought, many of the
32
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black nationalist groups in 1960s New York City had connections to earlier
organizations, especially the Nation of Islam. The most notable of these former NO!
groups was the one started by Malcolm X after his split Elijah Muhammad in 1964.
Robinson notes that part of Malcolm X's disenchantment with the NOI was its lack of
public activism, especially in the face of the direct action protests of civil rights groups. 34
Most black nationalist groups supported black entrepreneurship and "Buy Black-
campaigns. This did not mean, however, that they agreed on tactics or goals. Lawson,
lor example, differentiated his "Buy Black" efforts from Cooks' more strident strategies,
characterizing his goals as: "No. 1, buy from stores owned by blacks; No. 2, from stores
managed by blacks; No. 3 from stores that practice fair employment. In this we disagree
with the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement slightly. They say 'Buy only from black'
but we decided to be practical, for example, I'm not going to lug any groceries all the
way up here to the Bronx from Harlem."35 Sometimes the differences between the
groups devolved into violence, and in June of 1960 a dispute broke out on 125 ,h street
between members of the Order of Dandhala Oeudo and Cooks' African Nationalist
Pioneer Movement. In an article titled, "'Buy Black' Boys Shoot 'Em Up,'" the
Amsterdam News reported that the two groups "tried to settle their difference with rifles
and machettes [sic] at 7th Avenue and 1 25 ,h Street," where the two groups were both
holding meetings. Organization members began shouting at one another, and the
resulting fight sent four people to the hospital and four others to jail. 36
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wAlthough these groups and their "Buy Black" campaigns were rarely supported by
the leftist or liberal eivil rights groups, or by most blaek New Yorkers, several nationalist
organizations conducted small "Buy Black" protests throughout the early 1960s. One of
the most public campaigns, known as the "Battle of the Steak Houses," began in June
1962 under the direction of the Harlem Consumers Committee (HCC). The HCC was led
by Lewis Micheaux, owner of the National Memorial African Bookstore in Harlem and
long associated with black nationalist causes; many black nationalist speeches and rallies
were held in front of his bookstore on 125 ,h street. The "Buy Black" campaign started
hen the
1 ICC learned that a white-owned steakhouse was opening next to the Apollo
Theatre. Micheaux charged the Uptown Chamber of Commerce and local white
merchants with intentionally preventing African Americans from owning businesses in
1 Iarlem, in this case the steakhouse was designed to close down Lloyd's Steakhouse,
owned by African American Lloyd Von Blaine. Joining the HCC on the pickets lines
were members from James Lawson's United African Nationalist Movement and the
leftist Harlem Tenants Council (in a rare show of support from a non-nationalist group).
Other local black leaders, however, disagreed with the campaign, especially when HCC
activists began using anti-Semitic slogans against the steakhouse owner, Sol Singer.
Jackie Robinson and A. Philip Randolph, in particular, publicly denounced the nationalist
groups, and charged that they had chanted slogans such as "Jew go away - Black man
stay."
- They also supported Singer because of his efforts to find an African American
partner and willingness to hire African Americans to manage and work in the restaurant.
The HCC was unfazed by these efforts and by the criticism of Robinson and Randolph.
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and even picketed Chock Full 0' Nuts, where Robinson was a vice president, for his
defense of Singer. The protests ended in September when Singer promised to hire ten
people recommended by I ICC, to give Von Blaine one share of stock and to allow him to
buy steaks through Singer's wholesaler. " The outcome of the campaign, then, was both
the support of a local black-owned business and the employment of African Americans in
a white-owned business. Like "Buy Black" protests of the postwar era, this campaign
received a great deal of publicity in the local and national black press, as well as the New
York Times, but its achievements and support among black New Yorkers were limited.
The one large and successful "Buy Black" campaign of the 1960s claimed not to
be a "Buy Black" campaign at all. This was a campaign against the liquor industry that
raged in the streets of I larlem from June 1 959 to January 1 962, notable for its longevity,
success, and leadership by traditional civil rights groups. Throughout New York City
many liquor companies worked through wholesalers whose salespeople sold directly to
liquor stores. Observers estimated that I larlemites spent between fifty and sixty million
dollars on liquor per year, with two million dollars in commissions going to the
salespeople there. In Manhattan only seventy two of the 1,800 liquor salespeople were
African Americans, and of these seventy two not one sold to stores outside of black
neighborhoods. In June 1959 the local branch of the NAACP, led by Joseph Overton,
began to picket and boycott white owned liquor stores in Harlem with the goal of
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pressuring retailers to give more business to black salespeople. In its campaign the
NAACP argued that beeause wholesalers confined their blaek salespeople to 1 larlcm
these workers were at a disadvantage and therefore should be given a priority in I larlem
sales. When the NAACP was charged with waging a "Buy Black" campaign they denied
the charges, arguing that its ultimate goal was "negotiations with the liquor industry for a
system that disregards race in the assignment of sales personnel."3" In fact, the campaign
was a combination of the strategies and goals of "Buy Black" and "Don't Buy Where
You Can't Work" campaigns. The NAACP argued that retailers, "should do business
with the people from whom they make their money" and that helping black liquor
salespeople would be an economic benefit to the black community because those same
salespeople lived and purchased in the neighborhood - unlike white salespeople.40
Throughout the summer of 1959 the NAACP filed complaints on behalf of black
liquor salesmen with the State Commission Against Discrimination, the State Liquor
Authority, and the Commission on Intergroup Relations (COIR), and in the fall of 1959
COIR held a series of hearings about the liquor industry. Gathering over one hundred
and fifty witnesses from the wholesalers, retailers, salesmen, and black community,
COIR concluded that there was, in fact, bias within New Yor^s liquor industry. In
November, it held a conference where it urged wholesalers and retailers to "eliminate
specific instances of discrimination faced by Negro liquor salesmen."41
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When COIR and the liquor industry failed to take action other local leaders
quickly joined the protest and in early 1960 formed the Liquor Action Committee (LAC),
whose members included Overton, Adam Clayton Powell, Reverend O.D. Dempsey, and
members from the local NAACP. In January LAC met with area liquor retailers and gave
them a list of sixty salesmen whose territory was confined to Harlem, including African
Americans, Puerto Ricans, and a few whites, and threatened to boycott and picket any
stores that did not switch their business to these salespeople. The Metropolitan Package
Stores Association, Inc., an organization of liquor store owners, conceded to LAC
demands and directed its member stores to buy from the recommended salesmen, a
directive that the LAC followed up on with its own letters threatening action if the stores
did not comply. In March the Liquor Salesmen's Union, made up mostly of white liquor
salesmen in Manhattan, took the merchant's association to court, asserting that the
association's directive and the LAC's protests interfered with their ability to earn a living.
The union warned that if the LAC was allowed to continue that "the white salesmen will
be boycotted, the retail stores will be picketed, and, in all probability, violence will
follow."42 The courts sided with the union and prohibited, "persons, associations,
organizations, and groups," which included the Metropolitan Package Stores Association
and the Liquor Action Committee, from compelling liquor stores to alter their buying
practices.
43
42
Ralph Katz, "Suit Says Powell Bars Whites from Selling Liquor in Harlem," New York Times,
12 March 1960, 10.
43
"Powell Prepares Liquor Pickets," New York Amsterdam News, 20 February 1960, 16; Ralph
Katz, "Suit Says Powell Bars Whites From Selling Liquor in Harlem," New York Times, 12 March 1960. 1
;
"Dealers Enjoined in Liquor Boycott," New York Times, 31 March 1960, 27.
243
In the wake of the court's decision the LAC swung into action and began
picketing liquor stores in Harlem, despite the insistence of the liquor industry that picket
lines and boycotts violated the court order. In May the LAC began urging Harlemites to
boycott not only stores but also liquor products from distributors that did not support their
cause. In particular they boycotted J&B Scotch, whose products were sold exclusively
through a wholesaler that the committee accused of being "lily-white," with only one
African American salesman out of ninety. Throughout the summer and fall of 1960 the
LAC continued its picket lines and boycotts, and urged Harlemites to buy only from
black-owned liquor stores. In 1961 the New York State Supreme Court enjoined the
LAC from picketing stores, which significantly decreased these protests but did little to
stop the selective-buying campaign spearheaded by the local NAACP branch. When the
selective-buying campaign threatened the lucrative Christmas shopping season in 1961,
and gained support in other black neighborhoods in the metropolitan region, the Liquor
Salesmen's Union began its own negotiations with the LAC and NAACP. In early
January 1962 an agreement was reached that transferred over one hundred and fifty
accounts to black salespeople.
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Using consumer power in direct action protests was an important feature of the
black freedom movement in New York City in the 1960s, much as it was in campaigns
for equality throughout the nation. Significantly, few protests by black New Yorkers
focused on lowering high prices in black neighborhoods or equal access to (and treatment
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in) public commercial spaces - ideas which had been vital to understandings of consumer
equality since the 1930s. It was not as if high prices had ended, but in the early 1960s the
biggest concerns for black New Yorkers centered on access to jobs. With respect to
consumption itself, black New Yorkers shifted their focus away from high prices to the
ways in which the "Negro market" had segregated African Americans from the
mainstream American consumer society.
Desegregating the Advertising Industry
Although black New Yorkers had used their spending power against racism and
segregation since the 1930s, not until 1960 did they turn their attention to the segregated
nature ofthe "Negro market" itself. Their numerous campaigns centered on two goals:
desegregating employment in advertising agencies and desegregating advertisements in
mainstream media. Because the advertising industry was located mainly in New York
City, activists and organizations there - primarily the Urban League of Greater New
York, CORE, and the NAACP - took a leading role in these campaigns. These groups
often threatened boycotts and direct-action protests, but from 1960 to 1965 their strategy
focused on negotiation with advertisers and advertising agencies, and on pressing
government agencies to help produce needed changes. Although employment and greater
representation in mainstream advertisements were the twin goals of most campaigns.
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activists found that employment gains were far more difficult to win than changes in
marketing strategies. 45
In June 1 959 the Urban League of Greater New York launched a three-year
investigation of advertising agencies' employment practices. Its survey, completed in
September of 1 961
,
found that out of 20,000 employees at the ten largest advertising
agencies only twenty five African Americans were employed in creative or executive
jobs. To remedy this situation the League first turned to the American Association of
Advertising Agencies, known as the "Four As," an organization of the top 100 agencies
in New York. The Four As met with League officials and, after completing its own
investigation, agreed to forward to member agencies the resumes of African Americans
recommended by the League. League officials were outraged, however, when the
association deemed only four of their twenty seven candidates to be qualified for
advertising work, and the League then took its cause directly to the advertising
46
agencies.
From December 1 962 to March 1 963 the Urban League met with representatives
from the top ten agencies in New York City, including J. Walter Thompson (JWT),
McCann-Erickson, Young & Rubicam, and Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn, Inc.
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(BBD&O). The League was unhappy with the results of these meetings, reporting,
"While we were always cordially received the only positive evidence that our efforts
met with any success was the recent disclosure by one of the agencies visited that it had
hired a 21
-year-old Negro youngster as a research chartist."47 When questioned by the
trade journal Advertising Age, agencies directed criticism away from themselves,
claiming that clients didn't want to work with African Americans, that few African
Americans applied for agency jobs, and that those who did lacked experience or talent.
Edward Stern, head of a personnel agency, argued, "the Urban League has the facts
exactly upside down. I have yet to meet a competent copywriter or account executive
who is a Negro. There just aren't any. The problem is that Negroes do not tend to move
into the advertising business. I don't feel there would be any discrimination on the
executive or creative ends. It's just a complete lack of available talent."48 Some industry
executives also revealed fears that African Americans would cause disruptions within
their agencies, and one even argued against hiring qualified and experienced African
Americans: "with plenty of Caucasians applying for jobs at all levels of agency function,
why hire an equally qualified Negro and risk disharmony in the organization? Perhaps in
most agencies there would be no disharmony, but how can agency hiring people be sure
of this? And if prejudice festers, is the agency supposed to fire those whose backgrounds
have visited racism on them? [emphasis in the original]"49 Although most industry
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48
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personnel would not have endorsed sueh an extreme view, almost all argued that the
blame rested on advertisers or a lack of qualified black candidates.
African Americans in the advertising industry, however, refuted many of these
arguments and claimed that talented and experienced black personnel were available but
unable to find work. Richard Clark, owner of the African American personnel agency
1 lallmark Employment Agency, argued, "I have been writing to agencies for the past five
years, but they weren't calling. I have about seven or eight artists and copywriters in my
files and another 14 or so in sales and marketing. ... How many Negro creative people
have I placed in ad agencies? None. Clerical workers? Very few. Do I think there's
discrimination in advertising? There's discrimination under every rock." 50 After failing
to get anywhere with both the Four As and advertising agencies, the Urban League called
a press conference in April 1963 and made public its findings. It also sent its report and
details about its fruitless agency meetings to black newspapers, corporate advertisers, and
government agencies interested in employment discrimination. Although other
campaigns against the advertising industry also called for greater employment in
advertising agencies, after this Urban League effort the focus shifted to the lack of
African Americans in mainstream advertisements. 51
In December 1961 the New York City branch of the NAACP started a project
called D.A., which stood for "Desegregating Advertising." This campaign largely
ignored employment issues and instead focused on advertising images. The leader of the
D.A. project was Sylvia Applebaum. She targeted both department stores and national
50 Quoted in "Urban League Hits N.Y. Agencies," 8.
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corporations and began by writing letters to ten companies, including Lord & Taylor,
Saks Fifth Avenue, Macy\s, American Telephone & Telegraph co, and the American
Tobacco Company. In ( nsis Applebaum described the campaign and reproduced the
letter sent to the American Tobacco Company. In it Applebaum objected to the excl
of African Americans from mainstream consumer spaces. "To cite one current
illustration," she wrote,
we refer you to the subway ad showing an attractive young man and woman
lighting a Lucky. Our objection to this ad and to other ads of your company is
that they picture only white human beings and we think the same quality ad can
and should show Negroes who, as you probably know, also smoke Luckies We
understand there are some ads located in colored neighborhoods that show
colored people but this type of advertising distribution is not satisfactory because
it is ghetto advertising.
Except for the National Negro Congress conference in the late 1940s, and the few articles
by Walter Christmas in the 1950s, this campaign was the first direct criticism of the
segregated nature of traditional "Negro market" advertising strategies. Moreover, the
D.A. campaign did not rest its arguments solely on the impact to the black community
but instead included the effect these exclusionary policies had on whites, arguing that "if
visual advertisements of merchandise included the highly visible Negro along with white
people, the American public would get a new and more accurate image of the Negro. If
he is appreciated at his real worth, then it is possible for the American people to value the
Negro as just another citizen like themselves." 53 These same ideas would be taken up by
other organizations and campaigns which sought the integration of African Americans
into mainstream advertisements.
52
Sylvia Applebaum, "On Desegregating Advertising," The Crisis, June-July 1962, 315
53
Ibid.
249
Of the companies contacted by the NAACP only Macy's replied, and in a letter to
Applebaum the company explained, "we have no policy concerning the use or non-use of
Negroes, or any race, as models. Our practice in selecting models is based solely on our
judgment as to the most effective ways of meeting the needs of our business." They also
pointed out that in November 1961 a Macy's ad in the New York Times did, in fact, use a
black model, to which Applebaum responded, "One rose does not make a summer." She
further asked, "Would the business of Macy's or the other corporations named and
unnamed in this report prosper more without the Negro consumer? Or is the Negro
consumer a welcome sort of profit to those businesses as long as he is kept out of sight,
particularly out of sight in merchandise advertising?" Although Applebaum and the
NAACP did not have success with the companies they contacted their work launched the
first attack against advertising images and initiated the debate about "Negro market"
advertising strategies within the black freedom movement. 54
The next action was initiated not by civil rights groups but by the New York City
Commission on Human Rights (CCHR). In the spring of 1963 it launched an
investigation into the images of African Americans in mainstream advertisements, and its
report put the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of advertising agencies. The
CCHR argued that, "while advertising agencies tend to blame advertisers or networks (in
the case of programs) for the absence of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Orientals, etc., in most
advertising, there are signs the agencies themselves could be influential in this area if
properly approached."55 Historian Jason Chambers argues that as a New York City
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organization the Commission had influence only over those businesses located in the city,
which were overwhelmingly advertising agencies, not television networks or
manufacturers. 56 Throughout 1963 the Commission worked with agencies and the Four
As, and even contacted advertisers for their assistance when the agencies proved reluctant
to make needed changes. Although it chose not to submit the industry to formal hearings
on advertising images, as it did with other industries, the Commission's work supported
and strengthened the activities of civil rights groups who challenged the segregated
"Negro market."
In the summer of 1 963 CORE and the NAACP launched campaigns to integrate
mainstream advertisements. CORE's efforts focused on integrating television
commercials, and its "TV Image Campaign" was run by Clarence Funnye, a leader in the
organization's New York City chapter. Instead of reaching out to advertising agencies
CORE's strategy targeted the advertisers themselves, especially "blue chip advertisers,
who carry great weight in the industry both by the size of their budgets and their
influence as pace setters," hoping that any success at the top of corporate America would
trickle down to other businesses. 57 CORE set out to change the practice of the top one
hundred corporate advertisers and began by approaching television's three largest
sponsors, Lever Bros., Colgate-Palmolive, and Procter & Gamble. These three
companies may have also been targeted because of their long history of "Negro market"
campaigns which would have made them more aware of black consumers.
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LeVCT Bros, was the first to be approached. The company had already mel with
foe I Irban I ,eague of Greater New York and ,hc New York ( <ily ( omnnssion on I luman
Rights in the summer of 1963. As a result, by the time CORE mel with Lever it was
already investigating the incorporation of African Americans into ils mainstream
advertisements. Threatening that its selective-purchasing committees were ready to
spring into action, CORE had little trouble gaining compliance from Lever, and in
August of 1963 the company issued a directive to its advertising agencies to use African
Americans in its television commercials. The lust Lever commercial ran that month,
perhaps not COincidentally the same month as the March on Washington, and featured an
African American woman in an ALL Detergent commercial. Lever followed up that
commercial with one for Wisk which showed two young boys one white, the other
black playing together. This ad, in particular, challenged prevailing cultural images by
including whites and blacks in a socially integrated scene™ After its success with Lever,
CORE then turned to Colgate-Palmolive and Proctor & Gamble, and both companies
quickly followed Lever's lead by creating mainstream commercials and print ads
featuring African Americans.
Around the same time that ( ORL started ils campaign, the national NAA(T
office in New York City began its own campaign to integrate advertising, but instead of
focusing on advertisers it chose to lobby television network production studios in Los
Angeles and advertising agencies in New York City. In August 1963 it met with fifty six
of the leading advertising agencies and told them, "You have lagged in terms of
awareness of the Negro's role in society." The NAACL's program called for
Chambers, 181-19 1 ; Maurine Christopher, "Desegregate Ads, TV, Lever Tells Agencies,"
Advertising Age, 12 August 1963, 1,8.
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employment for African Americans in advertising agencies and for the "use of Negro
models in national and local campaigns for general media, not only for Negro-appeal
media." 59 This meeting was followed up in November when Roy Wilkins, then executive
secretary of the NAACP, spoke on a panel at the eastern conference of the Four A's titled
" The Expanding Negro Market and Its Importance - Methods to Reach it." Wilkins told
the audience that African Americans, "like to spend their money where Negroes can get
employment, and with businesses which do not distort the Negro image either by
ignoring his existence or utilizing unacceptable portrayals."60
Neither CORE nor the NAACP boycotted or picketed to desegregate mainstream
advertisements, but both used direct or veiled threats of these weapons in their
negotiations. Herbert Hill, labor secretary for the NAACP, told advertisers that those
who failed to include African Americans in mainstream ads would face selective-buying
campaigns. 61 In its meetings with advertisers CORE always invited members of its
selective-patronage committees from various local branches, threatening "block-by-block
boycotting if negotiations break down with any company."62 This direct-action threat
was underscored in November 1963 at a meeting of television networks held at the
Americana Hotel in New York City. CORE was picketing the hotel because the U.S.
Attorney General was staying there and they sought to draw attention to the
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government's poor civil rights record. Television executives had to walk through the
CORE picket lines in order to attend their meeting, getting a first-hand look at this
effective direct-action weapon. 63 In September of 1963 the Center for Research in
Marketing released a study of black consumer habits that also helped support boycott
threats. The study found that eighty nine percent of African Americans said they would
support a boycott against companies or products if asked to do so by a prominent civil
rights leader or group. Almost all of those interviewed in the survey indicated that they
had already participated in a local boycott, and thirty to forty percent were engaged in a
boycott at the time of the survey. 64
Along with the threats of punitive economic measures, CORE and the NAACP
both reached out to advertisers for their ability to influence the white public, an argument
that echoed the strategies of many civil rights organizations and that reiterated one of the
goals of the 1962 "Desegregating Advertising" campaign. Herbert Hill, NAACP labor
secretary, told the advertising agencies, "[w]e ask only that you tell the truth about the
Negro. We don't ask you to become a special pleader . . . Negroes function in all fields
today and are part of the day-to-day definition of the American scene. He is no longer
the 'invisible man.'"
65
This was a social responsibility argument that sought to confront
white audiences with a more accurate vision of American society. In the 1 940s and
1950s advertisers had been urged to eliminate racist stereotypes from mainstream media
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and to depict African Americans more fully in black media, but by the 1960s these
changes were no longer sufficient.
The combined efforts of civil rights organizations and the New York City
Commission on Human Rights created a small flurry of activity among advertisers in the
summer and fall of 1 963. No corporations sponsored the extensive television coverage of
the March on Washington in August 1963, and in an article titled, "March on Madison,"
Newsweek pointed out, "[a]side from Aunt Jemima and a few sports celebrities, finding a
Negro in any ad aimed at the general public until recently was as difficult as finding a
Southern Congressman at last week's march on Washington." But, the article continued,
one could now count twenty six companies that used African American models in mass
market ads, and twenty others had committed to doing so. 66 Besides Lever Bros.,
Colgate-Palmolive, and Procter & Gamble, some of the first advertisers to use African
Americans in mainstream media were Trans World Airlines, IBM, RCA, Equitable Life,
General Electric, Seagram, Borden, and Philip Morris. The changes also had an
influence on local businesses in New York City and several began including African
Americans in general market ads, including The New York Telephone Company,
Chemical New York Bank, the Hanover Trust Company, and the department stores
Macy's, Stern's, and Alexander's. 67
These incipient changes led CORE's Clarence Funnye to claim that 1964, "would
be the year when Negroes in ads in all media will become as much an accepted part of the
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U.S. scene as they are in baseball."68 This prediction proved to be overly optimistic. In
1 969 I larold Kassarjian, a business professor at the University of California, Los
Angeles, conducted a study of magazine advertisements for the years 1946, 1956, and
1 965. He found that mass market ads depicting African Americans were only slightly
more numerous in 1965 (.6 percent) than they had been in 1946 (.58 percent). His work
also supported earlier studies that found a decrease in black images in the 1950s, and he
hypothesized that this was due to advertisers' desire to avoid offending African
Americans through depictions of them as servants or caricatures, combined with their
equally strong desire to avoid offending whites by using blacks in meaningful roles.
Although black remained a rare presence in ads, Kassarjian found there were significant
changes in the ways African Americans were shown in the later ads; their appearance in
servant or menial roles dropped from seventy eight percent in 1946 to thirteen percent in
1965. Kassarjian summarized his findings as follows:
The portrayed occupational role of the American Negro has changed considerably
over the 20-year period with considerably more Negroes portrayed in the higher
status occupations in recent years The social role of the Negro and the
appearance of integrated ads in which black and white are shown as peers has also
tended to increase recently. However, the ads that treat the Negro as an equal are
so few that neither can the civil rights groups be acclaimed successful nor can the
advertising industry take particular pride in their supposedly newly found social
responsibility.
69
Similarly, as late as 1967 a survey of television ads found that less than three
percent of commercials used any non-white models, and many corporations clung to their
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traditional whites-only format.™ One auto industry exeeutive told Newsweek, "We don't
hire Negro models. We also don't hire fat models. When you have a pretty car, you
want to dress it up to the best advantage, so you get the best looking girl you can to go
* 71
with it." The most common argument against integrated advertising was the fear of
white backlash, the same argument used in the 1950s by those companies who did not
want to advertise in black media. A.R. Pinkham, a vice president at the advertising firm
Ted Bates & Company, told Advertising Age, "You must understand that the business
man does not wish to antagonize anybody - even the bigots."72 This concern was not
completely unfounded, and companies reported some negative reactions to integrated ads.
The New York Times, for example, discussed the problems faced by one company, who
was not named, that received over two thousand protest letters when it used an African
American in a mainstream ad. The same article, however, declared that few companies
reported any significant impact on their actual product sales and most argued, "we're
committed to this course and it's too late to turn back." 73 A month after Lever Bros
sponsored its first black-model commercial, it told a meeting of the National Academy of
Television Arts and Sciences that fewer than seventy people had written to the company
about the ad, and out of those less than half objected to it. Lever considered this number
inconsequential and argued that its integrated advertisements were a success. Perhaps
integrated ads were too infrequent to cause major disruptions to companies' sales, or
perhaps the positive reactions of black and whites who favored the changes help to offset
70
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segregationist attitudes. One thing is certain, although the changes in mainstream ads
were not widespread, they did significantly alter understandings of the "Negro market."
The "Negro market" in 1960s
Consumer boycotts, discussions about mainstream ads, and campaigns to
integrate employment had a tremendous impact on understandings of the "Negro
market.
,,
In 1 960 Sales Management ran a lengthy article about the state of the market
and explored the growing issues faced by advertisers. It argued.
In this day of highly refined marketing techniques there is probably no single
element as deeply cloaked in mystery, misapprehension and unfounded opinion as
is the Negro market. Some marketers hotly contend there is no such market;
others feel that to acknowledge its existence in marketing plans is segregation at
best, an open invitation to the Justice Department at worse. Still others know its
there, but hold ante-bellum opinions on it. A few recognize the Negro market and
profit from it; probably even fewer really understand it. 74
The "Negro market" itself was under attack, and advertisers, agencies, and industry
observers sought a way to balance the competing concerns of black activists and the
marketplace.
Some of the ideas and advice about the "Negro market" showed surprising
consistency from the postwar years, in particular the significance of its size, its location,
and its difference from the mainstream market. In 1960 the "Negro market" was
estimated at $22 billion, rising to $23.5 billion in 1963 and $27 billion in 1965. Although
the median income of black families remained well behind that of white families, during
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the 1950s black incomes grew at a faster rate than whites and many hopefully predicted
that as the civil rights movement eliminated employment discrimination that black
incomes would increase even further. Metropolitan New York City remained the largest
"Negro market," and its size was estimated at over $2.5 billion in the early 1960s. In
1 960 African Americans made up approximately fourteen percent of the city's
population, up from eight percent in 1950. These statistics made black consumption, and
black New Yorkers, difficult to ignore. 75
Marketers also continued their arguments that racial segregation and
discrimination made the "Negro market" distinct from the mainstream one. Not only had
housing discrimination made the black community overwhelmingly urban (by 1960 over
seventy three percent of African Americans lived in cities), it was usually confined to
select neighborhoods within cities, making black consumers easier to reach through
targeted campaigns. As David Sullivan explained, "[t]his compactness and virtual
segregation of the Negro population creates a solid, often seemingly independent Negro
community. This one factor is perhaps the most important force creating a solid Negro
market today; when the physical solidarity is eliminated by full assimilation of the Negro
family into white neighborhoods, the marketing significance of the Negro, as such, will
be greatly weakened." 76 The urban nature of the "Negro market" also made it especially
For statistics on the "Negro market" and black incomes see "Negro's Force"; "Marketing to the
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important to those companies relying on urban sales, which included many of the national
manufacturers.
Racism was also blamed for creating black buying habits that differed from the
mainstream market. This idea was especially promoted by African Americans, such as
Ebony founder John Johnson and the owners of black media and marketing agencies. As
before, there were few statistics or surveys to support the claims of higher brand buying,
but experts clung to the belief that African Americans bought branded and high-priced
items because of the protection and prestige they offered. James Hicks, editor of the New
York Amsterdam News, argued that African Americans also consumed status products in
order to overcome the disadvantages of a discriminatory system, telling Business Week,
"The successful Negro has to be 'a soldier and a half.' He can't stop with the passable.
He has to excel, just to keep on par."77 Additionally, industry experts contended that
black consumers differed from white consumers in the amounts spent on various product
categories - and unlike the brand buying argument they backed up these claims with
numerous surveys and statistics. Whether and to what extent black consumer purchases
differed from white purchases varied from survey to survey, but every study claimed
there were significant differences in spending habits. In 1960 the Research Corporation
of America conducted a national survey which found that African Americans spent eight
to twelve percent more on clothes and twenty four to twenty-eight percent more on
cosmetics and toiletries. Another 1960 study, this one of African Americans in
Memphis, found that black consumers there purchased sixty-one percent more cereals,
77
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seventy three percent more laundry soap, ninety-one percent more corn meal, and one
hundred and thirteen percent more rice than whites. 79 And according to William
Grayson, Vice-President of Johnson Publishing Company (publishers of Ebony), in 1963
African American families spent three hundred percent more on soft-drinks than did
whites. 80 These differences were sometimes linked to discrimination, such as the
argument that black Americans spent more on food purchased for home use because they
were unwelcome at many restaurants, country clubs, and other public establishments.
Other differences were traced to the urban nature of black life which, for example,
limited African American spending on such items as gardening tools and automobiles.
Industry experts believed that the unique characteristics of the "Negro market" would
disappear as the barriers to equality were broken down, but most argued that during the
1960s a separate market continued to exist. 81
Because of these differences many experts argued that a distinct approach to black
consumers was still needed. This point, however, became much more contested in the
early 1960s. Worried about getting caught in the cross-fire of the civil rights movement,
one advertiser told Business Week, "If we use the wrong approach, we may alienate the
Negro. If we use the right approach, we may alienate our white customers."82 Others,
however, argued that black consumer activism should make businesses more, not less,
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willing to enter the "Negro market/' In American Brewer, David Sullivan wrote,
"Ignoring the Negro market's existence, as too many have done and are still doing, will
not help matters at all. Nor will ignoring the insistent demands upon brewers by local,
sectional, and even national Negro interests solve any of the myriad problems facing
them arising out of 'sit-ins' - boycotts, and other community pressures'^ The point was
put even more urgently by John Johnson in a speech to the Public Relations Society of
America in September 1963:
Negro Americans are in the streets demonstrating and protesting. You cannot
service your clients adequately if you do not know why they are in the streets
You may not agree with the demands Negroes are making, but you cannot
iunction as public relations representatives in this age without an understanding of
the threat and discontent behind Negro demands.
. . . This is a crucial turning
point in the relations between Negro and white Americans. If PR people are not
telling their clients the truth about this revolution, their clients are going to end up
with a net loss of sales.M
I Jnderstanding the unique issues of importance to black consumers, then, was a vital
necessity in the 1960s.
The next problem for advertisers was how best to reach out to African Americans.
Because of campaigns to desegregate the advertising industry - campaigns that attacked
the traditional segregation of "Negro market" advertisements from mass media -
advertisers worried about continuing to target black consumers with special marketing
techniques. Even though protesters did not argue that companies should refrain from
using black media, advertisers worried that doing so might leave them open to charges of
discrimination. As one advertiser asked, "If we do begin to give the Negro special
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treatment as a consumer, won't we be guilty of a segregationist 'separate but equal'
attitude?"85 While most black activists failed to address this issue directly, African
Americans in the advertising industry argued for the continuation of "Negro market-
campaigns in black media. David Sullivan, for example, argued that companies helped
the African American community when they used black models, black media, and black
experts. "Negro market" campaigns, he argued, made the black consumer feel a
"recognized member of society," while using black media and hiring African American
salespeople was an economic benefit to the black community. 86
Companies that continued their "Negro market" campaigns in the 1960s were
suddenly reluctant to discuss their strategies in trade journals. In the 1940s and 1950s
such companies had been very eager to do so both in the trade press and in black media,
who gave them the added benefit of free publicity to black consumers. By 1960,
however, when company officials agreed to be interviewed they often did so only on
condition of anonymity. A Sales Management article, titled "The Negro Market's Shroud
of Fear," described the concerns of advertisers: "Because of the tendency of certain
interest groups (both pro-Negro and anti-Negro) to magnify and misinterpret practically
anything involved with inter-racial relations, the whole subject has become almost
dangerously volatile [T]he techniques of highly successful marketers in the Negro
field (and the reasons why others have failed) are as carefully guarded as the blueprints
for the H-bomb."87
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Despite these concerns many companies continued to seek black consumers
through special "Negro market" appeals, and throughout the early 1960s advertising trade
journals offered a great deal of adv.ce about how to reach African Americans. Much of
this information was virtually identical to what it had been in the postwar era, especially
the need to place ads in black media and use black models. Although African Americans
were heavy readers of mainstream magazines and newspapers, most industry experts
continued to argue that placing ads there failed to signal to black consumers that their
patronage was solicited. In New York City companies continued to advertise extensively
in the Amsterdam News which, by 1960, was the only regular black newspaper in New
York City. The Amsterdam News promoted the importance of using the black press to
reach African Americans, holding advertising conferences and conducting consumer
surveys throughout the 1960s. It worked with advertisers to promote products through
feature stories and ran a consumer page full of shopping tips that advertised specific
brands. Advertisers also reached black New Yorkers through black radio, especially
WLIB.
The impact of campaigns to desegregate the "Negro market" could be seen even
within black media, where companies became much more willing to include integrated
scenes in their ads. Many chose to do so by depicting an integrated work environment,
which had the added benefit of associating their companies with fair employment
practices. Remington Rand and IBM were trendsetters with this type of advertisement,
and IBM made a point to use real IBM employees. One IBM ad appealed especially to
black New Yorkers as it featured African American Geneva Butts talking with two male
coworkers, one white and one Asian-American, at the IBM offices in New York City. It
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indicated that Butts graduated from Hunter College in the eity and was continuing her
graduate studies while working as an associate programmer for IBM. This, and similar,
IBM ads listed career opportunities available at IBM and gave the address of the
company employment department where any reader could send his or her resume.
Rarer were those ads which showed whites and African Americans in socially
integrated settings, such as an Apex Beauty Products ad that began appearing in Ebony
and black newspapers in early 1962. This ad [Figure 5.1] shows a white and black
woman having tea, and addresses the "progress" of race relations directly by making it a
part of the advertising appeal. "More progress is essential," reads the copy, "and quickly,
because Americans cannot truly be Americans until we learn to live comfortably with
ourselves. This was to be an advertisement for Apex Natural-Perm. We set out to make
the point that both girls use Natural-Perm. But the inner meaning of the picture itself
guided us along a different, and better, path. After all, anyone can sell a good product.
At Apex, we stand for much more." As one of the earliest ads to directly discuss race
issues this campaign earned Apex a great deal of positive publicity in black media. Even
mainstream articles described it as a positive step in advertising and race relations.
The last piece of advice given to businesses seeking to reach black consumers was
that they needed to increase black employment and philanthropy to the black community
to enhance public relations. Certainly, continuing to hire African American salespeople
and marketing experts was a benefit to advertisers in addition to providing creative
expertise for "Negro market" campaigns. In 1961 Pepsi promoted Harvey Russell to the
position of Vice-President of Special Markets, making him the first vice president of a
major corporation. Schenley became the first distillery to name an African American to
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Progress
A picture, they say, is worth a thousand words. Yet, it took
uncounted word? and deeds and yean to make Ufa picture
possible Wo a; Apex ore proud to publish it, and we'd like you
to sco it aa we do: two attractive American girls enjoying
a quiet monuwit of friendship, An indication of prog-
ress, and. we hope, a prediction of future progress
Mere protti'osis i$ essential, and quickly, be-
cause Americana cannot truly be Americana until we learn to
live comfortably with ourselves. This was to be an advertise-
ment for Apex Natural-Perm, We set out to make the point
that both girls u*r* Natural-Perm. But the inner meaning
of the picture itself guided us along a different, and
belter, path. After all, anyone can sell a good
product. At Apex, we stand for much more.
Al'KX MKAIJTY PRODI"' TS, H00 W.mWrr S( IVilhmmr ». M.mlaiul
Source: Ebony (February 1963)
Figure 5.1 : Apex Beauty Products Advertisement
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arious
an executive position when it made Charles Williams a vice-president in 1963™ But in
the 1960s employment also meant jobs beyond a lew token executives or secretaries, a
fact repeatedly emphasized by industry experts and, as we have seen, by civil rights
organizations around the country.
The largest and most successful selective-buying campaign lor industrial jobs
took place m Philadelphia in the early 1960s, waged by local black ministers and va
civil rights organizations. One of the first targets was Pepsi, whose long-standing activity
in the "Negro market" and employment of I lenry Russell did not protect it from a
massive boycott for working-class jobs.
Throughout (he early 1960s some companies continued to follow the traditional
"Negro market" strategics of creating special campaigns, advertising in black media, and
hiring African American marketing experts. I lowever, attacks on the segregation of the
"Negro market" from the mainstream one, combined with the increased willingness of
African Americans to engage in consumer boycotts in New York City and around the
nation, caused many companies entering the "Negro market" to reevaluate their strategies
and business practices. Some responded by including African Americans in mainstream
ads, others altered ads in black media to reflect social integration or black activism, and
still others changed their employment practices to include more African Americans at all
levels ofcompany operations, few were able to ignore the growing militancy of black
activists and continue to keep the patronage of black consumers. The confluence of these
forces in New York City may be seen in a case study of the brewing industry.
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New York City's Brewing Industry
New York City was the nation's largest beer market, consuming eleven percent of
the nation's beer even though it was only four percent of the nation's population. And
the New York market was dominated buy three local brewers: Liebmann Breweries and F
& M Schaefer Brewing Company, both headquartered in Brooklyn, and P. Ballantine &
Son, located in Newark, New Jersey. These three companies were heavily dependent
upon African American consumers, who in 1960 made up thirty percent of the New York
beer market. The history of New York City's brewing industry and the "Negro market"
illuminates the ways in which black activism, the advertising industry, and the
importance of New York's "Negro market" collided in the early 1960s.
Chapter four described the lengthy and unsuccessful campaign to integrate
employment brewing facilities in the metropolitan region. Liebmann, Schaefer, and
Ballantine were among the targeted breweries, and in the wake of that protest they each
expanded their "Negro market" advertising campaigns in New York. In the late 1950s
Ballantine and Rheingold increased their activities even further. Ballantine, in particular,
aggressively court black New Yorkers and in August 1958 hired Roy Campanella as the
host of a sports radio show called "Campy' s Corner." Campanella, a former catcher for
the Brooklyn Dodgers, had been paralyzed in a boating accident in 1958. He was
tremendously popular among black New Yorkers and his employment by Ballantine
received enormous coverage in the local black press. In January 1960 the radio show was
transferred to television, and in April of that year Ballantine tapped Campanella as its
television announcer for the company's broadcast ofNew York Yankees baseball games,
making him the first African American television announcer in major league baseball
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History. The Amsterdam News ran a mulli-page feature about it, and the story's banner
headline read, "The Roy Campanclla-Ballantine Story A Story ofMan's Faith in
Man."89 James I licks, Amsterdam News editor and author of the article, linked
( ampanclkfs story of triumph and courage to the Ballantine
organization, lie wrote.
There in that small TV booth, a once all-around, but now paralyzed, athlete who
refused to believe that he was through with baseball, will be welcomed back to
the game through the efforts of a nationally known, community minded beer
Company which convinced him that he truly was not through and which was
willing to put its economic power behind his stout heart to help him prove it. The
star ol the drama will be Roy ( ampanella. The producers of the show will be P.
Ballantine and Sons, brewers of Ballantine Beer and Ale.90
Ballantine was also praised lor its history of good works in the black community.
Characterized as a "company which recognizes, and lives up to its obligations in the
communities in which it is doing business - obligations which say that a firm must be as
willing to 'put something in' as it is to Make something out.'"91
Ballantine's "Negro market" campaigns eroded Rhcingold's sales in the black
community and affected its overall position in the New York City market. In December
l%l Liebmann sought to reverse this trend by moving its account from the advertising
agency Foote, Cone & Belding to .1. Walter Thompson Company (JWT). Executives at
JWT focused much of their attention on the brewery's sales among black New Yorkers,
and promptly told Liebmann to discontinue its Miss Rheingold promotion. Although the
inclusion of African Americans in the contest in the early 1950s helped its standing in the
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black community, by 1960 black New Yorkers had become increasingly discontent with
the fact that no black contestants ever advanced beyond the preliminary rounds. As one
beer executive put it, "The Miss Rheingold theme [is] killing them in the Negro
92Market." Liebmann, however, did not follow this recommendation and instead
continued the contest ("Mr. Liebmann is attached to his girls," explained an anonymous
agency official),93 Another JWT recommendation, this one followed by Liebmann, was
to sponsor radio and television broadcasts of the New York Mets. As the account team
explained to Liebmann, "One of Rhcingold's immediate objectives is to strengthen its
position among the Negro and Spanish markets where Ballantine has been a dominate
factor. It [is] hoped that sponsorship of the New York Mets would, among other
objectives, help to strengthen Rhcingold's position among the ethnic groups."94 Under
JWT's direction Rheingold also increased its advertisements in black newspapers, black
radio, and Ebony, and used more point-of-purchase displays in black neighborhoods, all
of which were credited with increasing New York's "Negro market" sales beginning in
July 1962.95
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In the fall of 1962 Liebmann decided to take its "Negro market" advertisements
one step further, and ereated a path-breaking series of ads for use in black media. These
ads showed whites and African Americans in socially integrated settings where they
boated, played golf, and socialized on beaches and at pools. They capitalized on the
themes of youthlulness and fun, such as the ad in figure 5.2. In the foreground of this ad
are a white man and a black woman fishing together, and scattered throughout the
background are additional whites and blacks fishing and talking. When these ads hit the
pages ofEbony they created a stir in both the white and black communities, with some
believing they showed "integration as idealized by its most fervent supporters," while
others feeling that the level of social mixing was unrealistic or, at worst, "frightening-
Some African Americans, in particular, criticized the ads on the grounds that it "shows a
'togetherness
,
that does not exist, that cannot exist because of segregated hotels and other
facilities," and JWT, creators of the ads for Licbmann, acknowledged that the photos
were shot at places in the Caribbean and Bermuda to avoid problems with racial
segregation. Despite these criticisms Liebmann Breweries reported their satisfaction with
the campaign in that it achieved its goal of increasing sales in the black community. 96
As Liebmann and Ballantine continued to compete for dominance in the "Negro
market," Schaefer slipped to a distant third among black consumers. Partly to blame for
Schaefer's position was an employment campaign waged by CORL in the spring of 1964.
Although the 1950s employment campaign had included the entire brewing industry in
New York, the 1964 protests centered on Schaefer, and CORL argued that, "Schaefer had
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Wonderful day!
rtv
Si:
LIVE IT UP! Let yourself go-to the fun places where the fun poople
party and play. That's whore Rheingold Extra Dry goes best, because it's
brewed for an added sparkle and flavor that's extra bright, Rheingold
takes the extra time to brew a taste that's deliriously extra dry-never
bitter, never sweet. It's beer as beer should taste-Dry tells you whyl
Wonderful beer! !
Source: Ebony (August 1963)
Millions tny.
'My be«r 1i Rheingold
the dry beer"
Kheinqoli)
>
- IN n., I,m BM H>'
Figure 5.2: Rheingold Beer Advertisement
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been singled out for the boycott because of its influence within the industry."97 CORE
activists began their campaign against Schaefer by picketing its headquarters and main
bottling plant in Brooklyn, and on March 20 eight CORE members were arrested for
blocking the company's loading area. CORE also called for a boycott of Schaefer beer
and asked stores and bars to stop selling it. CORE demands included one hundred and
fifty union jobs for African Americans in the brewing industry, and they reported that
negotiations with breweries had proven unsuccessful. In April CORE included Schaefer
in its picket lines at the World's Fair, held in New York City. At this demonstration over
two hundred CORE activists, including national director James Farmer, were arrested for
their protests. The New York Times described the scene at the fair:
The demonstrators, part of a force of about 750 CORE members,
. . . blocked six
entrances to the New York City exhibit, climbed atop the bar at the Schaefer Beer
Pavilion, lay in front of automobiles entering the fairgrounds, forced the closing
of the Ford Motor Company exhibit, and scuffled with a detective at the main rail
entrance to the fair About 1 50 went to the pavilion operated by Schaefer
Beer, which has been the target of an economic boycott by CORE chapters. They
have accused the company of employment discrimination. Fifty-five of them
were arrested after they climbed on bars in the building. A second trip to the
exhibit resulted in 62 arrests.98
Throughout the summer of 1964 CORE activists continued their boycott of Schaefer and
picket lines at the company's plant in Brooklyn.
Late that year the City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) intervened in the
situation and negotiated a settlement between the entire brewing industry in New York
(including local breweries and the unions), and the Negro American Labor Council, led
97
Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., "8 Rights Pickets Held in Brooklyn," New York Times, 21 March
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by A. Philip Randolph. So while the New York State government, under the auspiees of
the State Commission Against Discrimination, had been a stumbling block In the 1950s
Campaign lor employment in the brewing industry, in 1964 the eity government was an
acth/e player in helping black New Yorkers reach a settlement with area brewers. The
agreement, inked in February 1965, called for an immediate increase in employment for
African Americans and Puerto Kicans in production jobs and also established a
committee to n.onilo. employment conditions in the industry. Complaints would be filed
through the Negro American Labor ( 'ouncil which was empowered to initiate action and
request third-party arbitration. Rrewery unions would submit all new hires to ( CI [R,
who would monitor the racial and ethnic composition of brewery workers in New York
( !ity. Since Ballantinc was not located in the city it was not subject to these conditions,
but both Schacf'cr and Liebmann signed the agreement."
Eager to keep black consumers in the wake ofthe (OKI' boycotts, the three
breweries continued their "Negro market" campaigns. Schacler, in particular,
approached the problem by publicizing its hiring practices. Company executive Ed Kelly
told the New York Herald Tribune, "We found that Negroes felt we didn't hire them and
didn't advertise to them." "| W|e retained our product approach lor advertising," he
continued, "[as] we didn't feel Negroes should be sold any differently from the German
down the block. What we did was to use more Negroes on delivery routes, to offset our
bad hiring image. We used them especially in gray, or mixed neighborhoods, so a Negro
'''
For information on the 1964 CORE campaign and llic 1965 settlement see Layhmond Robinson,
"Job- Training Bill to Aid Minorities Loses in Albany," New York Tunes, 21 March 1964, I; Thomas, "X
Rights Pickets," 12; Damon Stetson, "Jobs Vote Angers Rights Leaders," New York Times, 22 March l ( "> I
58; Powledge, "CORF Chief," 28; "live Students Fined lor Racial Protest," New York limes, 10 Inn.
1964, 32; Morris Kaplan, "City Brewers' Fact Bars Discrimination," New York Times, I I February 1965, I;
"New Rlow at Job Ilias," New York Times, 17 February 1965, 42; Orth, " The Beer 1 0-1 I, 49.
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store owner eould see that his delivery man stopped at white stores, too." 100 Ballantine
continued its sponsorship of New York Yankees games and also increased its public
relations aetivity in blaek neighborhoods. In the summer of 1965, for example, it
sponsored a Ja/./mobile of loeal musicians that toured I larlem under the cooperation of
the I larlem Cultural Council. The Ja/./.mobile stopped at stores and taverns where
Ballantine beer was sold, allowing the musicians to then put on a free concert. 101
Not to be outdone, Liebmann launehed an aggressive new marketing campaign in
1965 Which included mass media advertisements ofAfrican Americans, Chinese, Italians,
Greeks, Poles, and other ethnic groups. The ads appeared in blaek and mainstream print
media, on subway posters and billboards, and were even made into television
eommereials lor broadeast during New York Mets games. Although these ads appeared
in white consumer spaces they were not integrated; whites, blacks, and ethnic minorities
did not appear together but were highlighted as separate groups. As the New York Times
described, "six one-minute television commercials have been made and shown, in which
different ethnic groups appear. There's a Chinese dinner, and Italian wedding, a Puerto
Rican feast, an Irish farewell party, a Greek gathering and a Negro blues singer. ,,l<)2 This
allowed Rheingold to appeal to a diverse audience while sidestepping the issue of social
integration that was associated with its controversial ads in black media. Mach
advertisement linked Rheingold beer with the community presented in the ad, for
instance the African American featured a black female blues singer and the copy read.
100 Quoted in Orth, "The Beer Battle," 1 1
.
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'In New York's Negro communities, where you'll hear some of the hottest blues
anywhere, people usually cool things off with a Rheingold." Each ad also highlighted the
ethnic and racial diversity of the city: "The fact is that in New York City, where there are
more kinds of people than in any other city in the world, more people drink Rheingold
Extra Dry Beer than any other beer." Although ten different ethnic groups were used in
the campaign, most industry experts agreed that Rheingold was really seeking the African
American and Puerto Rican consumer markets. Liebmann reported no negative reactions
to the campaign, which was the cornerstone of their marketing approach in the mid-
1 960s, and used it to broaden the company market share in New York and throughout the
East coast. By the end of 1965 Rheingold was again the best selling beer in the city. 103
Conclusion
Black New Yorkers effectively incorporated consumer strategies into their direct
action protests of the early 1960s. Supporting Southern civil rights activists and working
for equal employment, the city's activists demanded and won many concessions during
the early 1960s. They were aided in their campaigns by a local government that, through
the City Commission on Human Rights, was more responsive to their goals and proved
willing to assist their work for integration on many fronts. The goals of the black
freedom movement in New York City, however, remained incomplete in 1965, the year
this study concludes. While local retail jobs opened up outside of black neighborhoods -
a significant accomplishment in the early 1960s - union dominated industrial and
construction employment continued to resist the work of black activists. Unemployment
103
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remained high among black New Yorkers and the eity's black neighborhoods would
erupt into violent demonstrations throughout the remainder of the decade.
Peter Bart, a reporter for the New York Times who frequently covered advertising
topics for the paper, wrote in the fall of 1963, "[i]t was long believed that the advertising
industry could successfully follow a policy of non-involvement on the touchy racial
issue. Several recent developments, however, have demonstrated vividly that advertisers
are inextricably involved in the civil rights movement now sweeping the land." 104
Because the advertising industry was headquartered in New York City activists there
were uniquely situated to influence the marketing strategies of advertising agencies and
corporations. Although the campaign to desegregate the advertising industry would
achieve only partial success in the early 1960s, the work of activists during those years
changed the ways in which advertisers understood, and marketed to, black consumers. It
also altered understandings among black New Yorkers about the "Negro market," and the
ways in which it had created a limited and segregated vision of American society.
Peter Bart, "Advertising: the Role of Negroes," 170.
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CONCLUSION
In a May 1966 article in The Crisis, Henry Lee Moon surveyed the previous forty
years of black economic protests. Moon, Director of Public Relations for the National
Association lor the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), argued that when the
"Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" boycotts started in the 1920s, they "provided a new
tool in the Fight lor Freedom, one that was destined to extend far beyond the confines of
the ghetto and beyond the demand for jobs." Since that time African Americans in
communities across the nation had used their spending power to win jobs outside black
neighborhoods, protest bigotry and racial violence, weaken segregation, pursue political
objectives, and gain fairer representations in advertisements. And by the 1960s, Moon
argued, the economic strength of the black community had risen to a level that it was
taken seriously by even the largest corporations. "[T]he Negro market," he wrote, "with
a presently estimated purchasing power of better than $20 billion annually, has become a
matter of grave concern to all major producers of and dealers in consumer goods. No
longer is such a threat brushed lightly aside. The changed attitude eloquently bespeaks
the Negro's changing status as a consumer and a citizen." 1 Moon paints a glowing
picture of African Americans' use of economic boycotts, and he rightfully demonstrates
the importance of this weapon in the long struggle for racial equality. Mis assessment,
however, obscures a more complex history regarding the role of consumption in the lives
and protests of African Americans.
1
Henry Lee Moon, "The Black Boycott," The Crisis (May 1966), 249-255, 278.
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Looking at consumer culture and black activism in New York City helps shed
light on the ways in which consumption aided the black freedom movement, and also the
limitations of using spending power as a protest strategy. One area in which black New
Yorkers achieved considerable success was in gaining local employment. From 1930 to
1960 most of this success came in the form ofjobs in black neighborhoods, since the
independent retailers and chain stores in those areas depended on black consumers. The
largest of these campaigns, "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work," was waged in Harlem
in the 1930s and drew inspiration from similar campaigns in other urban centers. Smaller
protests were conducted throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and as the black population
grew in other city boroughs, similar campaigns broke out in those areas. In the 1960s
black New Yorkers extended the "Don't Buy" impulse beyond black neighborhoods, and
won employment in department stores, chain retailers, and other businesses throughout
the city - businesses which, as whites moved to the suburbs, relied increasingly on black
consumers. These latter campaigns had much in common with the Depression-era ones,
and the success of both rested on the willingness of black New Yorkers to engage in
direct action protests and on the importance of black consumers to the targeted stores.
Ironically, segregation into racially-defined neighborhoods in the 1930s and exclusion
from the suburbs in the 1960s gave African Americans leverage in their employment
campaigns.
These jobs, however, were primarily in service industries, and black New Yorkers
had less success gaining industrial employment. As we saw in the early 1950s
campaign
against the brewing industry, the postwar era was an especially difficult
time to press for
integrated industrial employment. Unions, employers, and the
city government all
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resisted a major transformation of the workplaee and boycotts and picket lines were not
enough to dissnade them. By the mid-1960s the political and economic landscape in the
eity had changed to the point where African Americans were able to finally integrate
local breweries. I lowever, other industries continued to resist employment integration,
and the poor job prospects lor black workers were exacerbated by the flight of industries
out of New York City in the 1960s. The jobs left behind were mostly in low-paying
service work.
Another more successful way in which black New Yorkers used consumer power
was to challenge white supremacy, particularly legal segregation in the South and de
facto segregation in the North. These campaigns focused on northern racism in the 1940s
and 1950s, as black activists picketed restaurants, amusement parks, and other public
commercial establishments to gain entrance for black consumers. In the 1960s they used
this power to support southern lunch counter sit-ins, establishing an important connection
between the civil rights movements in the two regions.
Consumption wasn't just a tool in the black freedom movement. It was also an
important issue in the lives of black New Yorkers. African Americans understood
consumer rights in terms of racial equality, and when they paid high prices, received
shoddy merchandise, or were insulted by discourteous merchants, they fought back
against a predominantly white-owned retail community. Sometimes those frustrations
spilled over into violence, and in 1935, 1943, and 1964 black New Yorkers' anger over
racial injustices - including consumer treatment - became riots directed at white-owned
businesses in black neighborhoods. These outbursts were rare, however, and non-violent
and organized protests were more common. Many of these protests used direct action
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consumer tactics such as picket lines and economic boycotts. Black New Yorkers also
used other methods to gain consumer rights, including negotiation with local merchants
and pushing for government regulation and protection. During World War II the federal
government took unprecedented measures to ensure fair prices for all consumers - black
and white
- through prices controls and the Office of Price Administration. Despite the
protests of white and black consumer activists, this governmental agency would not
survive into the postwar era. Black New Yorkers, however, continued to demand help
from the government in their quest for consumer equality. In the early 1950s they
successfully won their long-standing fight for a public market in Harlem where the city
government would monitor prices, quality, and sanitary conditions. Although black New
Yorkers achieved many victories for fair consumer treatment, their ongoing protests
against white-owned businesses demonstrates the continuing salience of consumption as
an important issue for black New Yorkers and also the fleeting nature of any settlements
reached with local merchants. In 1968 another riot would erupt in Harlem, and
exploitative merchants would again share some of the blame for local frustrations.
Throughout their protests, black New Yorkers used consumer power in ways that
reflected differences within the community over ideologies and goals, and a group's
utilization of consumer power depended upon their particular vision of racial equality.
Black nationalists considered consumption a method through which a separate black
economy could be established, and urged black New Yorkers to support black merchants.
Nationalists differed among themselves about the extent to which African Americans
should be compelled to shop only at black-owned stores and the best methods for
encouraging them to do so, but their goal of economic self-sufficiency reflects their larger
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separatist objectives. Blaek leftists did not desire the creation of a separate economy but
wanted, instead, to transform the American economic system into one that was fairer and
more responsive to workers. They fought for greater employment opportunities,
especially for black workers. Liberal civil rights groups also wanted to create a more
racially inclusive society, and used consumer power to increase employment, integrate
public commercial spaces, and to protest demeaning cultural stereotypes. Even though
these groups sometimes opposed one another they also worked together on a number of
campaigns, and these coalitions formed, fell apart, and reformed throughout the decades
covered in this study. Many individuals not formally affiliated with any organization also
joined in black rights protests, sometimes through the simple act of shopping where they
believed their dollars would most help the black community.
These decades of protests, for consumer and other goals, affected the ways in
which corporate America understood and approached black consumers. From the
emergence of the "Negro market" in the 1930s advertisers were confronted with an
activist black community that was unafraid to use their consumer power against national
corporations. The work of black New Yorkers helped to shape the history of the "Negro
market," and as manufacturers and advertising agencies became more attuned to the
desires of African Americans their use of insulting product names and demeaning
stereotypes declined in mainstream media campaigns. Although extremely segregated,
the postwar "Negro market" did present positive images of African Americans in black
media and in those spaces African Americans were shown as typical American
consumers. Protests in the early 1960s even integrated a small number of ads in
mainstream media, changing the exclusively segregated approach of advertisers.
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Despite ils limitations the "Negro market" was useful to African Amerieans m a
number ol ways. Some black New Yorkers directly benefited from its existence. Black
newspapers and radio, lor example, gained importanl advertising revenue from "Negro
market" eampaigns, and black advertising executives and salespeople found employment
at major manufacturers. Although attempts to break into advertising agencies remained
extremely limited even into the late 1960s, a lew black New Yorkers opened their own
advertising agencies to serve the needs of corporate clients. Additionally, in the postwar
era and the l%()s black New Yorkers incorporated the importance of the "Negro market"
into their local struggles for employment, consumer rights, and integration connecting
corporate attention to local issues.
After 1965 black New Yorkers would intensify their pressure on the advertising
community and even more directly demand that advertising agencies in the city give
something back to black communities. In 1966 the Congress of Racial Equality and the
Consumer Information Services would launch a direct action campaign to secure jobs for
African Americans in the advertising industry by picketing the Benton and Bowles
advertising agency. These pickets compelled the agency to establish a training program
which offered classes and job placement for African Americans interested in advertising
careers. The City Commission on Human Rights also stepped up its work lor black
employment, and in 1967 launched a full-scale investigation into employment
discrimination in the advertising industry. It conducted surveys and held public hearings
on industry employment issues, and worked more directly with agencies and the black
2X3
community to increase employment for African Americans in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
2
This dissertation opened with James Farmer's call to African Americans to wield
their "consumer sword" in the struggle for racial equality. Black New Yorkers shared his
belief in the power of consumption, and recognized that it could be used for a variety of
purposes in their black freedom movement. They achieved some notable successes in
their struggle for racial equality, but despite their many protests, boycotts, and picket
lines, Farmer's vision of a "raceless system of production, distribution, and
consumption," would remain incomplete. 3 Perhaps the greatest transformation took place
within the "Negro market" itself. Having endured as a segregated market for three
decades, in the early 1960s black New Yorkers came to realize how this separate market
had created a distorted image of American society. Though they would continue to use
the "Negro market" in their wider black freedom movement, they would also increasingly
challenge the assumptions and practices that had defined that market since its inception.
2
For more information on these activities aimed at desegregating the advertising industry see
Jason Chambers, "Getting a Job and Changing an Image: African-Americans in the Advertising Industry.
1920-1975," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2001), 191-6.
3 James Farmer, "Unsheathing the Consumer Sword," The Crisis December 1946, 362-364.
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